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by Chester Perry
Sat Feb 17, 2024 1:47 am
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

RammyClaret61 wrote:
Sat Feb 17, 2024 1:00 am
I found it funny this week when the Ratcliffe/Man U deal was given the go ahead. Everton fans were first on the scene wanting to know how that was done so quickly, when theirs is still ongoing. Stating more evidence of a corrupt FA and just against Everton.
Also with their points deduction. Why so quick when nothing for Man City? No grasp of the fact Everton pleaded guilty. Or that city’s is so complicated, and they’re not assisting with the inquiry. It’s just all a plot against Everton.
I find it quite telling that Manchester City have fought all their cases on points of technicality, never on the charges themselves - remember they accepted their punishment from UEFA in 2014 (along with PSG) but never admitted guilt but were comfortable enough with a massive fine and no exclusion from the Champions League - not that they even paid all the fine

Manchester City accept £49m fine and transfer cap from Uefa over FFP
Fine is conditional on maximum losses until 2015
Club's transfers limited to £49m net in next window

https://www.theguardian.com/football/20 ... p-uefa-ffp

What we don't know is how many times that Manchester City have been in court challenging various technical aspects of the Premier Leagues charges, jurisdiction, rights of access relevant materials from Manchester City, even the validity of evidence from Football Leaks (as it was obtained illegally, not that the content was legitimate) - though there have been at least two in the High Court that City have lost, I am reasonably confident that there have been a number of others.

Everton's appeal, like all appeals is based on the technicalities surrounding their hearing, I hope they fail, the Premier Leagues processes for these hearings needs a rigorous shakedown and robust challenge before the Manchester City case is heard. Any weakness in it, needs to be snuffed out in advance. That said, I expect that Everton's points penalty will be reduced.
by Chester Perry
Wed Nov 22, 2023 4:59 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Tue Sep 12, 2023 8:06 pm
Probably not the end of the Football Leaks story but for Rui Pinto this appears to be positive news

Rui Pinto: Football Leaks founder handed four-year suspended sentence by Portugal court
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/66786085
Having completed his main trial in Portugal, Rui Pinto's tour of various European legal systems has gotten underway - it seems the French courts also think he has been through enough

Portuguese hacker in Football Leaks scandal handed 6-month suspended sentence by French court
https://apnews.com/article/soccer-footb ... d4c84f7804
by Chester Perry
Sun Oct 29, 2023 11:36 am
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Sun Oct 29, 2023 10:39 am
Almost 5 years now since the Football Leaks revelations about Manchester City and it's alleged financial shenanigans as this opinion piece in the Telegraph about the Premier Leagues need to show it can manage it's cases with both Manchester City and Everton

Manchester City and Everton's charges a test of Premier League's ability to control chaos
The ripple effect of whatever decision the Premier League makes on City and Everton could have far-reaching consequences

https://archive.ph/1h75v
A somewhat contrary take in the Times from Martin Samuel - who has a developed his own brand in such thinking - there are a couple of extremely valid considerations including the opening one plus a confirmation of a recent suggestion that 777 partners football enterprise is about creating a pre-packaged multi-club football enterprise to flip for a profit

Super League rebels got off lightly — why are Everton being crushed?
https://archive.ph/WEKid
by Chester Perry
Sun Oct 29, 2023 10:39 am
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Tue Nov 06, 2018 11:18 am
no surprise that there are fresh calls to look into Man City's finances after the detailed and very damaging revelations in Der Speigel

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/football/20 ... legations/" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Interesting that city claim that the documents are "hacked" "stolen" or "out of context" but never say they are fabrications or untrue

for those who have not read the articles in Der Spiegel links can be found here

http://www.uptheclarets.com/messageboar ... =2&t=34009" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
Almost 5 years now since the Football Leaks revelations about Manchester City and it's alleged financial shenanigans as this opinion piece in the Telegraph about the Premier Leagues need to show it can manage it's cases with both Manchester City and Everton

Manchester City and Everton's charges a test of Premier League's ability to control chaos
The ripple effect of whatever decision the Premier League makes on City and Everton could have far-reaching consequences

https://archive.ph/1h75v
by Chester Perry
Thu Oct 05, 2023 7:30 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Tue Sep 12, 2023 8:06 pm
Probably not the end of the Football Leaks story but for Rui Pinto this appears to be positive news

Rui Pinto: Football Leaks founder handed four-year suspended sentence by Portugal court
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/66786085
It seems that there is still an air of threat hanging of Rui Pinto, with many outstanding charges still to be heard along with the possibility of appeal - though how he managed his current suspended sentence is a complex tale of indirect intervention and circumstance

Here Josimar provide the detail

Saved by the Pope
The man behind Football Leaks was tried for 89 computer intrusion offences and one extortion attempt. The court found him guilty of almost all of them. But an amnesty for young offenders approved due to Pope Francis’s recent visit to Portugal cleared him of 79 of those charges.

https://archive.ph/Vsvuj
by Chester Perry
Tue Sep 12, 2023 8:06 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Probably not the end of the Football Leaks story but for Rui Pinto this appears to be positive news

Rui Pinto: Football Leaks founder handed four-year suspended sentence by Portugal court
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/66786085
by Chester Perry
Mon Feb 06, 2023 12:10 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Sat Jan 07, 2023 9:48 pm
Martyn Zeigler in the Times reminds us that the Premier Leagues investigation into Manchester City (courtesy of 'Football Leaks') is now into it's 5th year without much in the way of a public statement throughout it's course. Fortunately, unlike UEFA, there is no time limit on such investigations, however many lawyers City employ to delay proceedings

Protracted Manchester City investigation is ‘damaging English game’
https://archive.is/O9J9W
So this has exploded today as the Premier League has (finally) formerly charged Manchester City on over 100 counts between 2009 and 2018, these charges are entirely dominated by 'withholding information' issues

Premier League Statement
https://archive.is/WJkO6

and naturally it has provoked a lot of reporting and historical references from those who have been pursuing these issues for many years

Tariq Panja for one has referenced Pep Guardiola and his bullish attack after UEFA's defeat by City at CAS on a technicality

https://twitter.com/tariqpanja/status/1 ... 8576463872
Image

we have reports from the Telegraph

Man City charged by Premier League with breaches of FFP rules
Premier League champions have also been charged with failing to co-operate with four-year investigation

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/football/20 ... ffp-rules/

and the Times

Manchester City charged by Premier League with breaking financial rules
Four-year investigation finds more than 100 alleged breaches

https://archive.is/wf3eA

and though this investigation and the Football Leaks data it emerged from have been a feature of this thread for years there has now been a separate thread initiated after todays news

http://www.uptheclarets.com/messageboar ... =2&t=67332
by Chester Perry
Mon Jan 23, 2023 11:20 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Sat Jan 07, 2023 9:48 pm
Martyn Zeigler in the Times reminds us that the Premier Leagues investigation into Manchester City (courtesy of 'Football Leaks') is now into it's 5th year without much in the way of a public statement throughout it's course. Fortunately, unlike UEFA, there is no time limit on such investigations, however many lawyers City employ to delay proceedings

Protracted Manchester City investigation is ‘damaging English game’
https://archive.is/O9J9W
Mike Keegan in the Daily Mail suggesting that the on-going investigation into Manchester City could just fade - Not sure I agree with his reasoning, but city have proven adept with the application of lawyers to stall the process at virtually every step of the way

City probe now a cold case
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/footb ... GENDA.html
The Premier League's investigation into Manchester City is in danger of dragging on for so long that the key agitators will no longer be involved in football when it reaches its conclusion.

It has long been known that Manchester United and Liverpool were among the voices calling for action against the champions and were thought to be key to a 2020 bid, revealed by Sportsmail, to get City banned from the Champions League.

However, both are up for sale and, with speculation about further investment from sovereign wealth funds rife, it remains to be seen whether new owners will have the same thirst for blue blood.
by Chester Perry
Sat Jan 07, 2023 9:48 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Martyn Zeigler in the Times reminds us that the Premier Leagues investigation into Manchester City (courtesy of 'Football Leaks') is now into it's 5th year without much in the way of a public statement throughout it's course. Fortunately, unlike UEFA, there is no time limit on such investigations, however many lawyers City employ to delay proceedings

Protracted Manchester City investigation is ‘damaging English game’
https://archive.is/O9J9W
by Chester Perry
Sun Oct 09, 2022 1:42 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

It has been a long time since we have heard anything about Football Leaks - here the Guardian reports that there is to be a documentary on the saga released at the end of the month - there are some refreshers contained in the article for those who have forgot about just how huge the outflow of information was

Lines between hero and villain are blurred in new Football Leaks film
https://www.theguardian.com/football/20 ... leaks-film
by Chester Perry
Thu Apr 07, 2022 1:57 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

It has been a long time it seems since we had something new from Football Leaks - This piece in Der Spiegel brings into question evidence supplied by Manchester City to CAS https://twitter.com/tariqpanja/status/1 ... 8475292673 - remember their is still a Premier League investigation into City along similar lines to that UEFA one - only been going around 3 years now

https://www.spiegel.de/international/eu ... c081cd91a4

Manchester City's Cozy Ties to Abu Dhabi
Sponsorship Money – Paid for by the State
Since the sanctions imposed on Chelsea owner Roman Abramovich, links between English football clubs and authoritarian states have been in the spotlight. Internal documents show that Manchester City has received funding from a government agency in Abu Dhabi.

By Rafael Buschmann, Nicola Naber und Christoph Winterbach
07.04.2022, 14.01 Uhr

The Manchester City defensive wall is 7.4 meters (24 feet) high, 109 years old and cost around 244 million euros. It consists of defenders Rúben Dias, John Stones, João Cancelo and Kyle Walker, and it is one of the reasons why the team is currently on track to win its fourth English Championship in five years and is in the Champions League quarter finals.

No other football club in the world spends as much money on players as Manchester City. The CIES Football Observatory added up the transfer fees paid by the "Cityzens" over the last 10 years and arrived at a total of 1.7 billion euros. The team’s financial resources seem unlimited. After all, it is owned by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a member of the Abu Dhabi ruling family.

After the team from eastern Manchester spent decades wallowing in mediocrity, ManCity quickly became one of the most successful clubs in the world after Mansour took over control in 2008. In the Premier League, it looks as though the team can only be caught by FC Liverpool, with the two teams, coached by Pep Guardiola and Jürgen Klopp, set to meet on Sunday. And Manchester once again looks set to advance to the semifinals of the Champions League – one year after losing in the final to Premier League rival FC Chelsea.

But the proximity of the English club to the authoritarian nation of United Arab Emirates is a political issue. And recently, particularly since the political climate surrounding Chelsea owner Roman Abramovich changed for the worse following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the spotlight on state influence in professional soccer has shown more brightly.

Facing regular backlash, ManCity also invests significant amounts of money in defense off the field. Club leadership employs some of the best-known and most expensive lawyers in Britain in the attempt to ward off accusations made against the team’s business practices and to slow down investigations into rules violations.

And there is apparently no lack of such violations. New findings from DER SPIEGEL and the journalism network European Investigative Collaborations (EIC) show that the holding company behind Manchester City appears to have violated the rules by paying millions in fees to player agents and also orchestrated a secret, triangular deal to sign an underage player. Numerous documents provided by the whistleblower platform Football Leaks provide a deep look at the club’s inner workings and at government agencies in Abu Dhabi – sufficient to inflict a few chinks in ManCity’s juridical defensive wall.

Club owner Mansour has only attended a single Manchester City match – back in August 2010. Foto: ANDREW YATES/ AFP
Like the Qataris’ investment in Paris Saint-Germain and the Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund’s purchase of Newcastle United, the billions of euros spent on ManCity by UAE is primarily, it would seem, an attempt to use success on the football pitch to improve the country’s image. The UAE, after all, allows no political dissent at home, disregards human rights and is under suspicion of having committed war crimes in the ongoing violence in Yemen – which the UAE denies. The team owners are apparently willing to pay any price necessary to appear in the best possible light on the stage of elite football. And it looks suspiciously as though one of the richest nations in the world is financing the team’s operations, using hidden payments to circumvent spending rules.

In 2020, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) banned the team from the Champions League for two years due to revelations published by DER SPIEGEL. Manchester City, represented by almost a dozen top lawyers, appealed the ruling at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). UEFA lost the case, despite the existence of clear evidence for the questionable business practices employed by Manchester City.

Money from the Government
The company Abu Dhabi United Group Investment & Development (ADUG) belongs to Sheikh Mansour and was the official owner of Manchester City from 2008 until last year, when the team was transferred to a different company owned by Mansour. Officials in UAE have consistently insisted that ADUG is a purely private company and Mansour’s involvement with the English team is a completely private investment. In testimony before CAS, a legal representative of the Finance Ministry in Abu Dhabi said that ADUG "is completely unconnected" to the government of UAE or the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.

Research in the Football Leaks documents has revealed, however, that payments from ADUG to the club were cleared by a state office. According to internal documents, the Executive Affairs Authority (EAA), an Abu Dhabi government agency focused on providing strategic guidance, obviously manages the accounts belonging to ADUG. Agency chief Khaldoon Al Mubarak, the de facto prime minister of Abu Dhabi, is head of the state investment fund and is also chairman of Manchester City. He apparently approved money flows that were controlled by the government before ending up in the accounts of the football team. Payment requests for agent fees were sent to the EAA’s general counsel, with ManCity sending an invoice for the sponsorship company Etisalat to Omar Awad, the finance director of the government agency. "Omar works for the EAA and is very important and helpful in facilitating our financial administration of City," wrote Simon Pearce, a club board member, to a colleague in January 2014.

Were such a situation to play out in Germany, it might look like this: The state-owned railway company Deutsche Bahn would be FC Bayern Munich's main sponsor, but the club would send invoices for sponsorship money to a senior official in the Chancellery before then writing emails praising the financial services provided to the club by the government official. A rather absurd idea.

At Manchester City, the dividing lines between an authoritarian government and a private football club have become almost indistinguishable. Neither Manchester City nor the EAA officials responded to a DER SPIEGEL request for comment. The new revelations could create significant problems for the Premier League leaders. Already, the English football league has spent years investigating Manchester City, largely out of the public eye. According to information obtained by DER SPIEGEL, that investigation is focusing on three primary allegations.
  • Underage players were allegedly pressured to sign contracts with Manchester City through monetary payments, in violation of the rules.
  • Club sponsors in Abu Dhabi are suspected of having provided only a portion of their payments to the club themselves, with the majority apparently coming from Sheikh Mansour himself.
  • Roberto Mancini, who is currently the trainer for the Italian national team but who spent the years from 2009 to 2013 as the trainer for ManCity, is thought to have received a significant portion of his compensation secretly by way of a fictitious consultancy contract.
The Premier League declined to answer questions about its investigation. Past requests for comment sent by DER SPIEGEL to Manchester City have consistently been responded to with a statement that does not address specific issues, and which claims that material and quotes from the Football Leaks trove has been taken out of context. In response to this blanket claim, DER SPIEGEL has chosen to provide comprehensive and contextual information for each of the allegations.

Evidence of Manchester City's close ties with the Abu Dhabi government can be found in this file: https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/8 ... b/ADUG.pdf

1. Dealing with Underage Players
There are special rules in place for the protection of underage football talents. Clubs are forbidden, for example, from transferring players under the age of 16 across international borders. And they are not allowed to provide monetary payments to underage players, their parents or their agents.

Numerous clubs have spent years routinely ignoring these provisions. Indeed, FIFA even temporarily banned FC Chelsea and Real Madrid from the transfer market due to such transgressions. Manchester City has had to pay both the English Football Association and FIFA at least 300,000 pounds for violations of the youth protection rules.

DER SPIEGEL has in the past reported on hidden payments apparently made by Manchester City to the agent of Jadon Sancho, who was 14 years old at the time. In a case that has thus far flown under the radar, the club transferred 14-year-old Brahim Díaz from Málaga CF to Manchester in late 2013 and apparently trained him in their academy for two years before being officially allowed to register him.

When a player is transferred, training compensation is normally due for the original home club. However, Manchester City brought Brahim to England at a time when no official transfer was possible. Accordingly, it would likely have been difficult for the club to explain why they transferred money to the club in Málaga.

In club leadership emails, it becomes clear that ADUG was prepared to take care of the training compensation relating to Brahim’s transfer, but apparently wanted to conceal its involvement. According to the documents, the Sheikh’s company agreed to pay a 360,000-euro bill owed to Brahim’s youth club through an intermediary agency. The documentation indicates that ADUG paid the money to a company in Barcelona, which then forwarded the money onward to the Spanish club. Apparently Manchester City, like many other top clubs, used creative tricks to circumvent the rules protecting minors.

The internal documents also show that Brahim’s case wasn’t the only instance in which ADUG jumped in to cover the bills. Between 2010 and 2015, the Sheikh’s company apparently paid at least 4 million euros and 4 million pounds to a company belonging to the agent of club legend Yaya Touré. According to the emails, the payments were apparently cleared by ManCity CEO Ferran Soriano and team chairman Khaldoon Al Mubarak. The board member Simon Pearce apparently guided the payments from the Abu Dhabi government agency.

None of the clubs, companies and managers involved in these deals have provided comment on the allegations.

A dossier with evidence on this topic can be found here:
Jadon Sancho - https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/f ... Youth1.pdf
Brahim - https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/f ... Youth2.pdf

2. Sponsorship Money Provided by the Club Owner
Pearce played a leading role when it comes to a main accusation leveled against Manchester City by UEFA and the Premier League – the secretive financing of sponsorship payments by club owner Sheikh Mansour. As a member of the board, he controlled club business while also acting as a special adviser to agency head Mubarak. Pearce managed communications with numerous club sponsors headquartered in UAE and was also the contact person for members of the ManCity finance department when it came to contractual details and payments from Abu Dhabi.

In 2018, DER SPIEGEL published a series of articles about back-dated contracts, sudden cash injections and "alternative sources" pertaining to the sponsorship payments. Those articles described how Sheikh Mansour was apparently circumventing rules by disguising direct funding to the club as sponsorship payments. The money in question was apparently sent to the companies based in Abu Dhabi, which would then wire the money onwards to the club. The system supposedly allowed the club to claim a low volume of direct investment by the owner and a higher total of marketing revenues – in direct violation of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play rules. Those rules were designed to prevent clubs from spending more than they earn and thus sliding into financial difficulties or distorting competition on the pitch. It has since become clear that the rules have failed, and they are now to be replaced by a new set of regulations.

As a consequence of that series of articles, UEFA banned the club from the Champions League for two years. But the club managed to successfully appeal the ban before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which ruled that some of the accusations fall under the statute of limitations and that UEFA was unable to provide any evidence beyond that published by DER SPIEGEL. Furthermore, Manchester City had supplied witnesses who vehemently denied the UEFA accusations. CAS noted in its verdict that it saw no reason to believe these witnesses were lying.

One of those witnesses was Simon Pearce. The court asked him if he had "ever arranged any payments to be made to Etihad in relation to its sponsorship obligations of Manchester City Football Club?" His answer: "Absolutely, categorically not."

An email that Pearce wrote in December 2013 to the COO of Etihad at the time, Peter Baumgartner, stands in direct contradiction to that claim. In the mail, Pearce told the Swiss executive the precise sum that Etihad was to provide, how much he – Pearce – had wired to Etihad for that purpose and what he still owed the airline. DER SPIEGEL has already reported on this telltale email. Manchester City labelled the DER SPIEGEL story "a cynical attempt to publicly re-litigate and undermine a case that has been fully adjudicated." The club has not responded to a renewed request for comment from DER SPIEGEL. Etihad stated that "all financial obligations" related to the Man City sponsorship were the "sole liability and responsibility of Etihad Airways."

Nevertheless, it is instructive to take a closer look. A comprehensive file with documents from the Football Leaks database provides evidence of a system that was apparently used for several years:
  • In 2012, a portion of the sponsorship money coming from Abu Dhabi was booked internally as "owner investment" – a sum of 150 million pounds.
  • In 2013, Pearce asked CFO Jorge Chumillas to provide an overview of ADUG payment obligations and asked that they be divided up according to "club direct payments" and "partner supplements." The documents clearly illuminate the importance of the additional supplements. In an email to Chumillas, Pearce made it clear that Etihad only had to pay 8 million pounds of the total sponsoring sum of 67.5 million pounds. According to the mail, the remaining 59.5 million pounds was extra – presumably paid by Sheikh Mansour.
  • For the 2013-2014 season alone, the supplements from Abu Dhabi added up to 92.5 million pounds. The information pertaining to these supplements was not meant to be shared with outsiders: "We mustn’t show the partner supplement if it is going outside the club," warned Andrew Widdowson, who was head of finance at the time, in early 2013.
  • In 2014, Chumillas and Widdowson discussed money that was still to be paid by Abu Dhabi-based sponsors Aabar and Etisalat. Here, too, they differentiate between the amount being paid by ADUG and the sums for which the companies themselves were responsible. Chumillas wrote: "But actually, formally, we want all of these amounts to be paid by Aabar and Etisalat right?" The answer came: "Yes if they can."
  • In September 2015 as well, club representatives differentiated between a payment of 60.25 million pounds and the 8 million that Etihad "should be funding directly." Chumillas and Pearce again exchanged emails about the share of sponsorship money that was to come "direct" from the company. The rest was apparently to come out of the budget of shareholder ADUG – Sheikh Mansour.
  • In March 2016, the 8-million-pound payment relating to Etihad’s sponsorship made yet another appearance.
Neither Manchester City nor Aabar and Etisalat responded to a request for comment.

You can download these and many other examples from the Football Leaks database here:

Dossier: Manchester City and the Financial Fair Play Rules
https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/b ... 30/FFP.pdf

Whereas the last two years of pandemic-related financial difficulties created significant problems for professional soccer teams across England and Europe, Manchester City actually managed to increase its marketing revenues in the first corona season. At the beginning of the year, Manchester City was also able to add three new sponsors to its portfolio, all of which are headquartered in UAE. The Premier League has now decided to take a closer look at such deals.

3. The Apparently Fake Contract Between Roberto Mancini and Al Jazira FC
When it comes to financial trickery, Manchester City seems to have exhibited a surpassing amount of creativity. In 2009, club leadership turned to the Abu Dhabi-based football club Al Jazira – which is still today backed by Sheikh Mansour – to help conceal hidden salary payments to ManCity manager Roberto Mancini. And the payments were processed by a familiar cast of characters: Simon Pearce and the Manchester City financial department.

The Italian coach was signed by Manchester City on Dec. 19, 2009. According to a preliminary agreement hammered out by the two sides, Mancini was to be paid a base salary of 1.45 million pounds per season, with another 4 million pounds in performance-based bonuses on top of that. On that same day, Mancini signed an apparent consultancy contract – part of which contained identical language to the main contract – with Al Jazira. That deal promised him an annual salary of 1.75 million pounds for his services: "The Fees will be paid to an account nominated by your company and will be paid without deduction of any taxation."

The company initially named by Mancini to receive those fees was an entity called Sparkleglow Holdings, based in the tax paradise of Mauritius. One year later, he switched to a company registered in Rome called Italy International Services (IIS), which began issuing quarterly invoices. But those invoices were only seemingly paid by Al Jazira: IIS would send its invoices to Manchester City, the club would wire the money to ADUG which would then send it onward to Al Jazira before it was eventually paid to IIS. The system was described by a ManCity employee in July 2012, with Simon Pearce confirming the procedure from the emirate's perspective.

Those involved declined to provide comment when approached by DER SPIEGEL.

The contract and the emails can be read here:
Dossier: Roberto Mancini and Al Jazira
https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/5 ... 38b/RM.pdf

DER SPIEGEL was the first to report on the case, and it caused quite a commotion in England. Much to his consternation, Pep Guardiola was even confronted at a press conference and asked if he had a similar arrangement with the team. He did not answer the substance of the question.

The Premier League has been investigating Manchester City since December 2018. The league maintains financial rules similar to those of UEFA. But the club has been doing all it can to fight the investigation – and the club has apparently been just as hostile to investigators as it has been to UEFA. CAS fined ManCity 10 million euros for impeding the UEFA investigation and refusing to cooperate with the body’s Investigatory Chamber.

A case focused solely on the question as to whether the Premier League investigation may be reported on was pursued all the way to the second-most senior judge in the UK judiciary. He ruled that reporting on the case was very much in the public interest. "It is surprising, and a matter of legitimate public concern, that so little progress has been made after two and a half years – during which, it may be noted, the Club has twice been crowned as Premier League champions," the court ruled.

The outcome of the Premier League investigation and the possible consequences for Manchester City remain to be seen.
by Chester Perry
Tue Aug 17, 2021 2:01 am
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Lionel Messi's departure from Barcelona is regarded as a tragedy by the club's fans - the real tragedy was how they managed him while he was there. this is an important lesson for sport (and fans) - from the Financial Times

The Lionel Messi saga is a lesson in how not to handle a prize asset
MICHAEL MORITZ AUGUST 16, 2021

The writer is a partner at Sequoia Capital

Some people who go to work at the Nou Camp, home of five-times Champions League winners FC Barcelona, must have forgotten the adage that graveyards are full of indispensable people. That became clear last week as the sorry saga of Lionel Messi’s departure from the club and free transfer to Paris Saint-Germain played out in full public view. Instead, the management of Barcelona provided the fodder for a Harvard Business School case about how not to manage an investment portfolio or an organisation.

The vitals: Messi, one of the greatest footballers the world has ever seen; loyal club servant since the age of 13; highest goal scorer in the history of La Liga; six-time Ballon d’Or winner. As much a part of Barcelona as Antonio Gaudi’s Basilica or its Gothic Quarter.

What’s an investment manager to do with an asset (for yes, footballers, like it or not, are assets) whose rate of growth is slowing, and whose value is sure to decline?

Investment managers worth their salt have an answer. They are not anchored to the past, or to the refuge which, in the argot of the trade, “names” provide, or to the idea of squeezing out another quarter or year of performance from a stock whose glory years are over. Instead they redeploy the money and purchase different stocks lodged on the right side of progress.

Barcelona’s management chose to do the opposite. They continued to devote much of their payroll to Messi (so triggering a series of pay demands — to which they acceded — from his teammates). It is hard to exaggerate the damage that this, and a series of terrible player purchases, has done to the club, which is now drowned in debt.

Some people may blame Messi, or the intransigence of his father, who acts as his agent. But it is hard to fault either. Both were responding to market conditions when they made their requests. Rather, the culprits are those who gave in to the demands. Remember, no investor is ever required to buy an asset.

Barcelona committed investment hara-kiri. Instead of selling Messi during the past few years, they continued to pay him more until they were left with no choice but to shovel the 34-year-old off their books. By contrast, Manchester United sold the then 28-year-old David Beckham to Real Madrid in 2003 for $34m — probably more than $100m in today’s market. If leaks of Messi’s contract are to be believed, Barcelona paid Messi €555m between 2017 and 2021.

The other aspect of the Messi debacle that seems so foreign to anyone from Silicon Valley is that he — and all other footballers — are paid in cash (albeit with bonuses tied to certain accomplishments). No vibrant organisation in my little world compensates valued performers in such a ham-fisted manner. Instead, they grant equity whose ultimate value is tied to the overall health of the business.

Pedants will argue this isn’t possible in the world of football. They will say that players come and go, or may just have their moments in the sun. Yet the same happens in Silicon Valley, where highly valued employees might work at one company for three or four years before moving to another.

I suspect the real answers are different. This approach flies in the face of accepted practice: it requires football club owners to act less like 19th-century textile mill owners; it means that agents would need to abandon self-dealing; and, above all, it would mean that players come to grips with the uncertainty associated with the value of long-term equity compensation.

Imagine if every football club set aside about 25 per cent of its equity for player compensation, requiring that players sell their shares upon leaving the club. If Barcelona had compensated Messi with a combination of 50 per cent cash and 50 per cent equity, both he and the club would be far better off today. Two years before Messi joined the club it had revenues of $123m which, during the pre-pandemic season, had risen to more than $1bn.

When Messi made his debut for Barcelona in 2004, the club was probably worth about $400m (precise figures are unavailable). Today it is worth about $4.8bn. If, as his value became clear, Messi had been granted shares or options, for about 10 per cent of the club, that would be worth about $500m today.

I know this sort of approach will be laughed out of town in the boardrooms of the world’s most valuable clubs. But I know too that, had it been adopted by the management of Barcelona, today they would not need to beg for money to pay for the maintenance of the graveyard they created.
by Chester Perry
Tue Aug 10, 2021 6:16 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Mon Aug 09, 2021 6:46 pm
As predicted the Al Jezeera Investigation Unit piece heavily trailed yesterday is about Christopher Samuelson - and also about how interests can be supported in money Laundering, it also seems inextricably linked to other Investigations that the i:unit has done particularly around Cyprus.

This article focuses on a theme the mem who sell football - which itself has been an ongoing investigation for which there are now 3 associated podcasts - the third of which is linked to this article

the podcasts can be found here https://www.ajiunit.com/investigation/t ... orruption/

the associated article is here
https://www.ajiunit.com/article/investi ... der-money/
Al Jezeera's i:unit has now released a 2nd much much longer article associated to this investigation

How a convicted criminal can buy a famous English football club
The I-Unit goes undercover to show how English football clubs can become vehicles to launder the proceeds of crime.


10 AUG 2021 | 37 MIN READ

In a plush suite at a boutique hotel in London, a man known as The Magician is lounging on a sofa, his right arm snaking out across the top.

“The usual rubbish, I’m used to it,” he says. “I’m in the real world. I understand all of this. We’ll have no problem with any of that.”

“The Magician” is Christopher Samuelson, a football dealmaker and offshore finance specialist. He owes his nickname to his expertise in hiding clients’ money, and their identities.

He has just been told by an undercover reporter, posing as the agent for a fictitious Chinese investor who wants to buy an English football club, that the investor has criminal convictions. He was found guilty of bribery and money laundering and is on the run – which should automatically disqualify him from football club ownership.

It was a crucial moment in our investigation. We wanted to find out whether – and how – a convicted foreign criminal could buy a football club to launder his ill-gotten gains.

We thought the revelation of our investor’s crimes might prompt The Magician to make himself disappear, but Samuelson did not bat an eyelid. Instead, he offered to find a home for the criminal’s funds. “If he wants help with moving assets and he wants secure locations, I can do that too,” he said.

“Then I can organise the financial institutions who will hold them for him. Banks where he can move his money to. I have a close relationship with banks in Liechtenstein.”

‘The ultimate man in the shadows’
Few people outside the arcane world of offshore finance have heard of Christopher Samuelson. Unsurprising, perhaps, for a man once described as “the ultimate man in the shadows”. Yet in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, he helped to build one of the world’s biggest offshore trust companies, Valmet, with offices in Gibraltar, the Isle of Man and other tax havens.

His clients included some of the richest people on the planet: Middle Eastern sheikhs and Russian oligarchs – such as Boris Berezovsky and Arkady “Badri” Patarkatsishvili – whom he helped to move billions of dollars out of Russia.

Samuelson has been investigated by police in several countries for alleged money laundering, but never charged. In recent years, he has brokered the controversial sale of two of England’s oldest football clubs, Reading and Aston Villa.

Both were taken to the brink of financial collapse under secretive new owners. A third deal he arranged, for an unnamed wealthy Russian to buy a controlling stake in Premier League club Everton in 2004, was called off when the buyer’s name – Boris Zingarevich, a pulp and paper magnate – was leaked to the press.

We set up a fake company and contacted Samuelson. We told him we represented three rich investors looking for a “sleeping giant”, a once-great football club with a big fan base and ambitions to return to the lucrative top flight of the game.

Samuelson took the bait and agreed to meet. We briefed two undercover reporters. “Billy”, as we called him, would ask most of the questions; “Angie” would play the role of Billy’s assistant. Neither of them knew anything about football but after several long briefings, Billy eventually knew his championship from his Champions League.

He would tell Samuelson that the criminal investor, who we call Mr X, wanted to own 60 percent of an English football club; had fled to Hong Kong and smuggled his money out of China through Macau casinos, and was sentenced to seven-year imprisonment in absentia. Now Mr X wanted to clean his money.

One big hurdle for Mr X was the football authorities’ Owners’ and Directors’ Test, which bans anybody with an unspent criminal conviction, and a minimum 12 months’ jail sentence, from owning a football club.

Over a series of meetings in London hotels, a loquacious Samuelson gave a turbo-charged sales pitch, peppered with stories about football, Russian oligarchs and his own success. He spoke with an accent honed in Kent, southern England, where he was born to a society family in 1946, and at Sherborne, the private boarding school he attended in Dorset.

Samuelson said he had almost bought Chelsea, with the West Ham and England World Cup-winning captain Bobby Moore, in the 1980s when he ran a sponsorship company. He claimed that Abramovich bought Chelsea, some 20 years later, after he had advised the oligarch to buy a football club to protect himself from a political change in Russia.

He was a prodigious name-dropper but seemed well-informed and well-connected. He rattled off the names and prices of clubs for sale: Premier League teams Chelsea, 3 billion pounds ($4.1bn), and Tottenham, 2 billion pounds ($2.8bn). Charlton, Millwall and others, for much less. We were interested in a second-tier, championship side with the potential to rise to the lucrative Premier League, the world’s richest league.

Samuelson talked about Leeds United and Nottingham Forest but recommended that we go for another club, Derby County, twice champions of England in the 1970s, because he had an advantage. “I was with Mel [Morris, the Derby owner] yesterday. He’s appointed me to sell the club,” he said. He agreed to take our undercover operatives to meet Morris. Things were moving fast.

‘A gun to their head’
It was remarkable how little Samuelson even pretended to be interested in – or concerned about how Mr X had made his money. The English Football League (EFL) – which governs the divisions below the Premier League – can require would-be owners to produce “evidence of the ultimate source and sufficiency of funds” to buy and sustain a club.

Could Samuelson really get our criminal investor approved by the EFL? The Magician was breezily confident. The EFL would be given “the minimum information”, “presented in the right way”; and he would “come up with an idea of how we can structure it so we defeat the EFL”.

“We create the bio,” he said. “We’ll say his business was real estate investment, and other sectors … We’ll just manufacture it.

“I’m an expert,” he added. “When I did the Aston Villa application, I wrote the whole thing myself and I took the information I needed and left the rest out.”

He talked tough. “I’ll hold a gun to their head. I can pressure the Football League … it will be approved,” he said. “And if we have to threaten them with legal action – watch them fall over.”

EFL investigators? Nothing to be concerned about. “Sometimes, they appoint one of these investigating firms to do a report,” he said. “If they appoint somebody, we’ll know which one is doing it and we’ll deal with them.”

Samuelson named his team: Jamie Banfill, business partner and lawyer; Andrew Obolensky, chartered accountant who worked on the Reading and Aston Villa sales; and Christian Hook, lawyer at London-based Gunnercooke, who did the legal work on the same two clubs. He would look after Mr X’s money until the sale was completed. “He’s very discreet. No leaks,” Samuelson said.

“The main thing is, do you have the money – and the fact it’s sitting in Christian Hook’s law firm’s trust account has a huge effect on them [the Football League],” he added.

“Yes, I can help here. You’ve come to the right person.”

And there was, of course, his fee: 3 percent of the sale price, extra for his associates. Plus, club director roles for himself, Obolensky and Banfill.

Samuelson mentioned another associate with “skills” to help get deals done: Keith Hunter, a private investigator and former Scotland Yard detective. “He works hand in glove with us,” said Samuelson. “He can do all kinds of things, like tap telephones and so on.”

“When we were dealing with [the sale of] Aston Villa, for example, we were monitoring what the Football League was saying behind the scenes. They didn’t know this, of course.”

When Villa’s chief executive Keith Wyness was suspended by the club in 2018, Samuelson – who had fallen out with him – wanted to find out whether he was talking to the media. “Of course, we had an ability to get the telephone records, to see who he was talking to,” Samuelson said. “So, we could identify what numbers he was calling. He was talking to the media.”

During negotiations at Everton in 2004, Samuelson said when the name of the Russian owner who wanted to buy a majority stake was leaked to the media, Hunter obtained the journalist’s private telephone records to find out who the “mole” was.

“We knew which journalist had got the story, so we looked at that journalist’s telephone records. It’s not allowed but we did, and we found out who he had spoken to, and one of them was the financial controller in Bill Kenwright’s office, so we know who leaked it.”

Hunter later confirmed the Everton story to Billy: “Yeah. Two individuals that were communicating with someone they shouldn’t have been.”

Billy: “Two guys inside the football club?”

Hunter: “Yeah, board level.”

‘Sometimes it’s impossible, sometimes it’s illegal’
For the past 20 years, Hunter has run private investigation companies. His latest is called Animus and, like Samuelson, he numbered oligarchs including Berezovsky among his clients, as well as a prominent Nigerian politician, James Ibori, who in 2012 was given a 12-year jail sentence by a UK court for fraud and money laundering.

His past, too, is mired in controversy. An internal 2007 report by Scotland Yard’s anti-corruption team on his former company, RISC Management, obtained by the I-Unit, says: “Intelligence strongly indicates that RISC Management was an aggressive corruptor of serving Metropolitan Police Service staff.” RISC employees also exploited former colleagues “to corruptly obtain sensitive information”. But although Hunter was implicated in police corruption cases in 2006 and 2012 he was not charged.

Billy met Hunter separately, to ask him what services he could offer his clients, such as obtaining competitors’ bank statements.

“Yeah,” Hunter replied. “Banks, credit cards, lifestyle. Have they got a mistress? Is there anything that we could damage their reputation with?”

Phone records?

“We could potentially get that.”

He said third parties could be used in difficult cases.

“Sometimes it’s impossible. Sometimes it’s illegal … But there will be times where you could use trusted third parties to help you get the information you’re looking for.”

Emails?
“Again, that would be for third parties to do. Other people do those things. I’m very happy to organise an introduction but it would be something that we could ask people if they would do it.”

Billy: “How can you trust them?”

“Because you build up trust. My people will have relationships with people that can do things that we can’t do in-house.”

Hunter told Billy that he was also involved in buying football clubs. He claimed he was close to sealing a deal for Hull City and was confident of getting a mandate to sell Bournemouth AFC. Neither club has been sold to date.

Samuelson’s lack of curiosity about – or indifference to – Mr X’s finances had a precedent. In 2016, he arranged for Tony Xia, a Chinese businessman, to buy Aston Villa for a reported $105m, installing himself as deputy chairman.

Samuelson told our undercover reporters he was sure Xia was a front for other buyers – but still helped him obtain approval from the EFL.

“Tony Xia claimed to own this, that and everything else,” he said. “I said I don’t want to hear about it. I want one asset where you made more money, enough money to get you approved. He came with one, which was 450 million sterling [$621m] equivalent.

“OK, it may not have been his, Billy, but he claimed it was his. So, we put that on the form, just that.”

How much of that was his own money is a question. How much of it was somebody else’s?

“He said it was him. Well, of course, it wasn’t him. He was a front. I was sure he was a front.”

Two years later, Aston Villa was in deep financial trouble. Xia was sued by creditors in China for allegedly defaulting on loans worth tens of millions of dollars. He sold the club. In October 2019 Chinese authorities issued an arrest warrant for Xia and he was later detained for failing to repay loans. He denies the charges and remains in custody pending the results of a police investigation.

Keith Wyness, Villa’s chief executive under Tony Xia, until he left the club in 2018 and sued for constructive dismissal, said in a statement he prepared for an employment tribunal: “Not a lot was known about him that could be independently verified. My concern was that for a supposed billionaire with a string of companies, Mr Xia appeared not to have a grasp of basic financial modelling.”

‘A crook, a thief and a liar’
During our investigation, we obtained a secret 2005 report by the Dutch police which gave details of allegations against Samuelson. The investigators suspected he was the “de facto leader of an international money laundering operation”, with clients who had been the subject of criminal investigations.

The report said that his clients included the Russian oligarchs Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Berezovsky and “Badri” Patarkatsishvili and; the two largest organised crime families in the UK; and Kurdish organisations whose finances he helped structure to avoid money laundering accusations.

Samuelson was later named in court papers in the US as the subject of “multiple, high-profile, money-laundering investigations”. A 2011 court deposition in Miami said in an email from 2006, Badri had called Samuelson “a crook” and “a thief and a liar”. Samuelson dismissed the allegations as “farcical”.

The EFL had asked Samuelson about the Dutch investigation during a meeting at its headquarters in Preston to discuss his suitability to be a director of Aston Villa. In a statement written after the meeting, obtained by the I-Unit, Samuelson says that Nick Craig, the EFL’s head of legal affairs, had described him as “a master of concealment”. Samuelson claimed the investigation was politically motivated and said all claims against him were dropped. He was approved as a director.

Samuelson and Hunter prided themselves on their caution and discretion. Over high tea at an upmarket London hotel, they urged our reporters to be vigilant in case people were trying to record their conversation – unaware that they themselves were being covertly recorded. “I know too many of the old tricks,” said Samuelson. “When we were dealing with the Russians you had to make sure there wasn’t bugs in the room. Here they couldn’t bug it because it’s too difficult.”

He jokingly leaned in towards a teapot to see if there was a recording device inside. “Can you hear us?”

Football clubs as ‘vehicles for money laundering’
It has been said that Samuelson can make an elephant disappear. But could he make Mr X disappear, by concealing his name and identity, so he could buy a famous English football club.

The Magician said he had many “tricks” for doing this. His preferred option was to set up an offshore company with two other investors owning 50 percent each. They would then sign a Declaration of Trust in favour of Mr X. That meant they were holding shares for Mr X who was, in offshore parlance, the “beneficial owner”. Their names would be disclosed in the share registry but Mr X would be hidden from public scrutiny.

“Nobody can ever get behind who the shareholders are in the public domain,” Samuelson said. “No media can penetrate because it’s held in what we call nominee names.”

“I’m one of the leading specialists in this kind of work,” he said.

Samuelson claimed he had used offshore trusts to deceive the Football League before when he helped to arrange the purchase of a majority stake in Reading FC in 2012.

The money raised for Reading belonged to Boris Zingarevich, the Russian pulp and paper magnate. “I didn’t clear Boris [with the EFL], I cleared Anton,” said Samuelson, referring to Boris’s son. “Anton didn’t have any money. So, I got his father to gift the money to him, OK, done. That’s it. They didn’t argue about it, at all.”

But Anton Zingarevich did not have the funds to sustain the club and Reading were relegated after just one season in the top-flight, prompting fury from fans. “The fans at this point just felt they’d been taken for a ride,” said Jon Keen, former vice chairman of the Supporters’ Trust at Reading.

Zingarevich sold up. “He left Reading holding a big bill that he’d run up with no money left to pay it,” said Keen.

Samuelson had another “trick” as a fallback. He said he would set up an investment fund with 20 or 21 small companies, each held in a separate trust and with a stake of 5 percent or less. The real owner would be hidden in a master trust behind the small investors but the size of the shareholdings meant that the name of the real owner would not have to be disclosed, according to EFL rules.

He said he had planned to use this scheme for the Everton takeover in 2004, using a Brunei-based company called the Fortress Sports Fund – until Boris Zingarevich’s name was leaked to the media.

Keen said offshore trusts are “dangerous” for the game. “It leaves football clubs open to be vehicles for money laundering. Nobody knows where the money’s come from, it could come from any source, no matter how criminal or disreputable.”

A new identity
Samuelson said his offshore schemes meant only the Football League would have to know Mr X’s name and they were obliged to keep it strictly confidential. But we pushed harder, insisting that his identity had to be kept secret from everybody, including the EFL. Again, we thought this could be the end of our investigation. But for Samuelson, it was just another obstacle to overcome and, once again, he had a solution.

“We can always look at getting another passport for your big man,” Samuelson said. “With a new name, yes, why not?” This would give Mr X a totally new identity and an address in Cyprus to deceive the EFL.

Samuelson called his friend Hunter and told him Mr X needed another passport. “How quickly can we get a Cyprus one, money no object?” He made it sound normal, as if he was asking how soon a kitchen table could be delivered.

Like Samuelson, Hunter was unfazed when he heard the details of Mr X’s criminal record. He had excellent, high-level contacts, including a government minister in Cyprus, who could help obtain a Cyprus passport, he said.

It could be done through property investment. The Citizenship-by-Investment programme, a European Union scheme, allowed investors to obtain a Cyprus passport for an investment of $3m.

Convicted criminals were excluded from the scheme but Hunter was calmly reassuring. “We’ve done this many, many times for others who, I can assure you are in a worse position than your boss. So, you’ve just got to leave it to us.”

“The different name we just have to work on. We might just change the date of birth slightly. Everything’s possible.”

Hunter said he had obtained passports for “Indian, Russian, Ukrainian and Nigerian” clients. “And the process is seamless.”

Between them, Samuelson and Hunter would prepare due diligence reports for the English Football League and the Cyprus authorities.

Days later Samuelson emailed to say he had met two of Hunter’s Cyprus contacts who said the minister had given the price to get a passport for Mr X. “Last evening I attended Keith’s box at Epsom races and met Chris Giovani and Antonis Antoniou who handle obtaining Cypriot passports,” Samuelson wrote. “Their discussion … resulted in the Minister saying that the passport would be issued within 8 weeks providing the investment was 10 million euros ($12m).”

On the brink of striking a deal
Back on the football club trail, our undercover team headed up to Derby, with Samuelson, to meet Mel Morris, the club’s owner. On the way, Samuelson went through the numbers: 50 million pounds ($69m) for the club, plus 29 million pounds ($40m) for the stadium and a further 20 million pounds ($27.6m) to cover losses for the coming season. Total: 99 million pounds ($136.5m).

Morris gave our undercover reporters a tour of the Pride Park Stadium and the club’s training ground. He was passionate about the club and understood its importance to the people of Derby. He wanted the new owners to continue that close relationship.

Morris has put an estimated $200m of his own money into the club and he was keen for our investors to become the new owners. He proposed to help them by becoming a minority shareholder with a stake of 9.9 percent. This would mean he could write off his loans to the club over a number of seasons rather than in one go at the time of sale. The move would benefit the club financially but could be seen as circumventing Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules. Morris admitted: “It is something we must not commit in writing.”

Kieran Maguire, a football finance expert at Liverpool University, said Morris’s proposal broke the spirit if not the letter of the law. “That would be for the EFL to monitor and to choose whether or not to have charges against the club.”

Morris has had a few run-ins with the Football League over FFP rules, which limit a Championship club’s losses to no more than 39 million pounds ($53.8m) over three seasons.

In 2020, Derby County was cleared of breaching FFP rules over Morris’s sale of the stadium, effectively to himself. But in June this year, the club was fined 100,000 pounds ($138,000) for breaching rules governing the valuation of players and, in a non-FFP charge, was given a suspended three points deduction for failing to pay players’ wages.

Morris was keen on our investors buying his club. We left Derby knowing that we were on the brink of striking a deal to buy a famous English football club for a convicted criminal.

A message to Mr X
It was time for us to fly to Cyprus where Hunter had arranged for Billy and Angie to meet British estate agents Tony and Denise Kay who would start the process of acquiring Mr X’s new passport. “Keith is a good friend and I’ve worked with him for many years,” said Tony. “We refer each other people. If I send someone to him, I know that he looks after me and vice versa.”

Denise said of Keith Hunter: “He does the due diligence for us.”

The extra millions of dollars for the passport, our reporters were told, was not through the official scheme. “Where there are problems, it costs more money to achieve these things,” said Tony.

In a whirlwind week, our reporters were introduced to a network of powerful people who all said they were willing to help Mr X obtain a Cyprus passport.

A lawyer, Andreas Pittadjis, said: “So he had convictions … we will need to find ways to overcome this problem.”

He told Billy over dinner in Ayia Napa: “If it wasn’t for Keith and Tony, I wouldn’t even accept to see you.”

An MP and property developer, Christakis Giovani, said: “We help people take a passport, why not? I think we have a way to help.”

Finally, the president of the Parliament, Demetris Syllouris, the de facto vice president of Cyprus, told Billy to pass on a message to Mr X. He asked Mr X to come to Cyprus and said he would provide any support he can, using all levels of the state.

We told the story of Cyprus passports in a documentary called The Cyprus Papers Undercover, released in October 2020. Within days of its release Giovani and Syllouris resigned, the Cyprus passport scheme was scrapped, the EU and the Cyprus government launched investigations and weeks of anti-corruption protests erupted on the streets of Nicosia.

Football fans should be angry’
Before our trip to Cyprus – and soon after our meeting with Morris – we pulled out of the Derby deal so as not to prevent genuine buyers from buying the club. Samuelson tried to rekindle our fictitious investors’ interest. We said they had decided against Derby but were still interested in buying a football club and so we would press ahead with obtaining a Cyprus passport and a new identity for Mr X.

Two other deals to buy Derby County have since collapsed. One of the proposals was led by a member of the Abu Dhabi royal family through a company called Derventio Holdings (UK). Two of the original directors of Derventio were Samuelson and Obolensky but they stepped down after just two months, in November 2020.

In April 2021, football club ownership was thrust into the spotlight after the announcement of a European Super League for 12 leading clubs. Protests were held by fans in England where six clubs – Liverpool, Manchester City, Arsenal, Manchester United, Chelsea and Tottenham – had signed up to the breakaway league. The fans claimed that billionaire owners were treating English football as a global cash cow and cutting clubs off from their communities.

The Super League was dropped after 48 hours and the fiasco prompted the launch in the UK of a fan-led government review, headed by MP Tracey Crouch. Its interim report, published in July, called for an independent regulator for the sport and reform of the football authorities, particularly in financial regulation, corporate governance and ownership.

Ben Cowdock, investigations lead at Transparency International, said the I-Unit’s investigation exposed serious problems with football club ownership. “This investigation will be of great interest to the police and also the English football authorities,” he said. “They are up against faulty, fraudulent due diligence reports and a network of enablers seeking to pull the wool over their eyes.”

He added: “Football fans should be angry about this investigation because it shows the entire vulnerability of the English football system to funds from dubious origins and unsuitable owners for their clubs.”

Maguire found our evidence “disturbing” and said Samuelson “is a person that should have nothing to do with football in this country”.

Football clubs in England hold a particular place in the heart of everyone,” he said. “They are part of our history, heritage, community and so on and as such, they should be protected.”

Al Jazeera contacted all those involved in this investigation.

Christopher Samuelson’s lawyers say that he had never been told that Mr X had a criminal conviction for money laundering and bribery. Had he known of any criminality, he would have ended discussions immediately.

Keith Hunter refuses to engage with the details of our findings but says that he strongly disputes most of them. Hunter says that he left the police with an exemplary record. His company, Animus, refutes all allegations of wrongdoing.

Mel Morris and Derby County did not respond to the subject of Financial Fair Play regulations and other matters featured in this investigation. They tell us the club would only be sold to “appropriate custodians” and that they have not had any “formal association” with Samuelson for some time.

Roman Abramovich’s lawyers say he never had a personal relationship with Samuelson and never received advice about purchasing a football club.

A spokesman for Mikhail Khodorkovsky denies that Samuelson advised him to buy Yukos and says that it is “highly likely” that he has never met Samuelson.

Christian Hook and the Gunnercooke law firm say they comply strictly with all legal and regulatory obligations at all times. Our investigation uncovered no evidence to suggest otherwise.

Andrew Obolensky tells us he is not Samuelson’s partner and has never had dealings with anyone resembling Mr X.

Tony and Denise Kay, Andreas Pittadjis, Christakis Giovani, Antonis Antoniou and Demetris Syllouris, deny any wrongdoing.

Tony Xia is currently in jail in China pending a police investigation. He denies all charges.
by Chester Perry
Mon Aug 02, 2021 3:59 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Sun Aug 01, 2021 7:28 pm
This should be no surprise re the Premier Leagues investigation into Manchester City - the threat that it could run for years - typical Man City approach of dragging things out and making it expensive for the authorities - from the MAil

Man City's legal battle over alleged breaches of financial rules could rumble on for YEARS but Premier League are expected to fight on as they are 'likely being pressurised by the 19 other clubs'
Premier League's ongoing legal battle with Manchester City could last years
Warning of ongoing turmoil comes from former financial advisor to the club
Stefan Borson also expects the Premier League to push on with their fight
Case relates to Financial Fair Play and whether City inflated their income
By NICK HARRIS FOR THE MAIL ON SUNDAY

PUBLISHED: 22:31, 31 July 2021 | UPDATED: 01:08, 1 August 2021

The Premier League's ongoing legal battle with Manchester City over alleged breaches of League rules could 'move glacially on for many more years'.

Two weeks before City's title defence begins, the warning of ongoing turmoil comes from Stefan Borson, a former financial advisor to the club who also has experience dealing with complex litigation around accounting practices.

But Borson also expects the League (PL) to push on with their fight as he believes that are 'likely being heavily pressurised by the 19 other clubs'.

As detailed in The Mail on Sunday last week, City have been embroiled in the secret battle since 2019, when the PL announced a formal investigation into allegations that arose in the 'Football Leaks' files published by German magazine Der Spiegel in 2018.

After a request for 'open justice', this newspaper was the only media company allowed into court recently to hear some proceedings on the case and, while no specific details are known about what the League are probing, it relates to Financial Fair Play (FFP), and is likely to be focused on whether City inflated their income in contravention of the rules.

Borson worked with City between 2002 and 2007 and it was on his advice that the club accepted a £90 million takeover offer the club by Thaksin Shinawatra, the former Thai Prime Minister.

A City fan, Borson is also a lawyer, and now chief executive and general counsel of a public company, Watchstone, formerly known as Quindell. Since 2015, he has been leading their defence against allegations of historic faulty accounting.

'This has entrenched my group in the sort of regulatory and other litigation battles that City have faced,' says Borson.

He has closely followed City's FFP tribulations, from a first punishment by UEFA in 2014 for breaking the rules, to a second UEFA investigation in 2019, to a two-year Champions League in 2020, to a reversal of that verdict at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) last summer.

'The underlying allegations made against City are not 'rap on the knuckle' matters,' said Borson. 'It is apparent the PL are not yet minded to give up and are likely being heavily pressurised by the 19 other clubs to prosecute City to the full force of their powers, no matter how difficult.

'This is an unenviable position for the PL which needs to protect the integrity of its rules whilst being cognisant of the legal and commercial power of City.'

'If the PL decide to lay serious charges against City, this could yet move glacially on for many more years with the only real winners being lawyers.'

The most recent Court of Appeal judgements were defeats for City in as much as they meant the very existence of the battle with the PL should be made public, against their wishes.

'The judgments also made plain the judges think City have been fighting with weak and tenuous tactical arguments for many months,' said Borson. 'Litigation is heavy going and parties fight hard. The idea that City should throw open their books and worldwide documents to scrutiny by UEFA, the PL or whoever else is unrealistic.

'Battles around the disclosure of documents are routinely arduous. The League are not entitled to go on a fishing expedition, even less to demand documents from the palaces of Abu Dhabi.

'Rightly, City will feel the burden is for others to prove a case against them. They have more than 10 years of clean audited accounts under the current owners. Which is why City's approach is consistent with a leaked email from 2013 published by Der Spiegel in 2018.

'It featured City lawyer Simon Cliff explaining that, rather than settle with UEFA in the then ongoing tussle over FFP, the club's chairman Khaldoon Al Mubarak 'would rather spend £30m on the best 50 lawyers in the world to sue them for the next 10 years'.'
As if to underline the CFG approach to investigation, here are the current legal positions they are recruiting for - which seems a lot given the legal counsel they also have on retainer

https://twitter.com/tariqpanja/status/1 ... 69/photo/1
by Chester Perry
Sun Aug 01, 2021 7:28 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Sun Jul 25, 2021 6:25 pm
re Man City - It is the same story as that at the top of the page - I have been posting about it since it came to light at the time of the last UEFA ban - The Premier league do not have the same self imposed expiry on investigations and charges as UEFA which is what is worrying Man City - they are running out of Technicalities on which to put an end to the investigation - while they continue to strongly claim their innocence - if that was the case why cannot they just hand over the requested data and get in over with
This should be no surprise re the Premier Leagues investigation into Manchester City - the threat that it could run for years - typical Man City approach of dragging things out and making it expensive for the authorities - from the MAil

Man City's legal battle over alleged breaches of financial rules could rumble on for YEARS but Premier League are expected to fight on as they are 'likely being pressurised by the 19 other clubs'
Premier League's ongoing legal battle with Manchester City could last years
Warning of ongoing turmoil comes from former financial advisor to the club
Stefan Borson also expects the Premier League to push on with their fight
Case relates to Financial Fair Play and whether City inflated their income
By NICK HARRIS FOR THE MAIL ON SUNDAY

PUBLISHED: 22:31, 31 July 2021 | UPDATED: 01:08, 1 August 2021

The Premier League's ongoing legal battle with Manchester City over alleged breaches of League rules could 'move glacially on for many more years'.

Two weeks before City's title defence begins, the warning of ongoing turmoil comes from Stefan Borson, a former financial advisor to the club who also has experience dealing with complex litigation around accounting practices.

But Borson also expects the League (PL) to push on with their fight as he believes that are 'likely being heavily pressurised by the 19 other clubs'.

As detailed in The Mail on Sunday last week, City have been embroiled in the secret battle since 2019, when the PL announced a formal investigation into allegations that arose in the 'Football Leaks' files published by German magazine Der Spiegel in 2018.

After a request for 'open justice', this newspaper was the only media company allowed into court recently to hear some proceedings on the case and, while no specific details are known about what the League are probing, it relates to Financial Fair Play (FFP), and is likely to be focused on whether City inflated their income in contravention of the rules.

Borson worked with City between 2002 and 2007 and it was on his advice that the club accepted a £90 million takeover offer the club by Thaksin Shinawatra, the former Thai Prime Minister.

A City fan, Borson is also a lawyer, and now chief executive and general counsel of a public company, Watchstone, formerly known as Quindell. Since 2015, he has been leading their defence against allegations of historic faulty accounting.

'This has entrenched my group in the sort of regulatory and other litigation battles that City have faced,' says Borson.

He has closely followed City's FFP tribulations, from a first punishment by UEFA in 2014 for breaking the rules, to a second UEFA investigation in 2019, to a two-year Champions League in 2020, to a reversal of that verdict at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) last summer.

'The underlying allegations made against City are not 'rap on the knuckle' matters,' said Borson. 'It is apparent the PL are not yet minded to give up and are likely being heavily pressurised by the 19 other clubs to prosecute City to the full force of their powers, no matter how difficult.

'This is an unenviable position for the PL which needs to protect the integrity of its rules whilst being cognisant of the legal and commercial power of City.'

'If the PL decide to lay serious charges against City, this could yet move glacially on for many more years with the only real winners being lawyers.'

The most recent Court of Appeal judgements were defeats for City in as much as they meant the very existence of the battle with the PL should be made public, against their wishes.

'The judgments also made plain the judges think City have been fighting with weak and tenuous tactical arguments for many months,' said Borson. 'Litigation is heavy going and parties fight hard. The idea that City should throw open their books and worldwide documents to scrutiny by UEFA, the PL or whoever else is unrealistic.

'Battles around the disclosure of documents are routinely arduous. The League are not entitled to go on a fishing expedition, even less to demand documents from the palaces of Abu Dhabi.

'Rightly, City will feel the burden is for others to prove a case against them. They have more than 10 years of clean audited accounts under the current owners. Which is why City's approach is consistent with a leaked email from 2013 published by Der Spiegel in 2018.

'It featured City lawyer Simon Cliff explaining that, rather than settle with UEFA in the then ongoing tussle over FFP, the club's chairman Khaldoon Al Mubarak 'would rather spend £30m on the best 50 lawyers in the world to sue them for the next 10 years'.'
by GodIsADeeJay81
Sat Jul 24, 2021 11:04 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

https://twitter.com/sportingintel/statu ... 61826?s=19

Man city have spent the last couple of years embroiled in a secret court case with the PL who've been demanding certain paperwork etc.

Naturally City didn't want to play nicely so made sure the case was kept secret and kept fobbing off the PL.

The bloke at the centre of the football leaks scandal is still floating about and looks like he has information to help sink City...

This could be worth watching.
by Chester Perry
Wed Jul 21, 2021 1:51 am
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Tue Jul 20, 2021 8:07 pm
The Guardian with a report on a court ruling that reminds us that the Premier Leagues long running FFP investigation into Manchester City - since before the UEFA sanction and the successful appeal at CAS is still ongoing

Court ruling shows Premier League still investigating Manchester City over FFP
City strongly deny wrongdoing regarding financial fair play


Premier League started to investigate City in March 2019

Jamie Jackson

Tue 20 Jul 2021 19.28 BST

Manchester City have lost a ruling by the court of appeal, which confirms that the Premier League is continuing to investigate the champions for alleged breaches of financial fair play, with one of the judges stating part of the club’s argument was “entirely fanciful”.

City’s legal team did not want it reported that it was challenging the jurisdiction of Premier League arbitrators to investigate the case and that it was also fighting a request to disclose documents and information to the panel.

In March 2019 the Premier League said it was investigating City, as Uefa had already done. As with European football’s governing body, the league was interested in leaks to German publication Der Spiegel that claimed the breach of rules.

Last summer the court of arbitration for sport overturned City’s two-season Champions League ban from Uefa, saying that “most of the alleged breaches were either not established or time-barred.”

This, though, has not deterred the Premier League as Tuesday’s ruling underlines. City had lodged the appeal after a High Court judge ruled against the club with regard to the reporting of its dispute with the governing body.

Yet the three-judge Court of Appeal dismissed City’s argument. One of these, Sir Julian Flaux, the chancellor of the High Court, said: “The suggestion that press interest and speculation might disrupt the investigation or the arbitration, where both are being conducted by experienced professionals, is entirely fanciful. Likewise the suggestion that press comment and speculation following publication might damage the club’s relations with commercial partners was unconvincing.

“As Lord Justice Males [one of the other two judges] said during the course of argument, any potential commercial partner with whom the club might enter a contract would be bound to conduct due diligence, which would reveal the existence of the investigation and the dispute.”

As the arbitration was public knowledge the club’s argument that it cannot have a fair hearing was also dismissed. “[This] would seem to be a non-lawyer’s interpretation of the allegation of apparent bias,” Sir Julian said.

City strongly deny any wrongdoing regarding financial fair play. The Premier League supported the club’s argument regarding confidentiality but with the caveat that the league in the future “should be free to rely on and disclose the Merits Judgment in other arbitration proceedings against other member clubs”.

However, the court ruled this was actually a counterproductive argument. “It is difficult to envisage a more eloquent demonstration as to why publication of the Merits Judgment is in the public interest,” Sir Julian said.

Lord Justice Males noted the time that had elapsed since the Premier League launched its investigation. “This is an investigation which commenced in December 2018. It is surprising, and a matter of legitimate public concern, that so little progress has been made after two and a half years – during which, it may be noted, the club has twice been crowned as Premier League champions,” he said.

City released a statement saying: “We respect the decision of the Court of Appeal regarding the arbitration matter. The decision relates to ongoing proceedings and we are obviously not in a position to provide comment until those proceedings are complete.” The Premier League declined to comment.
The full judgement from the Court of Appeal on Manchester City vs the FA Premier League, interestingly both parties wanted to keep the whole process out of the public domain - as yet the investigation continues and Manchester City are still to share the requested information - at this stage no charges have been made against the club

https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2021/1110.html
by Chester Perry
Tue Jul 20, 2021 8:07 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

The Guardian with a report on a court ruling that reminds us that the Premier Leagues long running FFP investigation into Manchester City - since before the UEFA sanction and the successful appeal at CAS is still ongoing

Court ruling shows Premier League still investigating Manchester City over FFP
City strongly deny wrongdoing regarding financial fair play


Premier League started to investigate City in March 2019

Jamie Jackson

Tue 20 Jul 2021 19.28 BST

Manchester City have lost a ruling by the court of appeal, which confirms that the Premier League is continuing to investigate the champions for alleged breaches of financial fair play, with one of the judges stating part of the club’s argument was “entirely fanciful”.

City’s legal team did not want it reported that it was challenging the jurisdiction of Premier League arbitrators to investigate the case and that it was also fighting a request to disclose documents and information to the panel.

In March 2019 the Premier League said it was investigating City, as Uefa had already done. As with European football’s governing body, the league was interested in leaks to German publication Der Spiegel that claimed the breach of rules.

Last summer the court of arbitration for sport overturned City’s two-season Champions League ban from Uefa, saying that “most of the alleged breaches were either not established or time-barred.”

This, though, has not deterred the Premier League as Tuesday’s ruling underlines. City had lodged the appeal after a High Court judge ruled against the club with regard to the reporting of its dispute with the governing body.

Yet the three-judge Court of Appeal dismissed City’s argument. One of these, Sir Julian Flaux, the chancellor of the High Court, said: “The suggestion that press interest and speculation might disrupt the investigation or the arbitration, where both are being conducted by experienced professionals, is entirely fanciful. Likewise the suggestion that press comment and speculation following publication might damage the club’s relations with commercial partners was unconvincing.

“As Lord Justice Males [one of the other two judges] said during the course of argument, any potential commercial partner with whom the club might enter a contract would be bound to conduct due diligence, which would reveal the existence of the investigation and the dispute.”

As the arbitration was public knowledge the club’s argument that it cannot have a fair hearing was also dismissed. “[This] would seem to be a non-lawyer’s interpretation of the allegation of apparent bias,” Sir Julian said.

City strongly deny any wrongdoing regarding financial fair play. The Premier League supported the club’s argument regarding confidentiality but with the caveat that the league in the future “should be free to rely on and disclose the Merits Judgment in other arbitration proceedings against other member clubs”.

However, the court ruled this was actually a counterproductive argument. “It is difficult to envisage a more eloquent demonstration as to why publication of the Merits Judgment is in the public interest,” Sir Julian said.

Lord Justice Males noted the time that had elapsed since the Premier League launched its investigation. “This is an investigation which commenced in December 2018. It is surprising, and a matter of legitimate public concern, that so little progress has been made after two and a half years – during which, it may be noted, the club has twice been crowned as Premier League champions,” he said.

City released a statement saying: “We respect the decision of the Court of Appeal regarding the arbitration matter. The decision relates to ongoing proceedings and we are obviously not in a position to provide comment until those proceedings are complete.” The Premier League declined to comment.
by Chester Perry
Tue May 25, 2021 1:32 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

The Guardian's David Conn writes about Manchester City and how the ambitions of it's owners are being realised - Conn is a lifelong City fan, but has been outspoken about the owners from the off

Manchester City’s rise from stumbles of old to fine-tuned global product
The Abu Dhabi-owned club have become an exercise in how to construct the supreme modern football team with vast money

David Conn - Tue 25 May 2021 08.00 BST

When Sergio Agüero won the Premier League for Manchester City in the 94th minute of the last match of the 2011-12 season, the emotional extremes, how nearly they cocked it up, made a fevered connection with all the stumbles of the old club. City fans are pinching themselves again now at the prospect of a Champions League final within touching memory of a League One play-off final with Gillingham, but there can no longer be any illusion that this is the City of old.

Since 2008, after the takeover by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan of the Abu Dhabi ruling family, Manchester City have become an exercise in how to construct the supreme modern football club with vast money available for the project. And in the first season, as Mansour’s men and his multimillions rescued City from the chaos of ownership by the ousted Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the ideal to replicate, Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona, was winning the Champions League.

It has taken 13 years to cross that gulf, and £2.5bn or so of Abu Dhabi money, and from the start, unlikely as it may have seemed, this was the target of the new ownership: relentless, shimmering success.

As City and their dream teams have come to dominate, Amnesty and other human rights groups have taken to calling such mega-projects “sportswashing”, regimes laundering their reputations through the irresistible allure of football. That has never felt quite how Abu Dhabi sees itself, because although campaign groups have focused on the conditions for migrant workers, the suppression of internal dissent and the horrific war in Yemen, the state’s rulers appear to believe they are a relatively liberal regime, doing what they need to in a hazardous region, not in need of public relations cleansing.

The wealthiest of the seven United Arab Emirates because of its oil fortunes, Abu Dhabi is courted by western countries including Britain, which sells the country large stocks of arms. In December Boris Johnson hosted Abu Dhabi’s de facto ruler, Mansour’s brother, the crown prince Sheikh Mohamed, and the Downing Street communique enthused about “the long-standing friendship and shared history between our two countries and peoples”, before huge investment was announced in March.

Manchester City are, however, undoubtedly part of Abu Dhabi nation-building, woven into the strategy for diversifying its economy beyond the flows of oil prices, and projecting a modern, classy image to the world. City’s chairman, Khaldoon al-Mubarak, is responsible for key strategic government and business investment roles in Abu Dhabi, where he works principally not for Mansour but for Sheikh Mohamed.

Mubarak, appointed chairman within days of the shock takeover, was and still is the chairman of Abu Dhabi’s executive affairs authority, responsible for advising on the state’s direction and image, as well as a member of the governing executive council, and founder member of the supreme council for financial and economic affairs. In his official biography, the chairmanship of Manchester City, his most visible (and probably most enjoyable) role, comes low down, a part-time responsibility after being chief executive of the $243bn sovereign wealth investment company Mubadala, being on the board of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, and chairman of the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and Emirates Global Aluminium.

When the UAE made its accord with Israel last year brokered by Donald Tump, Manchester City’s chairman was with Sheikh Mohamed in the official government party hosting the first US-Israeli delegation. That is a sentence no City fan of any vintage can have imagined being written, when they were nursing pints in Moss Side’s Parkside pub, dreaming of one day forcing Peter Swales out.

The total reconstruction of City has been achieved like many industrial and prestige projects fashioned by Abu Dhabi in its few decades of compressed development, by employing the best resources and human expertise that money can pay for. Management consultants brought in immediately in 2008 to assess the task had Barcelona as the industry standard, and in 2012, just after the first title, City’s owners hired the know-how of Ferran Soriano and Txiki Begiristain, the former Barcelona chief executive and director of football respectively.

Waves of players had been bought to elevate the team, then the former Barcelona pair set their own imprints: acquiring a global network of clubs for the “City Football Group”, a worldwide commercial and youth development empire with the £200m academy “campus”, opened in 2014, at its apex. They knew to their fingertips that Guardiola was a coach on a different planet from his rivals, and City’s owners waited, putting everything in place, throughout the three title-winning seasons at Bayern Munich, before securing him in 2016.

One figure that records the cost of the City project is £1.3bn, the amount directly invested into the club as share capital by Mansour’s ownership vehicle. But that leaves out the vast sums from Abu Dhabi in sponsorships from other state-owned entities, principally the airline Etihad, whose £67.5m annual value became known through the fateful leaks of internal emails by the German magazine Spiegel. As early as 2013, when City began to face difficulties with Uefa’s financial fair play regulations, the sponsorships from three other Abu Dhabi entities, the investment firm Aabar, telecommunications giant Etisalat, and the country’s tourism authority, which had billboards around the Etihad Stadium inviting people to visit Abu Dhabi, were understood to be £15m, £16.5m, and £19.75m respectively: more than £50m in total. The breakdown of City’s huge annual commercial revenues – £246m last year – is not published, but if the Abu Dhabi sponsorships were to average £100m for every year of Mansour’s ownership, that would put the investment from the country at £2.6bn.

City, of course, have made the final in a year when they would have been banned, had their lawyers not succeeded in overturning the penalties at the court of arbitration for sport. The regime, mostly classy in all areas including relations with supporters and investment in the community, lost that sure-footedness in its war with Uefa, raging that FFP rules and their enforcement by properly constituted internal bodies were a kind of European conspiracy against them. The counter-evidence, that owners pumping money in to inflate players’ wages and transfer fees is potentially ruinous, lies around Manchester for all to see, in the ruin of Bury and the traumatic administrations of Wigan and Bolton.

City’s owners misstepped again last month when they opted to join the toxic European Super League, and this time they quietly accepted the rebuke and sanctions from Uefa, and the welcome from Aleksander Ceferin back to the “European football family”. The short-lived breakaway uproar served as a reminder to the whole of football, City’s owners included, that the game’s historic governing bodies, imperfect as they will always be, are all a sport has to protect itself from being just a business, driven only by the impulse for revenues and global domination.

Yet Uefa’s Champions League final will broadcast to the world how far the game is from being a collection of sports clubs in any kind of even competition. Manchester City, the grand old club of latter-day cock-ups, are now the fine-tuned product of a country, playing oligarch-owned Chelsea for football’s ultimate prize.
by Chester Perry
Thu May 20, 2021 4:59 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

I said it at the announcement of the European Super League an I keep on saying it FIFA/Gianni Infantino appeared complicit in it's formation and we keep being presented with additional evidence/support to the notion - Tariq Panja in the New York Times reports yet more detail with which to form your own opinion on the matter. I have been reporting on these kinds of relationships for a few years now on this thread

The Super League Thought It Had a Silent Partner: FIFA
MAY 20, 2021

Tucked away in the pages and pages of financial and legal jargon that constitute the founding contract of the Super League, the failed project that last month briefly threatened the century-old structures and economics of European soccer, were references to one “essential” requirement.

The condition was deemed so important that organizers agreed that the breakaway plan could not succeed without satisfying it and yet was so secret that it was given a code name even in contracts shared among the founders.

Those documents, copies of which were reviewed by The New York Times, refer to the need for the Super League founders to strike an agreement with an entity obliquely labeled W01 but easily identifiable as FIFA, soccer’s global governing body. That agreement, the documents said, was “an essential condition for the implementation of the SL project.”

Publicly, FIFA and its president, Gianni Infantino, have joined other soccer leaders, fans and politicians in slamming the short-lived Super League project, which would have allowed a small group of elite European teams — a group that included Spain’s Real Madrid, Italy’s Juventus and the English powerhouses Manchester United and Liverpool, among others — to accumulate an ever larger share of the sport’s wealth.

But privately, according to interviews with more than a half-dozen soccer executives, including one Super League club owner, Infantino was aware of the plan and knew some of his closest lieutenants had for months — until at least late January — been engaged in talks about lending FIFA’s backing to the breakaway league.

The Super League was perhaps the most humbling failure in modern soccer history. Announced by 12 of the world’s richest clubs late on a Sunday night in April, it was abandoned less than 48 hours later amid a hailstorm of protest from fans, leagues, teams and politicians. Its founding teams have since apologized — some of them multiple times — for taking part in it, and a few could still face significant financial and sporting consequences.

But the behind-the-scenes discussions that led to a week of public drama have laid bare simmering tensions between FIFA and European soccer’s governing body, UEFA, over control of billions of dollars in annual revenue; exposed a series of frayed relationships among some of the sport’s top leaders that may be beyond repair; and raised new questions about the role played by FIFA and Infantino in the project that shook soccer’s foundations.

FIFA declined to respond to specific questions related to the involvement of Infantino or his aides in the planning of the Super League. Instead it pointed to its previous statements and its commitment to processes in which “all key football stakeholders were consulted.”

The Super League’s discussions with FIFA began in 2019. They were led by a group known as A22, a consortium of advisers headed by the Spain-based financiers Anas Laghrari and John Hahn and charged with putting together the Super League project. A22 officials held meetings with some of Infantino’s closest aides, including FIFA’s deputy secretary general, Mattias Grafstrom.

In at least one of those meetings, the breakaway group proposed that, in exchange for FIFA’s endorsement of its project, the Super League would agree to the participation of as many as a dozen of its marquee teams in an annual FIFA-backed World Cup for clubs. The teams also agreed to waive payments they would have earned by taking part, a potential windfall for FIFA of as much as $1 billion each year. After their initial meetings, the advisers reported back that they had found a receptive audience.

Obtaining FIFA’s support was not merely a hedge; the organization’s consent was required to prevent the project from being mired in costly and lengthy litigation and to preclude any punishments for the players who took part.

But it was also an insurance policy for the players. In a previous superleague discussion in 2018, FIFA had issued dark warnings that players could be banned from their national teams — and thus the World Cup — for appearing in an unsanctioned league.

By the middle of last year, the advisers from A22 were telling clubs that “FIFA was on board,” according to a Super League club owner. Others interviewed, including several with direct knowledge of the meetings who spoke anonymously because they would face legal action for publicly disclosing information subject to secrecy rules, said FIFA was at least open to the idea of the new league. But they said the organization and its leaders remained noncommittal — at least officially — until more details about the structure of the project were in place.

Confident they could obtain the support they needed, the organizers discussed various concepts for their new league before landing on the one they presented to the world when they broke cover on April 18. The Super League, as it would be known, would have 15 permanent members but would allow access to five additional teams from Europe each season.

A22 had been working on iterations of a superleague for as long as three years. Laghrari, an executive at the advisory firm Key Capital Partners who has known the Real Madrid president, Florentino Pérez, since he was a child, was to be the league’s first secretary general. Pérez had long been the driving force behind a superleague, but now, as he had come to grow confident he had FIFA on board, the stars started to align for him and his friend.

In Infantino, Pérez and Laghrari had found an energetic president eager to remake the soccer business. Infantino often spoke about being open to new ventures and proposals — he has championed the expansion of both the World Cup and FIFA’s Club World Cup in recent years — as he sought to assert FIFA’s dominance over the club game in a manner unlike any of his predecessors.

Pérez and Laghrari also found kindred spirits in the men who controlled most of Europe’s top clubs. Most were drawn to a project that promised to open a spigot of new revenue while ensuring that costs would be controlled, leading to enormous profits and access to elite competition in perpetuity.

Yet even as they received assurances from the A22 advisers about FIFA’s involvement, some skeptical club owners did their own due diligence by reaching out directly to senior FIFA officials. And the word they got back, according to a team executive with direct knowledge of at least one of those conversations, was the same they were hearing from Madrid: If the plan was put together in a certain way, FIFA would not oppose it.

Those talks gave the clubs and JPMorgan, the American investment bank that had agreed to finance the project, a level of comfort about its viability. Their confidence wavered, though, when leaks about a potential superleague emerged in news reports in January, accompanied by whispers of FIFA’s involvement in the talks.

Alarmed by the reports, European soccer’s top official, Aleksander Ceferin, the UEFA president, held an urgent meeting with Infantino at UEFA’s headquarters in Nyon, Switzerland in which he asked Infantino directly if he was involved in the plan. Infantino said he was not, but he initially demurred when asked to commit to a statement condemning the proposals. Amid intense pressure and growing requests for comment, though, he backed down.

On Jan. 21, a statement was issued in the name of FIFA and soccer’s six regional confederations. It said a “closed” European league would not be recognized by FIFA or the confederations and reiterated the threat of a World Cup ban for any participant.

The statement shocked the organizers of the Super League, as their talks with FIFA until that stage had been positive. But according to people involved in the planning, they also sensed a signal in its wording: FIFA said it would not recognize a closed competition, but the Super League was now planning to supplement its roster of 15 permanent members with five qualifiers every season.

The A22 advisers, according to the club owner, insisted that loophole meant all was not lost. “They reported that FIFA was still open to something,” he said.

The founders’ plan was to tie the Super League to FIFA’s Club World Cup, the owner said. That way the clubs would commit as many as 12 of the biggest teams in Europe to Infantino’s ambitious global competition in exchange for FIFA’s blessing of their new league. To sweeten the deal, they considered waiving $1 billion in potential payouts to allow FIFA to keep the money as a so-called solidarity payment that could be spent on soccer development projects around the world.

It is unknown if any more talks took place between FIFA and the Super League clubs in the weeks before the clubs broke cover and announced their project. But FIFA was the last of the major soccer governing bodies to issue an official statement on the proposed league after the clubs went public, and it only did so after UEFA, top leagues and politicians had made clear their opposition.

Arriving as Ceferin was calling the leaders of the breakaway league “snakes and liars,” FIFA’s statement was far more measured. Any talk of excluding players from the World Cup was quietly dropped, and FIFA instead offered nuanced, conciliatory language. FIFA said it stood “firm in favour of solidarity in football and an equitable redistribution model which can help develop football as a sport, particularly at global level.”

It also reiterated that it could only “express its disapproval to a ‘closed European breakaway league’ outside of the international football structures.”

For those engaged in the breakaway, the words — as they had in January — were vague enough to suggest that there was still hope for their project, that FIFA might still be open to providing its backing.

Within 48 hours, though, their hopes were dashed. Opposition to the plan had by then reached a fever pitch. Fans in Britain — where six of the 12 founding members were based — were protesting in the streets, and politicians had threatened to enact laws to block the league.

Infantino, just as he had in January, once again came under pressure from Ceferin to distance himself from the plans. He did so in a speech to UEFA’s congress on April 20 in which he effectively walked away from the Super League project.

“We can only strongly disapprove the creation of the Super League,” Infantino said. “A Super League which is a closed shop. A breakaway from the current institutions, from the leagues, from the associations, from UEFA and from FIFA. There is a lot to throw away for the short-term financial gain of some. They need to reflect, and they need to assume responsibility.”

Hours later, realizing that the “essential” requirement their contract had called for would not be forthcoming, the first clubs started to walk away. By nightfall, all six English clubs had announced they were out. By midnight, three other founders had followed.

Today only three teams — Pérez’s Real Madrid, Juventus and Barcelona — remain as holdouts, refusing to sign a letter of apology demanded by UEFA as a condition of their reintegration into European soccer. If they do not sign, all three face significant penalties, including a potential ban from the Champions League.

Infantino, meanwhile, faces pressures of his own, not to mention accusations of betrayal. The head of the Spanish league, Javier Tebas, openly called him one of the masterminds behind the breakaway league and said he had told Infantino as much when the men met briefly at the UEFA Congress.

“It’s he who is behind the Super League, and I already told him in person,” Tebas said this month. “I’ve said it before and I will say it again: Behind all of this is FIFA President Gianni Infantino.”
by Chester Perry
Fri Feb 26, 2021 11:28 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Football Leaks has another victim - Spanish authorities charge football agent Abdilgafar Fali Ramadani and his associates with money laundering and offences against the public purse

https://theblacksea.eu/stories/football ... all-leaks/
by Chester Perry
Fri Feb 26, 2021 6:57 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Rui Pinto - John of Football Leaks fame is still trying to clear himself of charges in Portugal but there is better news for one of the Media organisations that have been publishing Football Leaks material - The Black Sea have just seen a two year old case against them in the Romanian Courts dismissed. this is their report on it

https://theblacksea.eu/stories/romanian ... s-stories/

Romanian Court dismisses lawsuit against Football Leaks stories

Two-year legal battle ends in win for Football Leaks reporting

By Craig Shaw
25 February 2021

The Black Sea’s Football Leaks reporting has been vindicated after a two-year legal battle in Romanian courts. In a ruling on Wednesday, the judge rejected the action brought by Tevfik Arif, Arif Efendi and Doyen Sports Investment Limited, the subject of a series of stories from 2016.

The judge has yet to issue a full, written judgment and reasoning on the decision, but nevertheless found the complaints by the Arifs to be “unfounded.”

Two years after publication of Football Leaks, Tevfik Arif, his son, Arif Efendi (aka Arif Arifov), and their Malta-based Doyen Sports Investment Limited, sued the Romanian Centre for Investigative Journalism (CRJI) in Bucharest during the last days of 2018. CRJI members had established The Black Sea as a project in 2013.

The Arifs filed two actions, at first a temporary gag order - obtained without a hearing or the knowledge of the journalists – that demanded every story on The Black Sea’s website which mentioned the Arifs be taken down. They then filed two further “emergency orders” intended to keep the stories offline and forbid journalists, and associated investigative groups, from publishing anything about the family or their companies in the future.

The stories remained available on The Black Sea’s website throughout the protracted legal case, which saw the Arifs and Doyen Sports requesting postponement around half a dozen times. As the trial experienced continued delays, CRJI accrued fines of 1000 RON (aprox €200) for each day the stories stayed online. The gag order has so far produced a penalty of almost €70,000 for CRJI, one of the oldest non-profit investigative centres in Europe.

The additional complaints to have the stories permanently removed were on the basis that the journalism was defamatory, based on hacked documents, and had harmed their ability to do business and obtain bank accounts. They also targeted Njalla, The Black Sea’s domain registrar, to force them to remove the stories. The company resisted the efforts.

But in a shocking disregard for privacy, during the course of proceedings, the Arif family lawyers were able to obtain personal and private information, including the full names and full home addresses, of journalists associated with CRJI and The Black Sea from the EU Domain registry EURID.

The suit stems from reports more than four years ago. In November 2016, The Black Sea and its partners in the European Investigative Collaborations network co-published the Football Leaks investigation, an expose of football’s dirty dealings, based on more than 11 million leaked documents, 3.4 terabytes of data.

The reporting led to official investigations for tax fraud and money laundering, some of which are still ongoing.

Among the main subjects of the investigation were the wealthy and highly secretive Arifs, a Kazakh-Turkish family, with strong ties to post-Soviet oligarchs, organised crime, and world leaders, like Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The brothers Tevfik (aka Tofik Arifov) and Refik Arif were the chief actors in the operations, but the new generation of children, including Arif Efendi, Tevfik’s son, began to emerge in the business.

It was reported that Arifs’ vast fortune stems from a deliberately obfuscated ownership of a polluting chrome foundry in Aktobe, Kazakhstan, known as ACCP – ownership the family are desperate to remain hidden.

Since the mid-1990s, the profits from ACCP – roughly $2bn according to our analysis and documents we’ve seen – appear to have been funnelled out of Kazakhstan via a series of offshore companies and money laundering schemes, facilitating generations of the Arifs to live lavish lifestyles, flying via private planes to series of luxury homes in Istanbul, London and New York.

But it also permitted the family to enter other industries: real estate, with Donald Trump, construction and hotels, commodities trading, and deals in the Turkish energy sector, such as a gas project with Sitki Ayan, suspected of bribing the President Erdoğan for tax abatements.

In later years, when Tevfik’s son, Arif, wanted to forge his own future, by entering into football’s since-banned third party ownership (TPO) business and commodities trading, he, too, tapped the chrome factory for funds. He borrowed tens of millions of dollars to finance Doyen Sports and Doyen Capital in London.

It was Doyen’s dealings in European football that caused its operation to be blown open. Targeted by the Football Leaks whistle-blowers, Doyen’s secrets fell into the hands of German weekly magazine, Der Spiegel, along with massive amounts of unconnected data. Der Spiegel shared the data with EIC network partners.

Football Leaks’s data revealed information about the world's biggest clubs, and Fifa and Uefa, but also about the offices where secret deals are forged between clubs, players and agents.

The face of 'Football Leaks' is 'John', a then anonymous whistleblower wishing to expose abuses in the international soccer world. In 2019, John was arrested and identified as Rui Pinto, a young Portuguese national.

Pinto remained in pretrial arrest for more than a year. Since last year, he has been cooperating with the Portuguese prosecutors. He handed over 17,5 terabyte of data to authorities and is now living in a whistleblower protection program at a secret location in Portugal. Pinto, who was also a source of “Malta Files” and “Luanda Leaks” is currently on trial in Portugal on suspicion of hacking, among other charges.

Despite EIC partners publishing similar allegations against the Arifs back in 2016, The Black Sea was the only publication targeted by the family. In the years since publication, they made multiple attempts to remove links and references to the stories in Google search results, using the EU’s “right to be forgotten” laws. Google rejected their requests, citing the public interest nature of The Black Sea’s journalism.

Stefan Candea, coordinator of the EIC Network, and President of CRJI told The Black Sea: “We must thank our lawyer, Diana Hatneanu, who, on her own, defeated the lawyers of Doyen and Arif, who had been represented by Stoica & Asociatii, the law office of Valeriu Stoica, the former Liberal Party Minister of Justice.”

He also thanks Media Defence for its valuable legal support, and criticised the EURid (the .eu domain registry manager) for providing the Arif lawyers, within hours* of the request and without warning, the full names and full home address of every journalist who’d ever owned theblacksea.eu.

*CORRECTION: EURid provided personal, private information to the German lawyers of the Arifs and Doyen within hours, not days.
by Chester Perry
Sun Feb 21, 2021 11:59 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Rui Pinto may still be on trial in Portugal but there has just been another release from Football Leaks and it puts questions to Real Madrid

https://translate.google.com/translate? ... _1011.html
by Chester Perry
Thu Jan 21, 2021 3:16 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Fri Jan 15, 2021 5:31 pm
Fascinating article in The Athletic today from Matt Slater - it is important to remember just how much of the football economy is built on the transfer market and how many clubs entire financial model is centred on it

Should football scrap transfer fees?
Matt Slater Jan 14, 2021

Professional cycling had rolled merrily along for more than a century without anyone trying to do something as underhand as buy a rider from another team. Fixing races, paying bribes, taking drugs? Sure! But financial inducements to break a contract? Pah, we’re all gentlemen here and we have shaken hands!

But then, in 2009, new money arrived and it wanted a star to lead its grand project. And it wouldn’t wait.

Bradley Wiggins, now Sir Bradley, had just finished fourth in that summer’s Tour de France. It was his breakthrough performance on the road after a decade of success in the velodrome. That fourth place was later upgraded to third when Lance Armstrong’s career was cancelled but Wiggins’ result was already a tie for the best Tour finish by a British rider, making him the obvious leader of the new British flagship coming down the slipway, Team Sky.

The lovechild of performance guru Sir Dave Brailsford and Sky chairman James Murdoch, Team Sky were determined to compete from the gun when the 2010 season started, which is why they needed Wiggo. There was one problem, though. He still had one year on his contract with US team Garmin-Slipstream and they wanted to keep him.

What followed was cycling’s first transfer saga. And it finished the way these things often finish in football, with the bigger team getting their man and the smaller team wondering if they got enough for him.

“Cycling contracts are typically short enough that it’s more efficient to just wait until the contract is up,” remembers Jonathan Vaughters, Wiggins’ old boss at Garmin and now manager of the team they have become, EF Education-Nippo. (Cycling might be behind football when it comes to transfers but it is has nothing to learn on naming rights).

“But with Wiggins, it was a combination of things. One, you had the wealth and personal interest of James Murdoch wanting him at Sky, ASAP. Two, the team was branded ‘Britain’s team’ — not having the best British rider would have looked bad. And three, our inability to financially match the compensation levels.

“So, it was a rare moment when a transfer made sense. Legally, we had no choice.”

Wiggins would win the Tour de France for Team Sky two years later but a decade after cycling’s first transfer tug-of-war, his move remains the exception to the rule. Contracts are getting a bit longer and small fees are sometimes paid by the richest teams to smaller ones for hot prospects, but the majority of riders go from one season to the next, eager to earn a bit more from their next contract while they’re on the up, and desperate to eke out another season on their way down.

It is the same story in almost every other professional team sport in the world. Rugby league, one of the UK’s oldest professional sports, used to have transfer fees, usually when one of its best players was being poached by rugby union, but they have dried up in recent years, with the last notable fee being the world-record £700,000 the New Zealand Warriors paid Wigan for Sam Tomkins in 2013.

There is no tradition of transfer fees in cricket, either, while rugby union, professional for the last 25 years, mainly lives without them. High-profile transfers such as Louis Picamoles’ move from Northampton to Montpellier or English stars George Ford and Jonny May joining Leicester are rare, and they involve tiny fees by football standards.

Of course, North American sport, with its closed leagues, collective bargaining agreements and draft systems, has no need for transfer fees. And this is where many in European football believed the game was heading after it received the biggest shock to its way of doing business, the Bosman ruling in 1995.

Jean-Marc Bosman is an unlikely revolutionary. Like so many other players before and since, his early promise had faded somewhat and he found himself out of favour at RFC Liege. He was only 25, though, and Dunkerque, just over the border, were convinced the former Belgian youth international could do a job for them in France’s second division.

Unfortunately, Liege wanted £500,000 for the player, despite his contract expiring, a sum Dunkerque could not afford. The impasse left Bosman stranded and, to make matters worse, Liege promptly cut his pay by 75 per cent and sent him to train with the reserves.

Bosman bit back, suing Liege, the Belgian FA and eventually UEFA, too. It took more than four years but by the time he was done with them, he had heralded the start of football’s free agency era and ended UEFA’s limits on the number of overseas players teams could use, which had been deemed a clear breach of the European Union’s single market.

In a classic case of justice delayed being justice denied, Bosman’s win did little for his career but made millions for fellow professionals, and their agents, who realised they now just had to wait for contracts to expire before they could take their pick of suitors willing to put what they would have spent on a fee into the player’s wage and signing-on bonus.

The transfer market was dead, right? Players had all the power, clubs no longer had any incentive to develop talent and the end of the world was nigh. Wrong.

Seven months after the Bosman ruling was delivered, Newcastle United paid Blackburn Rovers £15 million for Alan Shearer — double what Arsenal had sent Inter Milan for Dennis Bergkamp a year before. By 2000, the record was Luis Figo’s £37 million price tag for moving from Barca to Real Madrid. In 2009, Real paid Manchester United £80 million for Cristiano Ronaldo’s services and then, in 2017, Neymar set the bar at a shade under £200 million when he went from Barcelona to Paris Saint-Germain.

“What happened after Bosman is the European Commission investigated the rules of the entire transfer system and forced some substantial changes,” explains Jonas Baer-Hoffmann, general secretary of global players’ union FIFPro, which helped Jean-Marc Bosman fight his landmark case.

“But that process established new mechanisms and restrictions, which, according to the famous words of the then-European competition commissioner Mario Monti, were meant to strike a balance between the interests of the sport and the players’ right to free movement.”

Through a series of subsequent rulings, the most notable involving Brazilian playmaker Matuzalem and his attempt to force a move from Shakhtar Donetsk to Real Zaragoza in 2007, the pendulum swung back towards the clubs. A compromise was struck between the European Commission and FIFA based on the idea that football was different to other industries, and therefore footballers could not be allowed to just up sticks and leave whenever a more lucrative opportunity came calling.

It is a compromise FIFPro threatened to blow apart in 2015, when it announced a fresh challenge to the system. Frustrated at the authorities’ failure to address the problem of players being paid late, or not at all, the union told FIFA and UEFA that transfer fees impeded their members’ ability to find better employers. It also pointed out that fees were not trickling down the pyramid but had instead become a barrier to entry that only the richest clubs could clear. And, with that in mind, FIFPro also wanted to cap agents’ fees, limit loans and reduce the size of squads.

If it was a bargaining tactic, it worked, as FIFA started talks with FIFPro on reforms to its “regulations on the status and transfer of players” and the union agreed to drop the challenge. So far those talks have produced some tweaks to the rules that should benefit players but the most high-profile proposal — limiting the amount agents can earn from deals — is likely to result in another round of fierce legal argument.

Baer-Hoffmann is happy to continue trying to change the system for this 65,000 members’ benefit from inside the tent for now, but he does not sound like a man willing to wait for the sunlit uplands forever.

“FIFA has accepted the system doesn’t obtain its stated objectives and that raises questions about the restrictions it creates,” he says.

“There’s a misconception in football that we try to regulate this market by restricting the labour market for players but if you’re concerned about reimbursing clubs for training players, you don’t have to do that via a transfer system. You could put a tax on any of your revenues and say: ‘You know what? The clubs further down the pyramid do such a good job developing players, we’re going to share some of our money’.

“We talked about that at the time of Bosman. The advocate-general of the European court said the goals the clubs and federations wanted to obtain could be much better achieved by other mechanisms. That’s still the case today.

“The transfer system stabilises the power structure because only a few clubs will be able to pay the fees you need for certain players. Yes, it does redistribute money but not to a degree that will ever outweigh the competitive advantage the big clubs get.”

Stefan Szymanski, a professor of sport management at the University of Michigan and the author of the best-selling Soccernomics, agrees. In fact, he wrote a paper to support FIFPro’s planned assault on transfer fees in 2015 and is rather disappointed the union agreed to an armistice.

For him, the argument is very simple: transfer fees are illegal.

“If The Guardian offered you a staff job, but The Athletic said, ‘You can only move jobs now if they pay us a fee, otherwise you have to work for us for another two years’, you would be in court like a shot,” he explains.

“Everyone in Europe has the right to move freely, except footballers. No law has ever been passed exempting football clubs from labour law. So it is illegal and it breaches a right that everyone else takes for granted.

“If it’s illegal, it should stop. Full stop.”

What is the alternative, then?

“Players would negotiate contracts with teams, just as the rest of us negotiate contracts with our employers,” says Szymanski. “Most people are happy to stay with their current employer as long as they feel they are being treated fairly and only leave if a) they get a better offer or b) they don’t like their work environment.

“Clubs would need to treat players a bit more like human beings and less like horsemeat. It’s not difficult: every other employer has to do it. And it isn’t necessarily more expensive. It’s a state of mind.”

The counter-argument, however, is that so-called selling clubs — which, let’s face it, is nearly all of them — would either be unable to compete without transfer income or would go bankrupt without it. Szymanski rejects this.

“I’ve researched the financial performance of clubs over the last half-century and there is no evidence that small clubs obtain substantial benefits from transfers,” he says. “Teams do better when they can spend more on players, not when they sell them and spend less.

“Active trading in the transfer market is not a means of challenging the dominant clubs. In fact, I would argue that small clubs would have a better chance of challenging if transfer fees were not an obstacle to hiring stars.

“Financial failure is a valid concern but you need to understand why it happens, and to realise that the transfer system does not help. Most financial failures are a result of failure on the pitch, usually connected to relegation. Fire sales of players by teams in crisis do little to solve the problem, precisely because the buyers know it’s a fire sale.

“Very few small clubs are ever able to generate substantial revenues from player trading — it’s the big clubs that control the development of talent. The best players are cornered by the age of 15. What the clubs need is an insurance scheme to guard against financial failure.”

Sounds reasonable, doesn’t it? But how do you get there from here?

Dr Giambattista Rossi is a lecturer in sports labour markets at the University of London’s Birkbeck College and he isn’t so sure you can.

“When we talk about transfer fees in football, we’re really talking about compensation: good players make you win games and that means revenue,” explains Rossi. “But you cannot take 10 players and make a Messi. So there is scarcity value for the top players.

“North American sport doesn’t have (transfers) because they have closed leagues and the owners pool all of the game’s resources and say, ‘OK, the players get half’. Nobody can interfere as they have legal protection from US anti-trust rules.

“Transfer fees are implicit to global football’s system. Media interest has created the rise in fees because, don’t forget, you buy players to win and winning equals revenue. Football, unlike US sport, has a winner-takes-all approach to revenue.

“Economists often talk about human capital. Take our jobs: we know how to write and explain things but lots of people can do that. But there are some jobs — sport, music, surgery — that require a huge amount of specific training to acquire a high level of skill. And when you are a little bit better than everyone else, you can earn much, much more than the rest.”

For Rossi, the problems that Baer-Hoffmann and Szymanski identify have easier solutions than scrapping something as fundamental to the game as transfer fees, although to be fair to FIFPro, it has been calling for these ideas, too.

“It always strikes me as strange that people complain about the negative impact of transfer fees but do not talk about how financial fair play rules have entrenched the status quo or how the big clubs stockpile talent in feeder clubs, giving them huge power and influence,” says Rossi.

“We should criticise (leading agents) like Jonathan Barnett and Jorge Mendes if they don’t pay their taxes, not for doing their jobs. There is a lot of myopia about where the power really resides in football. You would think, in a sport where there are a fixed number of players, you would have to release anyone you don’t use, but the biggest clubs hold onto and control these players.

“And people often talk about money going out of the game to agents but what economic sector is there that is hermetically sealed? Money leaks in every sector. Look at image rights. Does that money stay in football?

“Transfer fees are here to stay because they are entwined in the system: most clubs use them to generate revenue. If you took them away, you would have to replace them with a mechanism that compensated clubs for that lost revenue. It’s not impossible but I do not see how you do it without a closed league.”

Daniel Geey is a leading British sports lawyer and the author of Done Deal, the definitive guide to the transfer market’s legal framework. He agrees with Rossi that scrapping transfer fees would be very difficult, as players are the club’s most valuable intangible assets and any new system would have to address that immediate loss of value.

He also believes the system has more benefits for players than its critics are willing to admit.

“When a player is in demand, the interests of the buying club and player are aligned in that they want security,” says Geey. “The club wants to lock in that value and the player gets the benefit of a life-changing contract.

“Why don’t players want to sign shorter contracts? Simple: one bad injury and it’s all over. So there are upsides in the current system that the unions tend to gloss over. I would argue that for players contractual stability will usually outweigh the restrictive effect of high transfer fees.”

This point makes perfect sense for Daren O’Leary, a former rugby union professional who is now a leading agent in the sport.

“Rugby union is going in this direction and the simple reason is length of contracts,” says O’Leary, who retired in 2005 after making more than 200 appearances across stints with Harlequins, Gloucester and Worcester.

“When I started as an agent, about 75 per cent of the players were on two-year deals, with the rest on one-year contracts and maybe a handful on three-year deals.

“But now about a third of the players are on three-year contracts and we’re even seeing four and five-year deals coming in, although they tend to be very much in the club’s favour and I would never advise a young player to commit that long.”

The complicating factor with rugby union is the hard salary cap, a cost-control mechanism that should work in the opposite direction of a vibrant transfer market, where, theoretically, the talent goes up the pyramid and money filters down. Salary caps, on the other hand, are meant to stop all the best players automatically going to the biggest teams, more evenly distributing talent throughout the league.

But the older professional club rugby union gets, the more like football it becomes. O’Leary says it is now fairly common for clubs to make small payments — £30,000 or so — to instantly get a player they want, rather than wait until his contract is up. And players are less willing to play out final seasons with their current clubs, risking injury, when they know there is a longer contract awaiting somewhere else.

O’Leary listed several other trends in the game — fixed development fees to compensate smaller teams when their best youngsters are poached, competition for talent from overseas and clubs separating recruitment from coaching — that he believes are lessons professional rugby is learning from football.

So perhaps it is not the case that football’s “illegal” approach to human resources is so out of step with the rest of sport. It is more that football — or, more accurately, top-flight football — is simply much richer than any other team sport outside North America, and if draft systems, trades and collective bargaining agreements are your thing, you cannot have promotion, relegation and transfer gossip, too.

Open or closed, total free agency or contractual stability. You cannot have both. Choose one, always read the small print and enjoy.
Matt Slater is talking about this on today's Sports Business Podcast from the Athletic

https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cH ... Q&hl=en-GB
by Chester Perry
Fri Jan 15, 2021 5:31 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Fascinating article in The Athletic today from Matt Slater - it is important to remember just how much of the football economy is built on the transfer market and how many clubs entire financial model is centred on it

Should football scrap transfer fees?
Matt Slater Jan 14, 2021

Professional cycling had rolled merrily along for more than a century without anyone trying to do something as underhand as buy a rider from another team. Fixing races, paying bribes, taking drugs? Sure! But financial inducements to break a contract? Pah, we’re all gentlemen here and we have shaken hands!

But then, in 2009, new money arrived and it wanted a star to lead its grand project. And it wouldn’t wait.

Bradley Wiggins, now Sir Bradley, had just finished fourth in that summer’s Tour de France. It was his breakthrough performance on the road after a decade of success in the velodrome. That fourth place was later upgraded to third when Lance Armstrong’s career was cancelled but Wiggins’ result was already a tie for the best Tour finish by a British rider, making him the obvious leader of the new British flagship coming down the slipway, Team Sky.

The lovechild of performance guru Sir Dave Brailsford and Sky chairman James Murdoch, Team Sky were determined to compete from the gun when the 2010 season started, which is why they needed Wiggo. There was one problem, though. He still had one year on his contract with US team Garmin-Slipstream and they wanted to keep him.

What followed was cycling’s first transfer saga. And it finished the way these things often finish in football, with the bigger team getting their man and the smaller team wondering if they got enough for him.

“Cycling contracts are typically short enough that it’s more efficient to just wait until the contract is up,” remembers Jonathan Vaughters, Wiggins’ old boss at Garmin and now manager of the team they have become, EF Education-Nippo. (Cycling might be behind football when it comes to transfers but it is has nothing to learn on naming rights).

“But with Wiggins, it was a combination of things. One, you had the wealth and personal interest of James Murdoch wanting him at Sky, ASAP. Two, the team was branded ‘Britain’s team’ — not having the best British rider would have looked bad. And three, our inability to financially match the compensation levels.

“So, it was a rare moment when a transfer made sense. Legally, we had no choice.”

Wiggins would win the Tour de France for Team Sky two years later but a decade after cycling’s first transfer tug-of-war, his move remains the exception to the rule. Contracts are getting a bit longer and small fees are sometimes paid by the richest teams to smaller ones for hot prospects, but the majority of riders go from one season to the next, eager to earn a bit more from their next contract while they’re on the up, and desperate to eke out another season on their way down.

It is the same story in almost every other professional team sport in the world. Rugby league, one of the UK’s oldest professional sports, used to have transfer fees, usually when one of its best players was being poached by rugby union, but they have dried up in recent years, with the last notable fee being the world-record £700,000 the New Zealand Warriors paid Wigan for Sam Tomkins in 2013.

There is no tradition of transfer fees in cricket, either, while rugby union, professional for the last 25 years, mainly lives without them. High-profile transfers such as Louis Picamoles’ move from Northampton to Montpellier or English stars George Ford and Jonny May joining Leicester are rare, and they involve tiny fees by football standards.

Of course, North American sport, with its closed leagues, collective bargaining agreements and draft systems, has no need for transfer fees. And this is where many in European football believed the game was heading after it received the biggest shock to its way of doing business, the Bosman ruling in 1995.

Jean-Marc Bosman is an unlikely revolutionary. Like so many other players before and since, his early promise had faded somewhat and he found himself out of favour at RFC Liege. He was only 25, though, and Dunkerque, just over the border, were convinced the former Belgian youth international could do a job for them in France’s second division.

Unfortunately, Liege wanted £500,000 for the player, despite his contract expiring, a sum Dunkerque could not afford. The impasse left Bosman stranded and, to make matters worse, Liege promptly cut his pay by 75 per cent and sent him to train with the reserves.

Bosman bit back, suing Liege, the Belgian FA and eventually UEFA, too. It took more than four years but by the time he was done with them, he had heralded the start of football’s free agency era and ended UEFA’s limits on the number of overseas players teams could use, which had been deemed a clear breach of the European Union’s single market.

In a classic case of justice delayed being justice denied, Bosman’s win did little for his career but made millions for fellow professionals, and their agents, who realised they now just had to wait for contracts to expire before they could take their pick of suitors willing to put what they would have spent on a fee into the player’s wage and signing-on bonus.

The transfer market was dead, right? Players had all the power, clubs no longer had any incentive to develop talent and the end of the world was nigh. Wrong.

Seven months after the Bosman ruling was delivered, Newcastle United paid Blackburn Rovers £15 million for Alan Shearer — double what Arsenal had sent Inter Milan for Dennis Bergkamp a year before. By 2000, the record was Luis Figo’s £37 million price tag for moving from Barca to Real Madrid. In 2009, Real paid Manchester United £80 million for Cristiano Ronaldo’s services and then, in 2017, Neymar set the bar at a shade under £200 million when he went from Barcelona to Paris Saint-Germain.

“What happened after Bosman is the European Commission investigated the rules of the entire transfer system and forced some substantial changes,” explains Jonas Baer-Hoffmann, general secretary of global players’ union FIFPro, which helped Jean-Marc Bosman fight his landmark case.

“But that process established new mechanisms and restrictions, which, according to the famous words of the then-European competition commissioner Mario Monti, were meant to strike a balance between the interests of the sport and the players’ right to free movement.”

Through a series of subsequent rulings, the most notable involving Brazilian playmaker Matuzalem and his attempt to force a move from Shakhtar Donetsk to Real Zaragoza in 2007, the pendulum swung back towards the clubs. A compromise was struck between the European Commission and FIFA based on the idea that football was different to other industries, and therefore footballers could not be allowed to just up sticks and leave whenever a more lucrative opportunity came calling.

It is a compromise FIFPro threatened to blow apart in 2015, when it announced a fresh challenge to the system. Frustrated at the authorities’ failure to address the problem of players being paid late, or not at all, the union told FIFA and UEFA that transfer fees impeded their members’ ability to find better employers. It also pointed out that fees were not trickling down the pyramid but had instead become a barrier to entry that only the richest clubs could clear. And, with that in mind, FIFPro also wanted to cap agents’ fees, limit loans and reduce the size of squads.

If it was a bargaining tactic, it worked, as FIFA started talks with FIFPro on reforms to its “regulations on the status and transfer of players” and the union agreed to drop the challenge. So far those talks have produced some tweaks to the rules that should benefit players but the most high-profile proposal — limiting the amount agents can earn from deals — is likely to result in another round of fierce legal argument.

Baer-Hoffmann is happy to continue trying to change the system for this 65,000 members’ benefit from inside the tent for now, but he does not sound like a man willing to wait for the sunlit uplands forever.

“FIFA has accepted the system doesn’t obtain its stated objectives and that raises questions about the restrictions it creates,” he says.

“There’s a misconception in football that we try to regulate this market by restricting the labour market for players but if you’re concerned about reimbursing clubs for training players, you don’t have to do that via a transfer system. You could put a tax on any of your revenues and say: ‘You know what? The clubs further down the pyramid do such a good job developing players, we’re going to share some of our money’.

“We talked about that at the time of Bosman. The advocate-general of the European court said the goals the clubs and federations wanted to obtain could be much better achieved by other mechanisms. That’s still the case today.

“The transfer system stabilises the power structure because only a few clubs will be able to pay the fees you need for certain players. Yes, it does redistribute money but not to a degree that will ever outweigh the competitive advantage the big clubs get.”

Stefan Szymanski, a professor of sport management at the University of Michigan and the author of the best-selling Soccernomics, agrees. In fact, he wrote a paper to support FIFPro’s planned assault on transfer fees in 2015 and is rather disappointed the union agreed to an armistice.

For him, the argument is very simple: transfer fees are illegal.

“If The Guardian offered you a staff job, but The Athletic said, ‘You can only move jobs now if they pay us a fee, otherwise you have to work for us for another two years’, you would be in court like a shot,” he explains.

“Everyone in Europe has the right to move freely, except footballers. No law has ever been passed exempting football clubs from labour law. So it is illegal and it breaches a right that everyone else takes for granted.

“If it’s illegal, it should stop. Full stop.”

What is the alternative, then?

“Players would negotiate contracts with teams, just as the rest of us negotiate contracts with our employers,” says Szymanski. “Most people are happy to stay with their current employer as long as they feel they are being treated fairly and only leave if a) they get a better offer or b) they don’t like their work environment.

“Clubs would need to treat players a bit more like human beings and less like horsemeat. It’s not difficult: every other employer has to do it. And it isn’t necessarily more expensive. It’s a state of mind.”

The counter-argument, however, is that so-called selling clubs — which, let’s face it, is nearly all of them — would either be unable to compete without transfer income or would go bankrupt without it. Szymanski rejects this.

“I’ve researched the financial performance of clubs over the last half-century and there is no evidence that small clubs obtain substantial benefits from transfers,” he says. “Teams do better when they can spend more on players, not when they sell them and spend less.

“Active trading in the transfer market is not a means of challenging the dominant clubs. In fact, I would argue that small clubs would have a better chance of challenging if transfer fees were not an obstacle to hiring stars.

“Financial failure is a valid concern but you need to understand why it happens, and to realise that the transfer system does not help. Most financial failures are a result of failure on the pitch, usually connected to relegation. Fire sales of players by teams in crisis do little to solve the problem, precisely because the buyers know it’s a fire sale.

“Very few small clubs are ever able to generate substantial revenues from player trading — it’s the big clubs that control the development of talent. The best players are cornered by the age of 15. What the clubs need is an insurance scheme to guard against financial failure.”

Sounds reasonable, doesn’t it? But how do you get there from here?

Dr Giambattista Rossi is a lecturer in sports labour markets at the University of London’s Birkbeck College and he isn’t so sure you can.

“When we talk about transfer fees in football, we’re really talking about compensation: good players make you win games and that means revenue,” explains Rossi. “But you cannot take 10 players and make a Messi. So there is scarcity value for the top players.

“North American sport doesn’t have (transfers) because they have closed leagues and the owners pool all of the game’s resources and say, ‘OK, the players get half’. Nobody can interfere as they have legal protection from US anti-trust rules.

“Transfer fees are implicit to global football’s system. Media interest has created the rise in fees because, don’t forget, you buy players to win and winning equals revenue. Football, unlike US sport, has a winner-takes-all approach to revenue.

“Economists often talk about human capital. Take our jobs: we know how to write and explain things but lots of people can do that. But there are some jobs — sport, music, surgery — that require a huge amount of specific training to acquire a high level of skill. And when you are a little bit better than everyone else, you can earn much, much more than the rest.”

For Rossi, the problems that Baer-Hoffmann and Szymanski identify have easier solutions than scrapping something as fundamental to the game as transfer fees, although to be fair to FIFPro, it has been calling for these ideas, too.

“It always strikes me as strange that people complain about the negative impact of transfer fees but do not talk about how financial fair play rules have entrenched the status quo or how the big clubs stockpile talent in feeder clubs, giving them huge power and influence,” says Rossi.

“We should criticise (leading agents) like Jonathan Barnett and Jorge Mendes if they don’t pay their taxes, not for doing their jobs. There is a lot of myopia about where the power really resides in football. You would think, in a sport where there are a fixed number of players, you would have to release anyone you don’t use, but the biggest clubs hold onto and control these players.

“And people often talk about money going out of the game to agents but what economic sector is there that is hermetically sealed? Money leaks in every sector. Look at image rights. Does that money stay in football?

“Transfer fees are here to stay because they are entwined in the system: most clubs use them to generate revenue. If you took them away, you would have to replace them with a mechanism that compensated clubs for that lost revenue. It’s not impossible but I do not see how you do it without a closed league.”

Daniel Geey is a leading British sports lawyer and the author of Done Deal, the definitive guide to the transfer market’s legal framework. He agrees with Rossi that scrapping transfer fees would be very difficult, as players are the club’s most valuable intangible assets and any new system would have to address that immediate loss of value.

He also believes the system has more benefits for players than its critics are willing to admit.

“When a player is in demand, the interests of the buying club and player are aligned in that they want security,” says Geey. “The club wants to lock in that value and the player gets the benefit of a life-changing contract.

“Why don’t players want to sign shorter contracts? Simple: one bad injury and it’s all over. So there are upsides in the current system that the unions tend to gloss over. I would argue that for players contractual stability will usually outweigh the restrictive effect of high transfer fees.”

This point makes perfect sense for Daren O’Leary, a former rugby union professional who is now a leading agent in the sport.

“Rugby union is going in this direction and the simple reason is length of contracts,” says O’Leary, who retired in 2005 after making more than 200 appearances across stints with Harlequins, Gloucester and Worcester.

“When I started as an agent, about 75 per cent of the players were on two-year deals, with the rest on one-year contracts and maybe a handful on three-year deals.

“But now about a third of the players are on three-year contracts and we’re even seeing four and five-year deals coming in, although they tend to be very much in the club’s favour and I would never advise a young player to commit that long.”

The complicating factor with rugby union is the hard salary cap, a cost-control mechanism that should work in the opposite direction of a vibrant transfer market, where, theoretically, the talent goes up the pyramid and money filters down. Salary caps, on the other hand, are meant to stop all the best players automatically going to the biggest teams, more evenly distributing talent throughout the league.

But the older professional club rugby union gets, the more like football it becomes. O’Leary says it is now fairly common for clubs to make small payments — £30,000 or so — to instantly get a player they want, rather than wait until his contract is up. And players are less willing to play out final seasons with their current clubs, risking injury, when they know there is a longer contract awaiting somewhere else.

O’Leary listed several other trends in the game — fixed development fees to compensate smaller teams when their best youngsters are poached, competition for talent from overseas and clubs separating recruitment from coaching — that he believes are lessons professional rugby is learning from football.

So perhaps it is not the case that football’s “illegal” approach to human resources is so out of step with the rest of sport. It is more that football — or, more accurately, top-flight football — is simply much richer than any other team sport outside North America, and if draft systems, trades and collective bargaining agreements are your thing, you cannot have promotion, relegation and transfer gossip, too.

Open or closed, total free agency or contractual stability. You cannot have both. Choose one, always read the small print and enjoy.
by Chester Perry
Tue Dec 29, 2020 12:20 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

There was hope from many (myself included) at the start of lockdown in March that the game could take time out to assess and address it's structural failings - this article by Melissa Reddy in the Independent is likely to be the first of many that finds the year has exacerbated rather than healed those issues as they have been forced into the spotlight one after another - some may argue that this is a necessary traumatic step of recognition and understanding towards resolving them.

Football needs a cultural revolution to survive a post-pandemic world
The pandemic forced the beautiful game to take a long hard look in the mirror, and it didn’t like what it saw. The entire system is broken and needs to be reset, reports Melissa Reddy

1 day ago

In mid-March, when everything as we knew it was suddenly reshaped by the coronavirus pandemic, a group of financial experts working in football hoped that the game would use the enforced break in play to finally pay attention to its plethora of ills, to sanitise itself. “This is the opportunity to stop sleepwalking into the future,” Professor Simon Chadwick, the global director of Eurasian Sport, told The Independent. “The current woes can bring about a cultural revolution. Football needs it.”

While there could be no certainty over the effects of Covid on the industry or an inclination of how long the hiatus would last, the game was finally forced to have a hard look at itself.

The entertainment and the income stopped with the spotlight switching to the mechanisms behind the show. It became very clear, very quickly that English football was far from sustainable.

The pandemic wasn’t the cause of this, merely the curtain-parter to give us a glimpse of what lurks beneath – gigantic financial inequalities, absence of accountability, no long-term picture – before then acting as an accelerant, especially with the removal of matchday revenue.

“The coronavirus crisis has shone a light on how drastically football lives a hand-to-mouth existence,” say Dr Rob Wilson, author of Managing Sport Finance.

“I’m not for one second saying they should have planned for a global pandemic, but they didn’t plan for… anything. Over the last 25 to 30 years, we’ve seen an erosion of basic economic principles, with many teams going for the winner-takes-all option. Everything has been driven by very selfish behaviour and has been very unscrupulous at times, which is a dangerous narrative. The system is fairly broken and needs a reset.”

Only four teams – Queens Park Rangers, West Bromwich Albion, Hull and Rotherham – had spent below Uefa’s recommended “healthy” wage-to-turnover limit of 70 per cent.

To reach the holy grail of the Premier League, clubs were bartering against its existence and when the crisis hit, the English pyramid was in threat. The divisions below the top-flight were in desperate need for a bailout, but more especially a drastic change in operations.

For months, no deal could be reached on a rescue package from Premier League to the English Football League. An agreement eventually materialised at the start of December, via £50m aid for League One and Two and a £200m loan facility for Championship teams.

But the lengthy period in-between was one of mounting frustration for the clubs who feared disappearing from the landscape. Government had given the arts industry a £1.57bn support shot in July, but were crystalline that they would not be lending a helping hand to the national game. In the absence of strong governance from those in charge of the country and those in charge of the game, Project Big Picture emerged, driven by Liverpool and Manchester United.

The controversial proposal, which would have seen the consolidation of power to the Premier League's Big Six along with Everton, Southampton and West Ham through special voting rights, was killed in its infancy through harmful leaks.

It did, however, have “overwhelming support” from the lower divisions as it addressed many of the key issues plaguing those levels of the game. Project Big Picture had advocated that the Premier League would share a net 25 per cent of its upcoming broadcast deals with the EFL as well as offer an immediate £250m bailout to help the pyramid survive.

It would also cover funding for stadium infrastructure and grassroots, the creation of a fan charter, an easing of the packed domestic schedule and a £100m helping hand to the FA. It promised an end to the “evil” of parachute payments, which fuels inequality and a reduction of the top-flight to just 18 teams, which would enhance competitive balance. Salary caps would curtail irresponsible free spending.

Project Big Picture was viewed as essential and the most pivotal plan in nearly three decades to help repair a broken system. There is a widespread feeling within the game that various aspects of the proposal will ultimately come to pass because greater sustainability is imperative.

Professor Chadwick has been “advocating for a football parliament for around 15 years, where relevant stakeholders debate in public over the key areas of concern and how it can be tackled in future”.

He had hoped the pandemic would push the importance of such a mechanism along, but it hasn’t been forthcoming. “Too often the management and leadership within clubs is insufficiently developed. In some cases it is immature,” Chadwick told The Independent. “There’s a thinking of what happens on the field is most important and so off the field, there’s a lot of me tooism.

“Instead of clubs individually assessing a situation and thinking ‘this is what we believe we need to do’, many will think ‘oh they’ve done that, so we need to do that’.

“You get a cascade effect of ‘me too – I’m doing it too.’ It results in generic responses to crisis situations. I’ve heard this being called a ‘reset moment’ for the game. Reset to what? Who is going to do the resetting? The government, the associations, clubs on their own?

“It need advocates, stakeholders from across the game – officials, fans, media, execs – to agree a path forward that becomes policy, which is supported by government. Whether it be ridding gambling sponsorships or making sure the game is really serious about corporate social responsibility.”

We've lost three generations of players who have been denied opportunities, we can't lose a fourth

The lack of sustainability is one of many fundamental issues that needs to be remedied in football’s future. Increasing representation off the pitch to make the game more representative of the communities it serves is another.

The FA launched its Leadership Diversity Code in October to tackle racial inequality in technical areas and the boardroom. At the time, there were only five out of 92 managers or head coaches who were from Bame backgrounds. The picture was no prettier in executive positions across the sport.

Measures had to be taken and with more than 40 clubs have signed up to the voluntary code, it is hoped that there will be greater commitment to providing equal opportunities and transparency in the hiring process.

It stipulates that: 15 per cent of new executive appointments will be from a Bame background, with 30 per cent female; 50 per cent of new coaching appointments at women's football clubs will be female, with 15 per cent Bame.

Shortlists for interview will have at least one male and one female Bame candidate, provided applicants meeting the job specifications apply.

“We are trying to modernise football so it stops relying on its 'little black book' and group of networks and actually gives equal opportunities to those who are qualified,” explained Paul Elliott, head of the FA's inclusion advisory board.

”This isn't about tokenism, this is about equal opportunities. To be the same as everyone else. What really inspired me to create the code was a comment from Raheem Sterling, when he said he looks up to the directors and senior leadership and doesn't see people like him. We've lost three generations of players who have been denied opportunities, we can't lose a fourth.”

Incidentally, an episode that underscored exactly why the upper echelons of football need a variety of voices and people from different backgrounds came from the FA itself just days after the launch of the code. Greg Clarke resigned as the organisation’s chairman after using what he admitted was ”unacceptable“ language. The ease in which he delivered several offensive, idiotic statements spoke to the reality of unrepresentative institutions.

Clarke used the term ”coloured footballers”, referring to gay players making a “life choice” and revealed a coach told him that young female players did not like having the ball hit hard at them. He also said there were “a lot more South Asians than there are Afro-Caribbeans“ in the FA's IT department because ”they have different career interests”.

Not only did Clarke undermine the body’s labour in drafting the code – there was a five-month consultation period, taking in the recommendations of players like Jordan Henderson, Tyrone Mings and Lucy Bronze as well as journalists and other stakeholders – he flagged just how out of touch the hierarchy of football is in the country.

The game has a distance to go in remedying these historic problems and with the way it deals with instances of discrimination. In the 2019-20 season, there was a 53 per cent increase in reported racial abuse in professional football. The problem is more pronounced on social media, where clubs, players, leagues and governing bodies need to get tougher with the platforms.

Another major concern – a matter of life and death – is the outdated and dangerously lax protocols for head trauma. Wolves forward Raul Jimenez suffered a fractured skull in November after aerially colliding with David Luiz at an Arsenal corner. The defender passed the current concussion protocol, his head was bandaged and he returned to action. Blood seeped through his dressings and he was unsettled heading the ball. Luiz had to be removed at half-time, but he shouldn’t have even been allowed to continue.

Dr Willie Stewart, the neuropathologist who proved the game’s link with dementia, believes football is still “in the last century” when it comes to dealing with head trauma.

While other sporting codes have a temporary concussion sub so a proper examination can happen, football is nowhere close to introducing such a mechanism

There is not enough time to assess the player under the current guidelines, which allows for three minutes. While other sporting codes have a temporary concussion sub so a proper examination can happen – independent of club medical staff so player welfare rather than the result is prioritised – football is nowhere close to introducing such a mechanism.

Stewart is frustrated at the non-action as his research, spanning two decades, shows that there is a 3.5 times higher risk of death and brain disease, a doubling of risk of Parkinson’s, a fourfold increase in motor neurone disease and a fivefold increase in Alzheimer's disease among former pro players.

Ryan Mason, who was forced to retire aged 26 in February 2018 after suffering the same injury as Jimenez, “feels lucky to be alive”. He has been campaigning for football to implement more advanced protocols for head injuries as well as appreciate the dangers of the type of aerial challenge itself.

“I would like to say a lot has changed since then on the football pitch, but it actually hasn't which is probably why I'm so passionate talking about it now, because obviously Raul has suffered a similar incident,” Mason explained.

“It makes me angry, makes me upset and so many different emotions because I've spoken to quite a few people over the last couple of years.

“What's football's excuse to ignore it? Because I can't really find any reasons to just ignore it and carry on with this protocol that we have in place, which clearly isn't right.

“Why aren't we willing to change? Why isn't football willing to adapt? The brain is very vulnerable and we need to do what we can to protect our players now, not only short term, but long term as well.”

This year should have also made it clear to the game that there is another group that need protection: supporters. Football without fans has been a soulless experience; a competitive training ground match played in empty stadia pumped with fake crowd noise to fulfil broadcasting contracts and offer a tiny bit of normalcy to lives.

Terraces in Tier 2 areas being filled with 2000 voices in the final weeks of 2020 was not only welcome, it was necessary. Emotion was back along with the feeling that football mattered well beyond the result; a sense of community and belonging returned. This should be remembered when the subject of ticket prices is flagged or whenever supporters are fleeced or unfairly vilified.

Their thoughts on VAR should be respected too. The spectacle is being dimmed by the implementation of the technology which promised minimum intervention for maximum benefit but has proved to be the opposite. The Laws of the Game, particularly around handball, need to be reworked.

On a more personal matter to supporters, The Independent has covered the prejudiced policing of matches in the UK in depth, where fans are seen as a public disorder threat rather than ordinary citizens attending an event. They would be treated differently if they were attending a music concert, a rugby game or any other mass gathering.

This has to be forced to change. Football can no longer continue with the status quo, not when the pandemic put it under the microscope and showed just how fragile it is. Not when we all know what lurks beneath the glitz and the goals.
by Chester Perry
Thu Nov 19, 2020 9:32 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Thu Nov 19, 2020 5:09 pm
Newcastle confirm that they have entered arbitration proceedings with the Premier League over the failed takeover this summer as they react to what they term leaks from the Premier League

LATEST NEWS19th November 2020
Club statement
Newcastle United has issued the following club statement on Thursday 19 November 2020:

“The Club has previously not commented on the arbitration it is pursuing against the Premier League (‘EPL’) with respect to its conduct relating to the proposed takeover because of the confidentiality clause in the EPL's rules.

"However, the Club is aware of public reports which state that, on 17 November, the EPL referred to legal proceedings with the Club (e.g. social media posts referring to the “Club’s own legal case”) in a letter to Newcastle supporters.

"The source of some of the reporting is said to be the EPL. It appears, therefore, that the EPL has leaked the contents of their letter to some of those commenting in the public domain.

"The Club understands that these will be matters of great concern to its fans and therefore considers that, in light of the information disclosed by the EPL, it has no choice but to respond and update its fans in response to this coverage.

"The Club makes no comment on the substance of the arbitration, but it can confirm that it has issued arbitration proceedings against the EPL.

"It is unclear when those proceedings will be resolved, given the approach of the EPL and its lawyers, Bird & Bird. Nevertheless, the Club will continue to use its best efforts to press for a fair, full and timely hearing of its claim.”
The Telegraph are reporting if Newcastle are successful in this action then the Saudi's are wanting to come back to the table - it remains telling to me that the Premier League invited the Saudi's to go to arbitration with them, but the Saudi's backed away

Saudi-led consortium intends to re-submit bid to buy Newcastle if club wins case against Premier League
JASON BURT NOVEMBER 19, 2020

The Saudi-led consortium that attempted to buy Newcastle United intends to re-submit its £305million bid if the club succeeds in winning an arbitration case against the Premier League.

Newcastle finally issued a statement to confirm that “arbitration proceedings” are under way after the collapse of the bid from the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia, the Reuben Brothers and Amanda Staveley’s PCP Capital Partners.

The offer was withdrawn in July when PIF grew frustrated at an impasse with the Premier League, amid concerns over the ownership structure, still not approving the proposed takeover despite it having been submitted in April.

Newcastle and the club’s owner Mike Ashley are contesting the use of the Premier League’s Owners and Directors Test and the buyers are also confident that they should have passed a test that, they argue, became impossible to deal with because of the demands placed upon them.

If Newcastle are successful and with Ashley remaining committed to selling to the consortium it is likely a new bid will be made in the hope of finally concluding a deal. Independent arbitration was offered to the buyers in the summer by the Premier League but it was declined because of concerns over the process and because they were adamant the takeover should have been approved.

In its statement Newcastle confirmed that it “has issued arbitration proceedings against the EPL” but added that it would not comment on its “substance” meaning it is unclear whether it has gone down the route offered by the Premier League for arbitration under its rule-book or taken another direction. The unprecedented dispute highlights the rift between Newcastle and the Premier League of which it is a shareholder.

The statement followed the Premier League responding to a Letter Before Action from Newcastle Consortium Supporters Ltd – a group of fans who have launched their own legal action – in which it appeared to confirm that legal proceedings involving the club were underway and will take priority.

In its statement Newcastle claims that “it appears” the Premier League “has leaked the contents of their letter to some of those commenting in the public domain” despite “the confidentiality clause in the Premier League’s rules”.

The club said it had not previously announced its action because of this although Blackstone Chambers, the law firm, confirmed that QCs Nick de Marco and Shaheed Fatima had been instructed to examine Newcastle’s legal options in September. That social media post by Blackstone Chambers was later deleted.

“The club makes no comment on the substance of the arbitration, but it can confirm that it has issued arbitration proceedings against the EPL,” Newcastle said.

It remains unclear as to what form the proceedings will take but Section X of the Premier League Handbook deals with arbitration. It states that a Form 28 has to be submitted by the “party requesting an arbitration” with the Premier League board sending “to each party particulars of those individuals who are members of the panel”.

If a case goes to arbitration it is usually heard by a three-strong panel, with each party appointing one member and a legally-qualified chairman selected. That is usually someone who the other two members agree on and, if that cannot happen, the choice is normally made by the Football Association given the Premier League is one of the parties. Alternatively both parties can decide on a single, legally qualified arbitrator.

The tribunals have the power to “determine any question of law or fact arising in the course of arbitration”, “order the rectification of a deed” and can also order compensation is paid.

With Newcastle it appears the commitment remains to agree the sale of the club although there will be continued frustration for fans given there remains no timescale to resolve the dispute.
by Chester Perry
Thu Nov 19, 2020 5:09 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Newcastle confirm that they have entered arbitration proceedings with the Premier League over the failed takeover this summer as they react to what they term leaks from the Premier League

LATEST NEWS19th November 2020
Club statement
Newcastle United has issued the following club statement on Thursday 19 November 2020:

“The Club has previously not commented on the arbitration it is pursuing against the Premier League (‘EPL’) with respect to its conduct relating to the proposed takeover because of the confidentiality clause in the EPL's rules.

"However, the Club is aware of public reports which state that, on 17 November, the EPL referred to legal proceedings with the Club (e.g. social media posts referring to the “Club’s own legal case”) in a letter to Newcastle supporters.

"The source of some of the reporting is said to be the EPL. It appears, therefore, that the EPL has leaked the contents of their letter to some of those commenting in the public domain.

"The Club understands that these will be matters of great concern to its fans and therefore considers that, in light of the information disclosed by the EPL, it has no choice but to respond and update its fans in response to this coverage.

"The Club makes no comment on the substance of the arbitration, but it can confirm that it has issued arbitration proceedings against the EPL.

"It is unclear when those proceedings will be resolved, given the approach of the EPL and its lawyers, Bird & Bird. Nevertheless, the Club will continue to use its best efforts to press for a fair, full and timely hearing of its claim.”
by Chester Perry
Fri Oct 23, 2020 12:04 am
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Today we had a really interesting podcast from Football Today which asked "Would an Ultras Culture Benefit English Football?"

https://www.footballtodaypodcast.com/po ... h-football

Which actually paired quite well with todays The Price of Football podcast which featured an interview with a member of Newcastle United's Supporter's trust

https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cH ... IDRAF&ep=6

There is no doubt that this calendar year has seen a dramatic increase in fan activism, and recent actions such as PPV. and leaks about Project Big Picture and The European Premier League only serve to to bring fans groups together, what we are seeing is that supporters groups are getting more organised and getting more political access as a result, not only are they now a common feature of DCMS debates on the game, but they are also finding established politicians amongst their number.

https://twitter.com/WeAreTheFSA/status/ ... 3945415680

I still believe this is a long way from Ultra Culture and certainly a long way from German organised fan culture which I have posted on this thread from time to time (usually courtesy of @FTamsut) but there appears to be a clearly discernable path in that direction being built
by Chester Perry
Fri Oct 09, 2020 12:00 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

The Chaps at Vysyble have a new blog article for us - Game Aid - it is pretty powerful stuff

Vysyble Blog - Game Aid

8th October 2020

Netflix is currently running an excellent mini-series about the NASA Challenger space shuttle disaster of January 1986 when, shortly after take-off, the spacecraft exploded resulting in the tragic deaths of all seven crew members including the first ‘ordinary’ citizen in space, schoolteacher Christa McAuliffe.

Due to weather and technical difficulties, the launch was delayed but eventually took place in the coldest temperatures ever recorded up to that point during a shuttle launch sequence. The resulting investigation found that the rubber rings (O-rings) which sealed the joints between the various sections of the booster rockets became brittle at low temperatures and did not return to their original levels of elasticity when subsequently warmed. Consequently, a deadly escape of solid rocket fuel ignited and thus violently disabled the spacecraft.

The shocking element in all of this, apart from the deaths of seven very capable individuals, is that the problem with the O-rings was not new nor unknown. Indeed, the manufacturer of the booster rockets and NASA held a conference call the night before the fateful launch to debate whether or not to send the vehicle and crew into space as the outside temperature dropped. Concerns from the booster manufacturer were raised about the O-rings and the cold but NASA pushed back on these concerns, mindful of a failing launch schedule and the potential PR issues if another delay or cancellation were to occur. Perhaps an example of the “sunk cost effect” affecting the overall decision-making process?

The process NASA deployed to reach the fateful decision to launch was not wholly based on an assessment of what could go wrong and the associated risks but mainly on what was going right and the associated benefits. In other words, if it hadn’t happened before, why should it happen now? And the consensus in the ‘room’ was that there was just not enough hard evidence or data to say that there would be a catastrophic failure.

The rest is, unfortunately, history.

This kind of thinking is not that unusual. If you consider your car, it is the sum of many moving parts, some of which will be operating at less than optimal performance due to wear and tear and perhaps a sub-standard manufacturing process depending on the type and origin of the part(s) in question, but the important thing is that your car still runs and gets you from A to B. There is not enough hard evidence from the current performance of your car to tell you that it will fail but there is a very manageable risk that it might.

Arguably, we encountered a similar thought process with the EFL in 2017 when we warned of impending club failures as a result of our analysis based primarily on an extended sequence of club economic profit data. Of course, we could not say when clubs would fail but we did say that clubs will fail, which some have sadly done so since. Indeed, the public response from the EFL was that no club had been through an insolvency process for several years. Therefore, the EFL had erroneously decided that as nothing was going wrong, by inference, that must mean that everything is going right.

Of course, we knew back then that plenty was going wrong and even more so presently as crowds continue to be banned from football matches. As a result clubs are pleading poverty. Indeed, the current impasse between the Premier League, the EFL and its clubs and the Government is intriguing but worrying.

There is no shortage of theories and suggestions regarding what should be done. The common consensus is that the lower leagues in the EFL, ie Leagues One and Two, do need some form of financial assistance if the current ban on crowds is to remain for the foreseeable future particularly against the backdrop of a rising national infection rate and more deaths due to Covid-19.

In addition, the problem is somewhat confused by an increasing number of Championship clubs spending more in salaries than they receive in revenues (14 in 2018-19). Here too recent reports in the media point to increasing financial distress and calls for assistance. Amongst the Championship club owners is the Coates family which is behind one of the most successful and profitable betting set-ups on the planet. A few other billionaires can also be found in England’s second tier of football

The Government and the Parliamentary committee for Digital, Communications, Media and Sport believe that the Premier League clubs should redistribute some of their ‘wealth’ to those clubs in need. On one level this is a laudable notion but unfortunately this is the same Premier League that has achieved economic losses of over £2.7bn since 2009 and achieved a pre- COVID-19 record economic loss in 2018-19 of £599.54m. When viewed through that lens – where is the wealth to distribute?

More recently, the Government has been under pressure to do ‘something’ by various groups and talking heads given the increasing reliance of the smaller football clubs on a matchday revenue stream that for now no longer exists due to actions taken by the same Government. One highly prominent and vocal figure in this chain of demands is Damian Collins MP who just so happens to be the former Chair of the Digital, Communications, Media and Sports Select Committee.

When Mr Collins was Chair of said committee, we wrote to him in 2017 and again in 2018 to express our concerns about the state of the game and the strong warning signals that our data was giving regarding the health of clubs and their leagues. We did not receive a reply in either case. Yet he has emerged, and in our view somewhat opportunistically, bemoaning the intransigence of the current Government in the matter of football’s financial plight.

If he had engaged with us when he had the chance, he could have perhaps set the wheels in motion for reform ahead of time. But we take the lack of response to be a strong indicator that nothing was going wrong in the minds of the politicians regarding football at that time. Only in 2019 when Bury and Bolton Wanderers had already endured their respective financial difficulties did Mr Collins enter the field of play. By then, of course, it was way too late.

The Government, it would appear, does not care for the minutiae of football financials given its direct approach in dealing with the Premier League. Indeed, Project Restart (the initiative to restart the 2019-20 season without crowds but with free-to-air TV broadcasts) was conditional on the Premier League providing support to clubs in the lower divisions. Months later and a number of leaks and comments are only just starting to filter out regarding potential caveats and conditions for providing such funds. No such thing as a free transfer of money.

Is it a coincidence that on the day that the international summer transfer window closed with £1.2bn in purchases and £419m in player sales resulting in the second-highest net spend ever of £805m by Premier League clubs was also the day that an open letter was published by the Premier League, the EFL and other football bodies imploring the Government to rescind the crowd-banning order?

Be under no illusion that there is a PR battle of wits taking place with arguably the Premier League presenting itself as an unwilling victim whilst at the same time hoovering up talent at some cost.

For those more cynically minded, one might think that it would suit the Premier League clubs to do nothing thereby forcing some of the lower league clubs to enter administration. For those that do survive, one inevitable step is an EFL-wide salary cap. This plays directly into the Premier League’s hands in that the clubs will not have to offer such large pay deals to up and coming talent from the lower leagues.

The second step is that the longer the distress lasts, the more likely talent will be for sale at a lower price. Do keep an eye on the domestic transfer window up to 16th October as those Premier League clubs still active in the market will be driving down prices with their impoverished lower league counterparts, which will no doubt see a sale as a temporary but welcome relief.

And yet there is more pressure on the lower leagues from the senior division. Very recently, a senior figure from Manchester City suggested that the way forward for further Premier League investment/funding is the dreaded B-Team scheme whereby a Premier League club takes a controlling share in a lower league club in order to nurture and provide talent for the senior-level operation.

With this type of structure in place, out go the traditions of the original entity and along with it any notion of a competitive and able footballing ethos. The lower leagues will become a subsidiary layer in the organograms of sporting holding companies such as City Football Group and investment houses seeking to get a piece of the action as asset prices continue to fall.

In our view, the debate about B-Teams would be largley irrelevant if the EFL had been allowed to regulate its clubs to a minimum financial break-even point on an annual basis. As it is, Championship clubs have achieved economic losses of -£1.5bn from a revenue of £3.3bn between 2015-19. Masters of misfortune par excellence, non?

However, the end-result is very likely to be that the local leagues simply become nurseries for what will inevitably be the Euro Super League sides.

In 2018, we announced that the demise of the Premier League had already started.

American investors had already made their mark at Arsenal, Liverpool and Manchester United. It seemed obvious (and still is) to us that the increasing Americanisation of football would continue, leading to a structural shift towards something more familiar to them rather than us.

The Premier League’s domestic TV rights are American owned with the exception of BT, although that too is rumoured to be in the sights of a number of US-based telco and investment companies.

The Premier League has the same number of American-owned clubs as it does UK-owned (5) although Burnley, as we understand it, is presently undergoing a sale to the American investement house ALK Capital. That would reduce the UK contingent to 4 – Brighton & Hove Albion, Newcastle United, Tottenham Hotspur and West Ham United – and increase the number of American-owned clubs to 6 – Arsenal, Burnley, Crystal Palace, Fulham, Liverpool and Manchester United.

Little wonder, then, that the traditions of English football can be so easily cast aside amidst the debate about B-Teams when the senior division is becoming increasingly international in make-up and outlook.

The Premier League clubs are not immune to the current financial pressures exerted by Covid-19 but they could have better insulated themselves by adopting a more focussed and value-based approach to overall strategy and financial management. Even so, there is a sense that the changes which we envisaged a few years as directed by the economic profit data are starting to happen and not in a good way. We never said that the process and outcome would be a pleasant one.

Time is not on anyone’s side here apart from, perhaps, the Premier League itself. The Championship clubs are rumoured to be taking a tax holiday in protest at the Government’s failure to provide funding, which did drop our jaws when you consider that HMRC is the most prolific originator of investigations and winding-up orders concerning football clubs. Obviously, provocation does not compute in the mind of a Championship club owner.

Returning to our initial theme, the evidence from our perspective was always there in that something would eventually go wrong. Whether football will react appropriately and change its ways remains to be seen but in adversity there is opportunity.

As the late Christa McAuliffe once said, ‘Reach for it. Push yourself as far as you can.’
by Paul Waine
Tue Oct 06, 2020 6:17 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Tue Oct 06, 2020 6:12 pm
The Times now has a look at the role of Jorge Mendes asking if his grip on Wolves is too tight - I have used my free articles for the week so would appreciate if someone could transcribe

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/is-j ... -gd33wh8v6
Hi CP, I'm on it.

Is Jorge Mendes’s grip on Wolves too tight?

Former FA chief calls for change in rules to limit agents’ huge influence, writes Martyn Ziegler
Martyn Ziegler, Chief Sports Reporter
Tuesday October 06 2020, 5.00pm, The Times

The last transfer window will surely have banished any doubts regarding the overwhelming influence wielded by the super-agent Jorge Mendes at Wolverhampton Wanderers.

Wolves’ three most important signings and the three most lucrative sales involved players who are represented by Gestifute, Mendes’s agency. The value of the six deals came to about £140 million, and Gestifute has made many millions of pounds from the transactions.

The most remarkable of the deals was for Fábio Silva, the 18-year-old striker signed for a club-record €40 million (about £36 million) having played only 12 matches — scoring one goal — for Porto in the Portuguese league last season. Public documents registered by Porto on the Portuguese stock exchange revealed that the club paid Gestifute €7 million for that deal, 17.5 per cent of the fee they received, with another €3 million going to other intermediaries.

If as is possible, and indeed likely, Gestifute represented Wolves as the registering club as well as the player in the deal, the agency would have been paid by both those parties too.

The other five deals involving Mendes’s clients were: Diogo Jota to Liverpool (£45 million), Matt Doherty to Tottenham Hotspur (£14.7 million), Hélder Costa to Leeds United (£16 million), Nélson Semedo from Barcelona (£27.5 million) and the loan move of Vitinha from Porto, which is expected to become a permanent transfer next summer.

It is by no means unheard of for an agent to develop a close relationship with a club, but this goes even farther with Wolves and Mendes: for the past five years a subsidiary of Wolves’ Chinese owners Fosun International, Foyo, has had a 15 per cent stake in Start SGPS, Gestifute’s parent company.

The FA has rules on intermediaries that state: “Any individual or entity with an interest in a club shall not have any interest in the business or affairs of an intermediary or an intermediary’s organisation.” Nevertheless the governing body has approved the Wolves-Mendes relationship, despite complaints two years ago from the Leeds United owner Andrea Radrizzani that it was “not legal or fair”.

Although there is no suggestion of illegality, just how the relationship complies with the rules is not clear: the FA will not give details but merely states it has had confirmation from Wolves and relevant parties including Mendes about their ongoing compliance with its intermediary regulations.

The Doherty transfer to Spurs stands out as one where Mendes appeared to have a finger in every portion of the pie. As well as Gestifute’s links to Wolves’ owners, the club’s head coach, Nuno Espírito Santo, was the first client that Mendes ever had; the defender is his client; and Doherty was sold to Tottenham, whose head coach, José Mourinho, is also a long-time Mendes client.

Confirmation of exactly how many of the parties were represented by Gestifute or Mendes’s associates in Wolves’ six key transfers will not be published by the FA until next year, but last season the club had eight intermediary transactions where Gestifute or Talents Throne, the agency owned and operated by Mendes’s close associate Valdir Cardoso, were named as representing both player and club. In a further three intermediary transactions, Gestifute or Talents Throne represented just Wolves, and in three more the agency represented a Wolves player’s former club.

The practice of representing player and club has long been regarded by many in the game as a conflict of interest. Gary Lineker, the former England striker and BBC presenter, has called on Fifa to “introduce a rule where no person can act or receive fees for more than one party in any deal”, adding: “Clubs should not pay a player’s agent, whether selling or buying. The player should negotiate his commission with his agent.”

Fifa’s football stakeholders committee last year recommended that there should be regulation to limit multiple representations to avoid such conflicts, and a cap of 10 per cent of agents’ commissions on transfer fees, but so far no such measures have yet been implemented.

Greg Dyke, the former FA chairman, said regulation of agents in the game was urgently needed. He told The Times: “The role of agents is one of the great untold scandals of modern football. For years everyone has known one of the biggest problems in football — if not the biggest — are the agents and the inability of Fifa, Uefa and the FA to regulate them.

“Not only can they represent both the player and a club, you even get the ridiculous situation where they represent both sides of the same deal. All the clubs moan about agents and then they all pay them.

“This has to be done by Fifa and Uefa — the FA can’t attempt to take it on alone, and the last attempt by Fifa to regulate agents failed dismally.”

Two years ago, the Football Leaks cache resulted in European media organisations publishing emails from the Wolves executive chairman, Jeff Shi, who also works for Fosun, to a Gestifute contact in 2016 saying: “You always know the reason for the investment of Wolves is mainly because of our bet and trust on Jorge. Jorge can take Wolves as the most reliable partner and agency revenue source for long, long time.”

Gestifute and Wolves declined to comment when approached by The Times, but a source close to Mendes insisted that he deals with clubs from all over the world — for example Rúben Dias, the Portugal defender signed by Manchester City this window for £62 million, is another of his clients — and pointed out the Wolves-Gestifute relationship was cleared by the EFL and the FA in 2018.

“Jorge always looks for the best options for the players and for all clubs,” the source said.

Even in this era of relative austerity in the transfer market because of the Covid-19 pandemic, it appears that Mendes at least, and thanks in no small measure to his Wolves connections, has contrived to ensure that his money supply has remained in full flow.
by Chester Perry
Sun Sep 27, 2020 3:19 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

TwoHunderedPercent.com with the latest on the current biggest Legal cases in football - can you imagine the President of PSG, Chair of Bien media and UEFA Executive Commitee member getting the 28 month jail sentence that the Swiss Prosecutors are asking for.

Football on Trial: Pinto, Al-Khelaifi & Valcke
by Mark | Sep 26, 2020

The two sides of football’s corruption, ahem, ‘coin’ are currently on show (trial).
On 4th September, in Portuguese capital Lisbon’s Central Criminal Court, the trial began of Rui Pinto, a 31-year-old, self-styled whistleblower and alleged computer hacker/blackmailer. Pinto is “behind” the “Football Leaks” (FL) website, a.k.a. “a whistleblower’s platform” and “the largest leak in the history of sport.”

Ten days later, in Switzerland’s Federal Criminal Court in Bellinzona, the trial began of Jerome Valcke, a 59-year-old former Secretary-General of (and twice sacked by) world football governing body, Fifa, and often labelled disgraced Fifa ex-president Sepp Blatter’s, ahem, “number two.” Alongside him is Nasser Al-Khelaifi, the 46-year-old chair of Qatari media group BeIN Sports, president of French champions Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) and member of European football governing body Uefa’s Executive Committee (ExCo).

The contrast is superficially obvious. Baddies accused of the sort of skullduggeries upon which whistles have been blown. But nuances abound. The Swiss trial has a complex backstory, given the involvement of Switzerland’s recently, rightly much-maligned Attorney-General’s office. The case against Pinto has more merit than many media supporters admit. And it felt appropriately confusing that Pinto was put in witness protection while awaiting his OWN trial.

If you’ve read about football finance ‘scandals’ since September 2015, FL will likely have been among the sources. Manchester City’s run-ins with Uefa’s regulatory interpretation of what constitutes ‘financial fair play” was an FL leak (and City’s appeal part-success against Uefa-imposed sanctions was not because of deficiencies in the FL data). Likewise, Cristiano Ronaldo’s run-ins with various legal authorities, despite Pinto once declaring the preening Portuguese his “favourite player” and history’s “most complete footballer.”

FL will turn five next Tuesday. There will be no birthday party as Pinto will still be in court, facing 90 criminal charges. Sixty-eight of undue access to computer files, 14 of correspondence violation, six of illegitimate access, and one each of computer sabotage and extortion/attempted extortion.

Operating under unimaginative pseudonym “John,” until ‘outed’ in September 2018, Pinto calls himself a whistleblower, serving the public interest (and salaciously interesting the public) in exposing the depth of football’s financial corruption. He claims he was inspired by the infamous May 2015 Fifa arrests and by seeing “irregularities in numerous transfers within Portugal,” although detractors note that his pre-FL accessing of computer information having more ‘personal finance’ motives.

FL has passed information onto “media partners,” the “European Investigative Collaborations” (EIC), also founded in September 2015 and including German news magazine Der Spiegel, leading Spanish newspaper El Mundo and French online investigative journal Mediapart.

Pinto’s exposees prefer the term “hacker,” for which is being prosecuted. Others label him a “computer genius,” complimentary but not necessarily helpful. Long-term Pinto legal representative, white-collar criminal and human rights French lawyer William Bourdon, likens him to US National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden. Less wisely, Pinto considers the demonstrably weird Julian Assange an inspiration.

Pinto has allegedly gone beyond football, for reasons good-and-ill. In 2013, the Cayman Islands-based Caledonian Bank (CB) alleged that he stole $350,000 from two CB accounts. Pinto said this was to show how easily their servers could be hacked, although to whom was unclear. The bank dropped charges against Pinto, who returned the second theft, $310,000, immediately but only half of the first amount, months later, having spent the rest.

CB noted, bitterly, that “the disclosure of our client’s identity, who is not indicted, would jeopardise their privacy, something that doesn’t appear indispensable for the discovery of the truth.” And they were anxious not to publicise how easily their cybersecurity was breached. CB went into fraud-induced bankruptcy in February 2015. Pinto told EIC journalists in January 2019: “In the end I haven’t received any money from that bank. I did not steal the money, that’s not the real story.” But when asked for the ‘real story’ he cited a “non-disclosure agreement” no-one else can find.

More nobly, he reportedly sourced the “Luanda Leaks,” a potentially more significant document-drop than FL. 715,000 leaked documents implicated Isobel doe Santos, the English-educated and domiciled 47-year-old daughter of Angolan ex-president Jose Eduardo dos Santos, in exploitative corruption in the former Portuguese colony. This has made her billions of dollars…and Africa’s richest woman.

The documents underpinned a January 2020 edition of BBC documentary series Panorama, entitled “The Corrupt Billionaire” (like there’s only one), fronted by Alan Pardew stunt-double Richard Bilton. Panorama said “most were obtained” by anti-corruption charity “the Platform to Protect Whistleblowers in Africa and shared with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.” But a week later, it was revealed that Pinto handed the documents to the charity in 2018.

The huge case against him was huger. Pinto had lived in Hungarian capital Budapest since leaving his native Portugal in 2015. He was arrested there in January 2019 and when extradited to Portugal in March, he faced 147 charges. His alleged ‘hacks’ focused on Lisbon’s Sporting Club de Portugal and private equity firm Doyen Sports Investments (DSI) and he also allegedly attempted to extort money from DSI’s then-CEO Nelio Lucas.

FL had by then spilled beans all over European football business. And Portuguese investigators also allegedly discovered that he had hacked…them. In June 2019, Pinto’s public prosecutor Patricia Barão declared his actions “not confined to Sporting and Doyen, nor to sport entities,” with possibly “several dozen ‘victims’.” But Lucas and DSI were the focus of massive hacks.

These were collated in an extensive 4,200-word article in December 2016, written by Mediapart’s Yann Phillipin as part of the EIC. “The Dirty Tricks of Doyen Sports,” outlined the “dark side” of DSI: “vast secret commissions to assist with player transfers, false billing and backdated contracts signed by frontmen.” And the now-illegal “third-party ownership” of footballers. Nonetheless, Pinto’s alleged extortion attempts ran counter to the public interest in which he claimed to be acting.

Pinto’s lawyers claimed, credibly, that his prosecution stemmed from “the mobilisation of all those worried about their judicial responsibility for the financial crimes in the football business, revealed by (FL).” But Pinto’s pleas that he “just wanted to see how important the documents were to Doyen…by learning how much Doyen was prepared to pay for my silence” (and that he soon regretted his naivete) rang less true. Especially with judge Calheiros da Gama, who wrote in July 2019 that “the way in which (Pinto) approached (Lucas) takes away any credibility of this version.”

Pinto ‘negotiated’ with Lucas under an alias, Artem Lobuzov, to whom he gave a Kazakhstan email address (Doyen has Kazakh ownership history). And da Gama thought his emails to Lucas “perfectly fitted” the “standard of normality in the accomplishment of this type of crime.” Pinto told Lucas what he had on DSI. He requested €500k-€1m to keep it quiet. And he ‘warned’ Lucas that “all this and more can appear online, and through the European press; certain French, Italian and Spanish papers have already requested a partnership to disclose information.” (the EIC). “Surely you do not want that, do you? But we can talk…”

Pinto claimed he deliberately demanded unrealistic money and noted that when Lucas responded with lawyers instead of realistic money, he gave up. Da Gama, making a case to keep Pinto in custody, claimed Pinto knew, having hacked DSI, that a mere million was very mere to them. And that Pinto only ‘gave up’ because he knew Portugal’s authorities were onto him (he had, after all, hacked them). Pinto made the Doyen docs among the first FL leaks anyway. But da Gama still had “no doubts that there was an extortion attempt.”

As if the waters of Pinto’s reputation weren’t muddied enough by all this, Andreas Selliaas of the excellent Danish sports transparency campaigning organisation “Play the Game,” did a curious, if exceptionally well-written hatchet-job on him this February, suggesting via headline, that FL “raises many questions, also for the media.”

Selliaas noted that “the charges against him as a blackmailer contrast sharply” with how “partners in the FL network have portrayed him for years.” But, even if that were entirely true (it isn’t), they would, wouldn’t they? And, disturbingly treating allegation as undisputed fact, Selliaas reported: “Many whistleblowers who have put their lives on the line are not particularly keen on being lumped into the same category as a person who has hacked data for personal gain.”

Of course, PTG is outside the “FL network,” which IS an oversight, given its sports transparency focus. And Selliaas is strong on other curious network absentees, noting, with appropriate alarm, that “even within Der Spiegel, the most hard-core investigative journalists seem left out, also some of those who exposed that Germany bought the hosting rights for the 2006 World Cup.” But PTG’s absence from the network could also explain, at least in part, Selliaas’s bitterness.

He also accused “the media” of being “fairly biased,” with “few journalistic investigations of who Pinto is, few updates on arrests and court hearings,” and news about case developments “mainly come from news agencies. Why?” The correct question here is “eh?” Even I, a journalistic nobody, could add lots more on “who Pinto is” and on the case against him AND the Caledonian Bank farrago as his backstory, good and bad, has been meticulously documented across continents.*

In April, Pinto was moved from prison to house arrest, having agreed to “decrypt” the previously encrypted material on the hard drives seized upon his arrest, in return for it not being used against him. And on 7th August, he was released, on bail, into a witness protection programme, a move “made possible,” according to his lively lawyers “because he has cooperated with justice,” and seemingly made necessary by the decrypted information his co-operation has provided.

Pinto and his case continue to contradict. After years of wrongdoing denials, he has admitted in interviews that “from the standpoint of Portuguese law, some of my acts may be considered illegal,” while maintaining “that many things were not illegally done.” And the first days of his trial contained lively refutations along the same lines, based on documents his lawyers, Francisco and Luisa Teixeira da Mota, presented on Trial Eve.

An article by Norwegian website Josimar, headlined, “Man of many faces,” quoted extensively from the missive. The lawyers “admitted he illegally hacked dozens of email accounts and explain how ‘easily’ he did it with the help of the email account owners.” But “he did it with a noble intention: to reveal serious crimes. A reason why, they believe, he should be considered a whistleblower and his actions viewed as such.”

Pinto claimed that a “substantial portion of the published documents were sent by anonymous sources to FL,” having told Der Spiegel in February 2016 that “some of our sources do not realise they are our sources.” Now, to protect his sources, unknown or unknowing, he would take responsibility for “information he didn’t personally access and posts he didn’t publish.”

Pinto’s lawyers claimed he didn’t hack DSI, as Doyen Capital was “the true victim of illegal access.” But he admitted suggesting that DSI employ him “as a technician for €25,000-a-year” before he “voluntarily and sincerely gave up the extortion attempt,” a reason why, under Portuguese law, he wasn’t guilty of extortion. This part of Pinto’s defence is the hardest to define as nobly-intended or reconcile with his claim that “I never did anything for money.”

However, he would “continue collaborating with the authorities,” as his information had kick-started “important inquiries” (France’s financial crimes prosecution unit have expressed in-trial interest in it). And he pleaded: “I’m in a strange situation. I’m a defendant and a protected witness. I’ve been the target of a slander and libel campaign. I’ve been in prison for a year-and-a-half, with seven months of total isolation. It was very difficult.”

The case continues…probably for some months.

Valcke is “old school” Fifa corruption. The allegations against him were typical Fifa, involving awarding media rights, for the World and Confederation Cups.

The OAG’s February 2020 indictment said he “unlawfully enriched himself” while trying to buy a luxury Sardinian villa. He “was refunded” a €500,000, downpayment “after Al-Khelaifi purchased the villa instead.” Al-Khelaifi then gave Valcke “the exclusive right” to use it “for 18 months,” free of an estimated €900,000-€1.8m rent. Valcke should have reported this to Fifa…but didn’t. He was charged with “accepting bribes, aggravated criminal mismanagement and falsification of documents,” all linked to the villa.

Al-Khelaifi is new school (alleged) corruption, and new school money. He was highly visible at last month’s Uefa Champions League final, as PSG president, another reason to dislike PSG, like we needed one beyond Neymar. And he has been on Uefa’s ExCo since February 2019, despite being under investigation in Switzerland since March 2017 and the OAG opening criminal proceedings against him that October, accusing him of “bribery of private individuals.”

Valcke remains accused of “exploiting” his Fifa position “to influence the award of media rights for Italy and Greece” for World and Confederations Cups “from 2018 to 2030,” to “favour preferred media partners,” for which he received “€1.25m.” But “the suspicion” that he” accepted a luxury watch” from Al-Khelaifi was “not found to be substantiated.” And Al-Khelaifi remains accused of not much.

In January 2020, a month after “the OAG gave the parties written notice that it would be filing an indictment, Fifa informed them that it had reached an ‘unspecified amicable agreement (“accord amiable”) with Al-Khelaifi’ and that it was thus ‘withdrawing its criminal complaint against Al-Khelaifi and partially against Valcke.’”

This complaint had again involved “the award of media rights,” this time “for the 2026 and 2030 World Cups (and) other Fifa events in the Middle East and North Africa.” But as “the basis for these criminal proceedings” included this criminal complaint “which Fifa filed against the accused in December 2016,” and as the alleged offences were being “prosecuted only on complaint,” the OAG had to “abandon proceedings.”

Worse, on 30th March, Switzerland’s Federal Court damned the OAG’s allegation of criminal mismanagement collusion between Valcke and Al-Khelaifi. The ruling noted: “These conditions of mismanagement are absent from the OAG’s accusation (which) does not set out the specific management obligations Valcke allegedly breached in return for economic advantages. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that (they) are the result of an agreement between them in a private capacity, without any connection with the function of general secretary that (Valcke) exercised.” But apart from that…

Al-Khelaifi considered boringly predictable counter-attack the best form of defence: “As I have said vehemently and repeatedly for three years, the charges have not, and have never had, any basis whatsoever, either in fact or law,” There was, he claimed, a “seemingly relentless agenda to smear my reputation in the media. For that reason, I have requested the relevant Swiss authorities to open a criminal enquiry into the conduct of the investigation.”

However, his and Valcke’s trial was set for September, despite his lawyers’ inevitable claims that even the diminished case against him was “completely unfounded” and “manifestly artificial.” They also asked, twice and unsuccessfully, that the case’s prosecutors be recused (withdrawn) and this time made a criminal “compliant” reportedly “related to leaks” (while Pinto was under house arrest, BTW).

Little surprise, then, that the trial was paused almost immediately, on a “procedural point.” But Al-Khelaifi’s lawyers suggested, correctly, that “the vast majority of this case does not relate to our client in any way.” And the procedural points belonged to lawyers for previously unnamed third accused party and “sports rights sector” businessman, Dinos Deris, who allegedly paid Valcke his €1.25m.

In Deris’s illness-enforced court absence, his lawyer Alec Reymons, argued unsuccessfully that the trial was flawed (Valcke’s lawyers said “muddied” and “contaminated”) by recently-revealed clandestine meetings between Fifa president Gianni Infantino and Swiss Attorney General Michael Lauber, held and covered-up for still unclear purposes and currently the subject of separate Swiss criminal proceedings. Lauber resigned his attorney-generalship in July.

Valcke pleaded poverty. His bank, Credit Suisse, “wouldn’t give him a cent more” because of multi-million debts he racked up buying two houses and a yacht. And without “a lot of people I can ask for money from, I had to find someone to lend me money” (not bribes, though). “Without work, with a family, money burns very quickly,” he advised. And while he hoped that “an agriculture project” would “provide income in the coming months,” he said his circumstances had forced to him to sell the yacht and items of jewellery. Any red in court was surely embarrassment rather than hearts bleeding.

Prosecutors want Valcke banged up for three years, and Al-Khelaifi for 28 months. Federal Prosecutor Joel Pahud highlighted Al-Khelaifi’s “contempt for justice” in not co-operating with investigators and lying about buying THE Sardinian villa. Valcke sought Al-Khelaifi’s help with the villa, JUST as beIN Sports won a World Cup media rights contract extension. The men called this a “private arrangement,” unconnected to the contract talks. And the $480m beIN paid for the two World Cups was 60% more than 2018 and 2022 cost them. Which makes Fifa’s original criminal complaint ‘interesting.’

The case continues. And Al-Khelaifi may miss Uefa’s next ExCo meeting, in Budapest, the long-time home town of…Rui Pinto. Verdicts, guessable already, are expected next month.

The wheels of football justice tend to turn at whatever speed the game’s money and power dictate. Pinto has upset monied and powerful people. And even his briefly-dipped toe into extortion waters has given the monied and powerful a big enough hook on which to hang him. He is, as cockney telly cops are wont to say, “going down.”

Al-Khelaifi IS monied and powerful…even more so while under investigation, (and little sums up modern club football better than appointing a wealthy, former tennis player and potentially corrupt man to represent the European Clubs Association on European football’s governing ExCo). Suspension has been common for football administrators under investigation. Even Blatter. And Valcke. But Al-Khelaifi is no commoner. He could afford to “amicably agree” things with a Fifa happy to amicably agree things with he and his and his country’s money. And he’s staying up.

Valcke, meanwhile, is impossibly damaged and consequentially powerless goods. And, apparently, not monied. Fifa part-exonerated Valcke only so they could accord amiably with Al-Khelaifi. While the Swiss OAG’s incompetent record on Fifa prosecutions has allegedly been strongly influenced by Infantino. And with Infantino currently insisting that Fifa fell “victim to corrupt officials” pre-2015 and that this “will not come back,” Valcke looks like legal toast.

But nobody’s legal fate affects the veracity of Pinto’s leaks. As ever in such cases, the disputes are about context not content (although, asked for context, Manchester City chose regulation-breaching silence). And his case concerns improper information-gathering, a crime which legally neuters even the most damning evidence obtained by it.

The comparative legal fates of the Football and Luanda Leaks, and those of alleged co-conspirators Al-Khelaifi and Valcke, could be revealing. But Pinto’s information HAS exposed football skullduggeries and corruptions, of which Valcke and Al-Khelaifi were/are embodiments.

Pinto declared in court that his “work as a whistleblower is finished.” But as he told Der Spiegel in 2016, when explaining his less orthodox methods, “the important thing is that all our documents are genuine.” Which is these tales’ fundamental truth.

*The Pinto parts of this article have been constructed from extensively and exceptionally well-researched work by the journalists (and others) below, in the media outlets further below:

Yann Phillipin, Michael Bird, Zeynep Sentek, Craig Shaw, Rafael Buschmann, Michael Wulzinger, Hendrik Maassen, Nino Seidel, Nuno Tiago Pinto (no relation), Christoph Winterbach, Andreas Selliaas, Sam Cunningham, Ed Aarons, Sam Knight, Jon Allsopp.

Black Sea, Josimar, Play the Game, Der Spiegel, Sports Business, “i” , Guardian, New Yorker, Sabada, Colombia Journalism Review, Portugal News.
by Chester Perry
Thu Sep 24, 2020 3:03 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Mon Sep 21, 2020 6:01 pm
This could cause quite a stir - from the BBC - Roman Abramovich had stakes in players not at his club - Third Party ownership (now banned of course)

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-54229269

I suspect that this will form part of tonight's Panorama from 7pm on BBC1

@TariqPanja with some additional background

https://twitter.com/tariqpanja/status/1 ... 4732577796
The Guardian's David Conn with more background to this particular story and the general issue of 3rd Party Ownership

Abramovich's buy-up of rival players sheds a little light on murky world
David Conn

Thanks to the FinCEN files, we know the Chelsea owner had ‘economic rights’ in other clubs’ players, but the transfer business remains mostly opaque and out of reach

Thu 24 Sep 2020 11.54 BST Last modified on Thu 24 Sep 2020 14.10 BST

It is only due to the “FinCEN Files,” a huge leak of confidential information, that the world knows a sliver more about the predilection Roman Abramovich apparently had for buying “economic rights” in players at clubs other than his own. This nugget has been sifted from more than 2,000 suspicious activity reports (SARs) filed with the US government’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), that would have remained unknown but for the reporting on the leak by the BBC and other media organisations.

Yet as these episodes always do, by providing a one-off glimpse into vast secretive dealings this leak also delivers a jolting reminder of how much remains unknown, about the multibillion-pound business of human football talent.

Years pass before tiny pieces of this huge global jigsaw turn up accidentally, and are painstakingly put together. A spokeswoman for Abramovich has not denied the essence of the reporting, that the Chelsea owner also owned a company, Leiston Holdings, registered in the British Virgin Islands, a tax haven, that was advised by the agent Pini Zahavi and bought rights in players at Sporting. The spokeswoman’s statement concentrated on emphasising that there was no wrongdoing in any of it: “third-party ownership” of footballers was allowed worldwide until Fifa finally banned it in 2015 – the Premier League banned it earlier, in 2008 – so no football rules were breached. Abramovich and his advisers could not know if a SAR was indeed filed with the FinCEN relating to him, she said, and if it was: “Millions of SARs are filed yearly and a filed SAR on its own does not mean that a transaction was unlawful or otherwise in breach of rules or regulations.”

To further questions, about why Abramovich invested in third-party ownership of players at other clubs, he has declined to comment, and there is no requirement on him or anybody else to provide any further information.

In all these years of enormously billowing transfer fees, eye-watering commissions paid to agents, and profits made by investors in tax havens from buying and selling rights in players, solid facts and details have largely remained confidential. So the FinCEN material about Abramovich owning Leiston Holdings is a genuine revelation, but most of the rest of the jigsaw puzzle remains in shadow.

One small piece of it had been lying about in public for years: it was a long-established fact that Leiston Holdings had bought rights in Sporting players. It was just that, until now, it was not known who owned that company, as it was registered offshore.

So the world is now informed that Abramovich, one of the original Russian oligarchs, while owning and vastly funding Chelsea, also bought up rights to Sporting players. They included the Peruvian winger André Carrillo, who played against Chelsea in the Champions League in 2014. Zahavi, the agent whose long career is a one-man atlas and history of the burgeoning transfer business, confirmed to the Guardian that he advised Leiston Holdings on players whose rights they might buy, although he said he had not known that the owner was Abramovich.

It was, though, already known that Abramovich, through Chelsea, was apparently involved in third-party ownership of players. The Guardian reported six years ago that Chelsea appeared to be in partnership with the Quality Football Ireland group of companies which invested in players’ rights, advised by another of the game’s prodigiously-earning agents, the Porto-based Jorge Mendes. Then too, it was Sporting players – nine of them, including Ricky van Wolfswinkel, the Dutch striker Norwich City subsequently signed from Sporting for £8.5m – who could be identified as having their rights part-owned by these companies.

There is a reason, though, why Sporting came up repeatedly as an apparent base of third-party ownership, by Abramovich-owned or -linked investment entities and others: like Benfica at that time, they declared such deals in their annual financial reports. Sporting’s accounts, for example, note that in the year to 30 June 2014, the club owed Leiston Holdings €2.6m for “amounts already received for the transfer of part of the economic rights of some players”. Quality Football Ireland was also listed, owed €14m, along with Doyen Sports Investments, another well-known company then involved in third-party ownership, owed €4.5m, and Holdimo SA, owed €20m.

Away from those Portuguese clubs which published their dealings with third-party ownership investment companies, the extent of the trade at other clubs was mostly not declared. This device, in which a club sold a percentage of a player’s value for cash up front from an outside investor, was institutionalised through the 2000s in Portuguese, Spanish and South American football. It was alien to the English game before 2006, when the investor-owned Carlos Tevez and Javier Mascherano signed for West Ham immediately after making their names internationally for Argentina in that summer’s World Cup.

The Premier League’s revulsion at aspects of those deals, and at the very concept of players’ rights and onward transfer fees being owned by financial investors rather than clubs, led to the ban in England as early as 2008, and pressure on Fifa for the global ban that finally came seven years later. But the legacy of this practice, who made what money on which players, remains largely unknown outside these occasional leaks. And the global footballer transfer business, the value of which has now multiplied into fees unthinkable even in 2015, is still conducted through dealings and documents that remain confidential, with the public allowed barely a peek.
by Chester Perry
Sun Sep 20, 2020 2:57 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

claretandy wrote:
Sun Sep 20, 2020 2:35 pm
Yes, but they are including it in with the "dodgy payment" money, when it's quite clearly standard practice.
just re-read that section - they are illustrating (rather clumsily) that Benfica's recording of a book profit of Euro 23m (It should have been over Euro 30m because so much of the deal they had paid for the player had been amortised) confirms that Benfica did not have full ownership of the player (there was a third party involved), when they brought him to the club.

That fact, and also that so much of the profit went out the door shows much of the problems in Portuguese football and why Football Leaks happened - Rui Pinto was a fan frustrated at the amount of money being sucked out of clubs so decided to investigate.
by Chester Perry
Mon Sep 14, 2020 1:26 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

More leaks over the FAI/John Delaney scandal over the weekend - from the Irish Independent

KOSI report on FAI finances finds John Delaney incurred personal expenditure of almost €1m in five-year period
Aidan Fitzmaurice September 13 2020 11:17 AM

A report into the FAI's financial affairs during the tenure of former CEO John Delaney, which was commissioned by the association, has found that Delaney clocked up personal expenditure of just under €1million in a five-year period.

Extracts from Champagne Football, a book analysing the Delaney years and the 2019 fall from grace of the long-serving CEO, were published today in the Sunday Times and details of a report by KOSI, make clear just how financially committed the association were to Delaney.

Costs incurred by Delaney but which were paid by the FAI include €316,000 on legal fees for defamation-related cases he took over coverage of the ticketing scandal at the Olympic games in 2016.

The KOSI report, which was commissioned by the FAI but never published as its contents were forwarded to An Garda Síochána and the ODCE, found that the FAI paid €70,000 to cover the costs of Delaney's 50th birthday party, that there was "personal spending" of €125,000 on Delaney's FAI credit card, including just under €50,000 for ATM withdrawals between 2015 and 2019.

The report also found that between 2015 and 2018, the FAI paid €242,000 in rent and other personal expenses for Delaney, who was on a salary of €360,000 at one stage and KOSI estimated the combined financial outlay of the FAI towards Delaney as €972,626. Delaney repaid €227,629 to the FAI, including a €50,000 payment for the costs related to the birthday party which was attended by public figures such as UEFA president Alexander Ceferin, former international manager John Giles, TD Alan Kelly and pundit Eamon Dunphy.

Reports carried out by KOSI and Mazars, commissioned by the FAI, have not been published and the Delaney matter is currently being processed by the ODCE
by Chester Perry
Fri Sep 04, 2020 1:12 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Rui Pinto's (Football Leaks) trial has started today in Portugal https://twitter.com/tariqpanja is your man if you want to keep abreast of things - reporters will not be able to tweet updates through the day though as phones/computers have been banned for those watching/observing the proceedings
by Chester Perry
Sat Aug 29, 2020 1:42 am
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Der Spiegel reports on Rui Pinto (of Football Leaks notoriety), who is now in witness protection as a whistle blower gollowing his confession to being a hacker

End Game
Football Leaks Source Prepares for His Day in Court
The trial in Portugal against Rui Pinto is scheduled to begin next week. The man behind the Football Leaks revelations is now in a witness protection program after reaching a deal to cooperate with legal authorities.
Von Rafael Buschmann, Nicola Naber und Christoph Winterbach - 28.08.2020, 14.44 Uhr

Rui Pinto is wandering past cows and pigs at an isolated spot not far from Lisbon. Two police officers are following the 31-year-old as he walks with two reporters from DER SPIEGEL. The man behind the whistleblower platform Football Leaks is currently in a witness-protection program, which is why there are strict rules regarding what can be written about his current location. "My life is still at risk," Pinto says.

Yet he still appears to be in good spirits. For the first time in a year and a half, he is a free man. And his chances of getting acquitted in his upcoming trial in Lisbon have recently risen.

Our walk together with Pinto outside of Lisbon took place on the day before last Sunday's Champions League final between Bayern Munich and Paris Saint-Germain, which was played in the Portuguese capital. It was to be the first of two interviews. Like no one else before him, Pinto was responsible for shining a spotlight on the dark side of professional football. Even as the football industry celebrates the pinnacle of the club season in Benfica Lisbon’s stadium, Pinto is living just a few kilometers away under police protection in a safe house.

Pinto has made numerous influential enemies in recent years. He shared more than 70 million confidential documents - a total of 3.4 terabytes of data – with DER SPIEGEL and its partners in the journalism consortium European Investigative Collaborations (EIC). Since 2016, more than a thousand articles have been written based on that data, some of which had serious legal implications. Cristiano Ronaldo was handed a suspended sentence for tax evasion and had to pay around 20 million euros. Some of the most important sports agents in the world are still being investigated for tax violations and money laundering. The Football Leaks documents have even created problems for FIFA President Gianni Infantino, and Swiss public prosecutors are investigating him.

Thus far, though, only a single person has landed in prison as a result of Football Leaks. Rui Pinto himself.

He has been accused of hacking and of attempted extortion, with his trial slated to begin next Friday. Back in December, Pinto discussed his rather bleak prospects in an interview with DER SPIEGEL, including a possible prison sentence of up to 25 years. But one reason for his improved confidence is a deal he has reached with the Portuguese judiciary. Pinto has granted access to his greatest treasure: He opened up eight encrypted hard drives containing 17.5 terabytes of information.

Strict Security Measures
It's not easy to meet up with Pinto these days. DER SPIEGEL sent him repeated requests for an interview over the past several months, but Pinto declined them all without offering an explanation. He was in house arrest and was not allowed to tell anyone that he was engaged in negotiations with the judiciary. He may now officially be free, but he must consult the police each time he wants to go outside so that the potential risks can be discussed. For his meeting with DER SPIEGEL, Pinto's guardians have imposed strict security measures. They provided the address of a holiday apartment, where the meeting on the day of the Champions League final can take place.

Late in the evening on the day prior to our first meeting, Pinto sends an address via an encrypted messenger service. It leads to the parking lot of a supermarket located far away from Lisbon. "Send me the license plate number of your rental car," he asks, and names a time for the meeting.

The next day, a car appears at the parking lot just a few minutes after the agreed to time. Two men wearing masks roll down their windows, nod briefly indicating they should be followed. On the drive, they make several sudden turns, apparently to shake off any potential tails. When the car finally comes to a stop at a remote rest stop, Pinto opens the door and jumps out of the back seat. He is wearing a baseball cap, sunglasses and, of course, a mask.

A former history student who emigrated to Budapest in 2015, Pinto has been accused by Portuguese prosecutors of hacking into servers and stealing sensitive data from football clubs, law firms, investigators and sports agencies.

Since the very beginning of the Football Leaks project, Pinto has insisted that he doesn't see himself as a hacker. Last December, though, he told DER SPIEGEL, "I fully accept that, from the standpoint of Portuguese law, some of my acts may be considered illegal." In his statement of defense submitted to the court at the beginning of this week, he elaborated on what that might have meant. Pinto regrets having violated the law in order to access data. He said he was convinced that the data would help him uncover serious crimes and that he didn't adequately reflect on the consequences of his activities. "You can ask me all the questions you want," Pinto says. "But before the trial, I won't be able to answer everything. The court is the right place to explain my position."

"Psychological Torture"
The next day, Pinto shows up at a secret apartment several hours before the start of the Champions League final. It is a sparsely furnished room with a double bed, two recliners and a small television in the basement of a holiday home. Pinto sits down in one of the easy chairs and looks back on the last year and a half. He speaks of harassment and "psychological torture" in a Budapest prison, where he was locked away following his arrest in January 2019. Hungary extradited him two months later to Portugal, where he was put in solitary confinement for over half a year.

Pinto is proud of the fact that he managed to get through that time. "After leaving isolation, I sometimes had problems concentrating," he says. It felt like a huge door had opened in front of him, he says, and he had trouble interacting with groups of people. In April, Pinto was released into house arrest and has officially been a free man since August 7. A commission made up of judges, state prosecutors and Justice Ministry officials continue to believe that he is in danger. Pinto didn't just ruffle the feathers of football stars and clubs, but also those of state leaders in Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Angola. Still, he says, "I can sleep pretty well at night." He can live with the risk, he says, since his main goal was uncovering transgressions.

Pinto skirts around questions about how he accessed the data. He says his role was merely that of searching for, collecting and analyzing information pertaining to violations before passing them along to journalists or criminal investigators. He doesn't view himself as a hacker, but as a whistleblower.

There is also another way of looking at it. Pinto’s greatest weakness in court is the accusation of attempted extortion. It calls into question Pinto’s supposedly lofty intentions. "I regret specifically one thing: having this contact with Nélio Lucas," says Pinto. Indeed, it was a legal complaint filed by sports marketing agency Doyen and its manager Lucas that led to the current trial. Pinto allegedly hacked the company’s IT systems in 2015. In an email, he demanded a sum of "between 500,000 euros and 1 million” in exchange for not publishing the documents. He also contacted a lawyer who then met with Lucas and his legal adviser at a gas station in Lisbon to discuss the deal. Police secretly recorded the conversations. DER SPIEGEL and the EIC reported on these allegations back in 2016.

"I was naive back then," says Pinto. He says he wanted to test how far Lucas and Doyen would go to prevent the publication of compromising documents.

"I Did Everything for the Public"
A few days ago, the Portuguese daily Público published an article quoting from an email that could challenge Pinto’s portrayal. The article claims that in the mail, he suggested to his former lawyer, who is also now facing legal proceedings himself, that the money being demanded from Doyen could be funneled through tax havens like Malta or Cyprus. Was Pinto really considering making use of such opaque channels? This is exactly the same accusation he himself has been making all this time against the football industry.

"I will explain in court when deemed necessary," Pinto says. He says he broke off the negotiations before any money changed hands. As such, Pinto claims he didn’t commit a crime.

Within the industry, Doyen had a reputation for being a particularly dubious company. The sports marketing firm purchased shares in transfer rights from professional football players and then profited significantly from the later sales of players. At some point, the setup, known as Third-Party Ownership (TPO) went too far even for FIFA, and the global football governing body banned the model.

In Malta, where Doyen Sports is registered, the Financial Services Authority fined the company for illegal lending. Spanish authorities are investigating Doyen Sports and Lucas on suspicions of tax evasion based on the publication of Football Leaks documents. Two other managers have also been accused of money laundering. Portuguese authorities froze 8 million euros in a Doyen account in spring 2019 because they were concerned about a planned transfer of millions of euros to the tax haven St. Lucia. An investigation is still ongoing. Lucas and Doyen are not making any public statements about the allegations.

Officials have questions about the origins of the billions Doyen has invested in the football industry. Pinto’s documents suggest that the Doyen network’s capital came from Kazakh oligarchs who raked in millions in the raw materials sector after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Tevfik Arif, the father of one of the former Doyen bosses, engaged in real estate business with Donald Trump. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence even highlighted Arif’s contacts with Russia and Turkey in a report last week, stating: "Information obtained by the committee suggests he was involved in Russian organized crime, money laundering and human trafficking dating back to at least 2000.” In response to a request for comment, a spokeswoman for Arif denied all the allegations.

Football Leaks exposed how professional football doesn’t care one iota about the sources of money for salaries, commissions and transfer fees.

A Deal with the Authorities
Pinto has now handed this data over to the Portuguese judicial system. The fact that he is cooperating so extensively with investigators will likely also strengthen his position in court. But how did a deal take shape?

Pinto says he has always wanted to work with the Portuguese, but only on the condition that the documents contained on his hard drives not be used against him. For a long time, the Public Prosecutor’s Office didn’t want to agree to the deal. But pressure grew on the investigators. In January, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), whose members include Germany’s Süddeutsche Zeitung newspaper, published the findings of its research into Isabel dos Santos, the Angolan who is Africa’s richest woman. The "Luanda Leaks” reporting traced a kleptocratic system of corruption and money laundering in Angola. The documents came from Rui Pinto. "It's disgusting that Portugal became the laundromat for Angolan elites,” Pinto says. He claims the rulers enriched themselves even as the country suffered under extreme poverty.

Dos Santos denies the allegations. But her system collapsed nonetheless. After previously calling him a hacker, a pirate or a spy, the Portuguese media suddenly came to view Pinto as a valuable whistleblower. It also forced the Portuguese authorities to admit that the data he is holding can be used to uncover misconduct in many different areas.

The problem they had was that they couldn’t get to the documents without his help. The hard drives have passwords that are more than 40 characters long, and each drive had been encrypted individually. Pinto threatened that dos Santos was only the tip of the iceberg and that there were still many more irregularities that could be exposed through his data – also in Portugal.

It appears to be better for investigators to be working together with Pinto. The director of the law enforcement agency has even praised Pinto for his help. When asked if he thinks it is likely he will be sent to jail again, Pinto says, "I don’t think so.” His defense team is comprised of three lawyers: Portuguese attorney Francisco Teixeira da Mota and his daughter Luísa and French lawyer and whistleblower expert William Bourdon. They want to call 45 witnesses, including American whistleblower Edward Snowden. And they have already had success with petitions claiming possible bias on the part of two out of three judges who had been assigned by lottery to the trial. After showing on Facebook that he’s an avid Benfica Lisbon fan and clicking the "like” button beneath an article critical of Pinto, the presiding judge who had been selected for the trial got dismissed from the proceedings as well as the second judge, who had been represented by one of the current plaintiffs’ lawyers in another case.

The interview has already gone on for several hours by the time the Champions League final begins. Pinto wants to step out and get some fresh air as the players with Bayern Munich and Paris Saint-Germain walk out onto the pitch. After he returns, he follows the final pitting the two Qatar-sponsored clubs against each other with one eye, while at the same time chatting with his girlfriend. "Football is about the fans, the real atmosphere,” says Pinto, "not this plastic event atmosphere where money dominates everything.”

He is slowly turning away from football, the sport for which he took all these risks. These days, he’s more passionate about issues like investigating corruption, fraud and tax evasion. Pinto says he used his time in jail to read numerous investigative exposé books, including ones about the abuse of power by states.

After the match, Pinto drives off into the darkness with his bodyguards to an undisclosed location, where he plans to prepare for his trial. He says he’s not concerned yet with what comes next. "I want to solve my legal situation first,” Pinto says. "I want to get acquitted.”


A Football Links Chronology

In September 2015, Rui Pinto, a Portuguese national, launched the anonymous Football Leaks whistleblower platform on the internet.

In spring of 2016, the platform provided DER SPIEGEL with the first set of documents. It was then shared with the European Investigative Collaborations (EIC) reporting network.

Starting in December 2016, DER SPIEGEL and its EIC partners began publishing the revelations. They include:
- tax evasion by professional football players like Cristiano Ronaldo;
- side agreements for player transfers;
- the handling of young players;
- racist scouting practices;
- skirting of Financial Foul Play rules;
- and secret plans for a Super League that would not answer to UEFA.

By November 2018, the Football Leaks platform had provided DER SPIEGEL and EIC with more than 70 million documents (3.4 terabytes of data).

Allegations against FIFA President Gianni Infantino, including that he wanted to alter the FIFA Code of Ethics with the aim of making preliminary investigations more difficult.

In December 2018, Rui Pinto, who was living anonymously in Budapest, decided to enter a French witness protection program. France wanted to review the data.

In January 2019, Portuguese authorities issued an arrest warrant for Pinto based on alleged criminal offences in six cases. He was arrested in Hungaryshortly before his planned move to France.

On March 21, 2019, Pinto is extradited to Portugal, where he is placed inpretrial detention in Lisbon.

On April 16, 2019, the far left GUE/NGL faction in the European Parliament announced Rui Pinto as the winner of its Whistleblower Award.

On Sept. 20, 2019, the attorney general in Lisbon charged Rui Pinto.

On February 19, 2019, public prosecutors in nine countries expressed interest in reviewing the data at a Eurojust meeting.

On Jan. 19, 2020, ICIJ published "Luanda Leaks." A few day later, Pinto revealed that he had provided the network of journalists with the data.

On April 8, 2020, Pinto was released from prison into house arrest.

On May 20, 2020, it was revealed that Pinto is cooperating with the Portuguese authorities. Thus far he has provided them with 17.5 terabytes of data.

On August 7, 2020, Pinto was placed in a witness protection program.

Sept. 4, 2020 is when Pinto's trial is set to begin. He has been accused of committing 90 crimes. They include charges of attempted extortion, illegally accessing secret data and violations of correspondence secrecy laws
by Chester Perry
Wed Aug 26, 2020 8:12 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

This could be significant, Rui Pinto of Football Leaks fame has officially admitted to hacking for the first time in papers submitted for his defence ahead of trial in Portugal next month - he appears to be hoping to be judged as a Whistle blower with the protections that that would offer him - from Sabado.pt

Rui Pinto admits to being a hacker...
18:11 by Nuno Tiago Pinto
... but he says that it was the victims who easily gave him access to his emails and that his guilt should be diminished because his motives were noble: revealing crimes.

Over the years, Rui Pinto has always denied being a hacker or having obtained illegally the information he published in Football Leaks and that he gave to the consortium of EIC journalists. He did so in interviews with several newspapers, but also in the first judicial interrogation to which he was subjected in March 2019, after being extradited from Hungary to Portugal. However, in the challenge he presented to the court where he will be tried for 90 crimes of illegitimate access, computer sabotage, violation of correspondence, undue access and extortion attempt, to which SÁBADO had access, Rui Pinto assumes for the first time to have entered illegally the emails of people and entities. However, he says that this intrusion did not require great technical knowledge - rather it was facilitated by the lack of care of the victims themselves or by the lack of computer security of the entities - and that their guilt should be considered small due to their altruistic motivations: the revelation of serious crimes of corruption.

Throughout the 130 pages of the document, his defense lawyers - Francisco and Luísa Teixeira da Mota - try to frame Rui Pinto's role in the right to information and freedom of expression and, above all, in what they argue is an increasingly broad concept of whistleblower. "The defendant does not argue that the ends justify the means and that, therefore, his activity as a whistleblower justifies the way the defendant and Football Leaks obtained some of his information. And he knows that the special protection of the state to whistleblowers is regulated assuming the existence of a relationship with the type of labor. But he also knows that wistleblower's status has been expanding...", they write.

In other words, they intend to bring to trial the debate about the confrontation between the benefits and the harms of their crimes to society at
large. That was the reason that led the hacker to roll personalities as witnesses without any knowledge of the facts that will be tried - such as Edward Snowden, Rafael Marques, Rui Santos, Miguel Poiares Maduro or Edwy Plenel, among others - but who can give their opinion on the importance of the revelations made by various journalistic investigations carried out based on documents provided by Rui Pinto.

In the challenge, the lawyers write that Rui Pinto is sorry to, "to obtain the data he was looking for, to have ended up committing criminal offences", but also that "the ease of entering the systems combined with access to information that, in part, reflected unlawful actions that the Defendant understood should be public knowledge gave the Defendant a conviction, on the one hand , of impunity and, on the other hand, gave him a sense of the 'justness' of his actions." And they conclude: "the defendant's conduct presents a diminished fault, aware of the reasons for the practice of the facts: seeking proof of the commission of serious crimes to publicly disclose them."

The admission by Rui Pinto that he practiced acts of computer piracy is even the main novelty of the challenge to the facts that will be judged from September 4. Most of the nullities listed by the defence – such as the illegality of the extension of the European arrest warrant, the wrong legal framework for various crimes, the invalidity of the evidence seized in Budapest (the hard drives) due to uncertainty about the manipulation or illegitimacy of Doyen Sports Investments being an assistant in the process (because the attack was on Doyen Capital's computer structure) – had already been invoked during the investigation and investigation phases. All of them were rejected by the public prosecutor and the Criminal Investigation Judge who evaluated them and who pronounced the founder of Football Leaks for 90 crimes: six of illegitimate access, one of computer sabotage, 14 of violation of correspondence, 68 of misinformation and one of attempted extortion.

In addition, Rui Pinto's defense also tries to discredit the main assistant in the process – Doyen – even writing to be "repugnant" that he intends to give "moral and ethical lessons to the accused, when he is a legal person with a heavy record" and that Nélio Lucas "has a criminal record that includes the commission of various crimes, which did not even allow him to be an intermediary in the transfer of players registered in the Portuguese Football Federation for lack of idoneity".

Hacker or whistleblower?
Since Football Leaks was created, Rui Pinto has always denied being a hacker. In December 2015, under the pseudonym John, he told the New York Times:"People may think we're hackers,but we're just normal computer users." In February 2016, as part of a report by German revista Der Spiegel, when asked about the origins of the documents he published, he mysteriously replied: "Some of our sources do not realize that they are our sources." In December of the same year, he returned to the German publication: "We have never pirated anyone and as we always say we are not hackers. All we have is a good network of sources." After being arrested in Budapest, he said in a joint interview with Der Spiegel, the German public television NDR and the French website Mediapart: "I do not consider myself a hacker but a citizen who acted in the public interest." In the same interview he said he had initiated a "spontaneous movement of revelations about football", which over time "more sources were added and shared the material" and that "never" thought to be doing something "illegal".

In Lisbon, questioned by the judge of criminal investigation, on May 22, 2019 assured that Football Leaks "was a collective of people, from sources", that he had not been the creator of the site, that "there was no unauthorized intrusion into computer systems" and that the information was obtained "through sources". In December last year, still in custody, he gave a new interview to Der Spiegel magazine in which, asked if he accessed plmj's servers, he replied: "it is debatable. I'm going to discuss this in court." And he said again, "I don't consider myself a hacker."

All these statements are in contradiction with what is now assumed by Rui Pinto, a few days from the beginning of his trial. If doyen Rui Pinto's relatively exfiltration of documents does not take any blame – he is accused of attacking Doyen Sports Investments and says that in London there was only Doyen Capital – the same is not true of the other entities.

About the intrusion into Sporting Rui Pinto's lawyers write that his interest in the club resulted from several controversies – such as the termination of the contract with Marco Silva, relationship with Doyen, hiring Jorge Jesus or the relationship with Álvaro Sobrinho. Without ever explicitly saying so, they assume that he was the author of the attack that left Sporting's servers inoperative. As? Writing that "on the part of the accused, not only did there be no intention to generate a breach of service but not even, in proceeding as it did, admitted such a possibility" since "any computer system updated and a large company" would never collapse with an attack like what he carried out: "a vulgar anti-DOS software blocks the IP address, if there is a large flow, and protects the stability of the server. However, surprisingly, Sporting Clube de Portugal had not installed this software."

Regarding the intrusion into the Portuguese Football Federation, Rui Pinto's debt explains that his interest was related to "impunity in matters of sports corruption". Examples: the case of vouchers; "schemes" in the control of arbitration structures; the intermediation of player transfers; or the weak scrutiny of the suitability of investors. "[These were] the reasons that led the defendant to become aware of information in the FPF," they write in the document.

On the attack on PLMJ, Rui Pinto denies that his interest has resulted from the office's links with Benfica. He explains that in 2017/18 he had had access to information related to Fidequity, a company linked to Isabel dos Santos, and realized that PLMJ lawyers – "like Inês Pinto da Costa" - were "key pieces in aiding and optimizing money laundering of the Angolan president's daughter." To learn more about these deals, they write, Rui Pinto "needed more concrete information" which he understood to be possible "using documents from the law firm." Something that he achieved, he admits, with the "documentation contained in the mailbox of lawyer Inês Pinto da Costa" and that "gave rise to the so-called Luanda Leaks". However, this explanation is in contradiction to what has been said by his French lawyer, William Bourdon, who assured the New York Times that Rui Pinto had stumbled upon Isabel dos Santos' documents while looking for documentation related to football business in plmj's office.

Continued crime.
One of the main evidence snared against Rui Pinto is the analysis of the hard drive that was seized from him and that was not encrypted. There, the Judicial Police and prosecutors found evidence that the hacker accessed the mailboxes of more than 500 people and entities between 2015 and 2019. In a chapter dedicated to the "defendant's performance as a continuing crime" the defense acknowledges most of the facts of which he is accused.

The lawyers write that Rui Pinto analyzed the documentation of an entity, found links to others and by finding email addresses of those involved proceeded to analyze the infrastructures and access bridges", identifying "their weaknesses and then creating a kind of form sent to the recipients who enter their credentials, passing the accused to have access to them and, consequently, their computer systems" – in the background, an action known as spearphishing.

In this performance, he denies ever having sent viruses, malware or malicious code and ensures that the recipient of the email installed nothing or kept the computer compromised. "But because he did not properly pay to the page presented to him – not realizing that it was not reliable – he introduced his credentials," the lawyers write. The targets were clubs, agents, intermediaries, lawyers and consultants who, by their relations understood to be able to "hide acts of corruption, tax fraud, money laundering, among other crimes".

For Rui Pinto's defense, "the successive unauthorized access to the systems was facilitated by the fact that the targets did not detect the non-reliability of the 'forms' presented to them and introduce their credentials, and the defendant immediately and 'easily' had access to their mailboxes." More: "In the background is the internet (...) the circumstance which allows the accused to re-commit new facts because there is a favourable opportunity for the commission of the crime"; the "ease of entering the systems combined with access to information that, in part, reflected unlawful actions which the defendant understood to be public knowledge gave the defendant a conviction, on the one hand, of impunity and on the other, gave him a sense of the 'justness' of his actions."

For this reason, they maintain, "the defendant's conduct presents a diminished fault, aware of the reasons for the practice of the facts: seeking practical evidence of serious crimes to publicly disclose them. Being certain that the defendant regrets that, to obtain the data he was looking for, he ended up committing criminal offences."

The trial is scheduled for September
by Chester Perry
Tue Aug 25, 2020 11:32 am
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Wed Jul 29, 2020 12:11 pm
If you do not want to read the 90 plus page document from CAS on the Manchester City appeal- I empathise. However, there is some real nuggets in there that tell you quite about about Man City did and UEFA should have done - UEFA come out of it badly for not following their own rules and Manchester City appear to be every inch the nasty enterprise we suspected.

Much, though not all is summed up in threads from
@SportingIntel https://twitter.com/sportingintel/statu ... 3694051329
and
@TariqPanja https://twitter.com/tariqpanja/status/1 ... 1082681346

David Conn (a life long City fan) in the Guardian was particularly struck by the fact that City's nominee for the panel ended up being chair (final decision looks like a 2-1 to City) and appeared to be far from independent given his law firm has done million and millions of Euros/dollars worth of work for State owned Abu Dhabi businesses over the years

https://www.theguardian.com/football/20 ... -cas-rules

in his 2nd report he emphasises that the club still has questions hanging over them despite their claim of being exonerated

https://www.theguardian.com/football/20 ... s-judgment

The Independent chooses to focus on the complete has of things made by UEFA (Aleksander Ceferin must be furious - he is a lawyer by profession)

https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/foo ... 43511.html

I will post some legal observations from the regular sources at a later date
Finally got round to the Legal observations - now that both UEFA and Man City say it is closed and they will hold no grudges - this from LawinSport.com is pretty detailed

A full review of Man City v UEFA CAS Award – why this is not the end of FFP
A full review of Man City v UEFA CAS Award – why this is not the end of FFPPublished: Wednesday, 12 August 2020. Written by Christopher Flanagan No Comments
The dispute between UEFA and Manchester City Football Club over the latter’s compliance with the former’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations has been one of the most high-profile sports law matters of the year.

On 13 June 2020, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) released a media statement under the header “MANCHESTER CITY FC DID NOT DISGUISE EQUITY FUNDING AS SPONSORSHIP CONTRIBUTIONS BUT DID FAIL TO COOPERATE WITH THE UEFA AUTHORITIES”. The CAS statement noted that “The Panel of arbitrators in charge of the matter, composed of Mr Rui Botica Santos (Portugal), President, Prof. Ulrich Haas (Germany) and Mr Andrew McDougall QC (France)” (the Panel) and concluded that “The final award with reasons will be published on the CAS website in a few days.”

Inevitably, this announcement resounded loudly around the world: Tottenham Hotspur manager Jose Mourinho said he agrees with the “concept”[1] of FFP, but called for an end to the regulatory initiative due to the “circus” that goes with it; Liverpool manager Jurgen Klopp described Manchester City’s success in the case as “not a good day for football”[2]; the BBC asked “is FFP dead?”; and the President of La Liga, Javier Tebas, was reported to have said that the result showed that “CAS is dead”[3].

On 28 July 2020, CAS 2020/A/6785 Manchester City FC v. UEFA (the Award), was published[4] (the Award being dated 13 July 2020).

This article will examine and critically analyse the Award before providing commentary on what––if anything––this means for FFP as a regulatory initiative. Specifically, it looks at:

- The factual background
- The key issues determined by the CAS Panel
- Analysis and commentary
- Whilst reports of the death of FFP and the CAS are greatly exaggerated, the Award will certainly give sports governing bodies and participants in professional football some pause for reflection.

References to ‘Paragraphs’ in this article are references to the paragraphs of the Award.

Factual Background
Main participants
Before setting out the principal facts and allegations, it is helpful to set out, and group together, the key legal persons involved in the case.

UEFA is the governing body for European football. At club level, its functions include the organisation of European club competition (presently the Champions League and the Europa League), the promulgation of rules relating to those competitions, and the obligations of clubs under its jurisdiction. Oversight and enforcement of FFP is undertaken by the Club Financial Control Body (CFCB), which is divided into two chambers; an Investigatory Chamber, responsible for monitoring and investigating FFP compliance, and an Adjudicatory Chamber, responsible for making decisions (including disciplinary decisions) on the matters referred to it by the Investigatory Chamber. The CFCB is functionally independent from UEFA.[6]

Manchester City Football Club Limited (MCFC) is a professional football club based in England. MCFC is part of a sophisticated corporate structure. MCFC is a subsidiary of Manchester City Limited. Manchester City Limited is itself a subsidiary of City Football Group Limited, which company is responsible for the operation of a portfolio of football clubs across the globe (Paragraph 7). City Football Group Limited is in the majority ownership of the Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG),[7] the investment vehicle(s) of His Highness Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed bin Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan (HHSM). HHSM is the Deputy Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates (of which Abu Dhabi is a constituent emirate).

Emirates Telecommunications Corporation PJSC (Etisalat) and Etihad Airways PJCS (Etihad) are each multinational corporations headquartered in Abu Dhabi. Etisalat is the Middle East’s largest telecommunications company and majority-owned by the sovereign wealth fund of the UAE, whilst Etihad is part of the Etihad Aviation Group and is ultimately owned by the government of Abu Dhabi. Etisalat and Etihad each have held sponsorship arrangements with MCFC commencing during the 2009/10 football season. These sponsorship arrangements were varied from time to time.

The 2014 settlement agreement
In 2014, the CFCB investigated MCFC in respect of alleged FFP breaches. On 16 May 2014, UEFA and MCFC entered into a settlement agreement (the Settlement Agreement) in respect of those alleged breaches. MCFC expressed no admission of any such breach under the Settlement Agreement (Paragraph 14). MCFC discharged its obligations under the Settlement Agreement on 20 April 2017.

Facts and allegations leading to present case
In November 2018, as a part of the ‘Football Leaks’ movement, various articles were published in various media outlets concerning MCFC. Amongst these publications were materials “acquired from MCFC’s computer systems by an illegal hack” (Paragraph 16). In an interesting flourish of advocacy rhetoric, MCFC appears to refer to the Football Leaks information throughout as the “Criminally Obtained Documents”, whereas UEFA refers to the same information as the “Leaked Documents”. The Panel prefers “Leaked Emails” (Paragraph 16). It is evident that the Leaked Emails, taken in isolation, implied to UEFA contraventions of FFP.

In the view of the CFCB, the Leaked Emails provided “compelling evidence” that the sponsorship payments received from Etisalat were “made or caused to be made by ADUG but attributed to…Etisalat”; and that the sponsorship payments received from Etihad were in part “funded or procured to be funded by or on behalf of ADUG, but paid through Etihad” (with £8m per year funded by Etihad itself) (Paragraph 29).

The CFCB Investigatory Chamber invited MCFC to comment on the Leaked Emails. Dissatisfied with MCFC’s response in correspondence, the Investigatory Chamber opened an investigation. On 28 March and 11 April 2019, hearings took place; however, as is made clear in Paragraph 317 of the Award, MCFC did not make available to the Investigatory Chamber all the persons whose attendance was requested, nor did MCFC adduce all the documents requested.

On 15 May 2019, the Investigatory Chamber referred the matter to the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber. MCFC unsuccessfully challenged that referral before the CAS. The facts of that case are discussed here[8] and the award is available here[9]. The adjudicatory chamber rendered its decision on 14 February 2020, finding to its comfortable satisfaction (Paragraph 29) that MCFC:

- disguised equity payments by ADUG in respect of the Etisalat and Etihad sponsorship agreements;
- made false submissions in its financial statements submitted as part of the FFP process;
- made false submission in respect of its break-even compliance; and
- failed to cooperate with the CFCB.
- Specifically, the Adjudicatory Chamber found MCFC to have “contravened Article 13, 43, 47, 51, 56, 58, and 62 of the [Club Licensing and FFP Regulations]” (Paragraph 28).[10] There were no allegations or findings that the sponsorships were not for fair value (Paragraph 10).

The Adjudicatory Chamber excluded MCFC from UEFA club competitions for the seasons 2020//21 and 2021/22 and fined the club EUR30m, the severity of the sanction being warranted in the view of the Adjudicatory Chamber owing to this case being “by far the most serious breach of the Regulations to have been referred to the Adjudicatory Chamber” (Paragraph 29).

On 24 February 2020, MCFC appealed the decision of the Adjudicatory Chamber to the CAS. It was agreed by the parties that in order to “safeguard a proper running of the competitions” a reasoned CAS award should be issued no later than 10 July 2020.[11] A three-day hearing was held on 8, 9, and 10 June 2020.

Key issues determined by the CAS Panel
Based on the submissions of the parties, the key issues to be determined by the Panel were:

- The authenticity and admissibility of the Leaked Emails.
- Whether the CFCB breached its due process obligations.
- Whether the Settlement Agreement obviates any rights the CFCB may otherwise have had to prosecute the issues at hand.
- Whether the matter is time barred.
- The standard of proof.

The Panel’s findings of fact in respect of the allegations at hand:
- Did MCFC disguise equity payments?
- Did MCFC fail to cooperate with the CFCB investigation
G. The appropriate sanction, if any.

A – Authenticity and admissibility of the Leaked Emails
The Panel found it unnecessary to determine the parties’ strict legal rights in respect of the authenticity of the Leaked Emails, given original copies were disclosed by MCFC in the CAS proceedings.

Commenting on the fidelity of the Leaked Emails, however, the Panel observed that they did appear to have been amended by way of deletions of certain information, and in one case the elision of two emails, but that this “did not affect the veracity of the Leaked Emails on which UEFA primarily based its case.”

The Panel added (at Paragraph 88) that it “did not have evidence before it to establish whether the Leaked Emails are the only evidence that could support UEFA’s case…because such information was not disclosed by MCFC and – in the view of the majority of the Panel – because UEFA ultimately chose not to seek further disclosure.” It would be interesting to understand the view of the dissenting arbitrator in this regard. It is clearly true that UEFA did not pursue further disclosure during the CAS proceedings, in light of limited time available to the parties to resolve the dispute, but it appears incongruous with CFCB Investigatory Chamber’s requests for information pursuant to the Club Licensing and FFP Regulations, denied by MCFC.

This is however an issue of MCFC’s cooperation (discussed further below) rather than the authenticity of the Leaked Emails per se.

The Panel found the Leaked Emails (and, it is to be inferred, the original versions thereof) to be admissible as evidence. The Procedural Rules governing the CFCB state at Article 13(2) that “All means of evidence” may be considered; the Procedural Rules are, however, silent as to whether ‘illegally’ obtained evidence may be used. Consequently, the Panel considered position under Swiss law,[12] finding that that Article 184 of the Swiss International Private Law Act and Article 152(2) of the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure apply. This required a balancing of interests between “finding the truth” and “MCFC’s personality rights”.

Relying on the prior wide publication of the Leaked Emails and the private and public interest in FFP as a regulatory initiative (Paragraph 103 and 104), the Panel found that the balance swayed in favour of discerning the truth. The Panel’s conclusions in this regard are hard to disagree with; however, the reasoning is somewhat circular, in that the Panel relied upon the publication of the Leaked Emails in media outlets in order to find a public interest in their admissibility as evidence, which was derived from that same publication.

B – CFCB Due Process Proceedings
MCFC raised two issues in respect of the due process of the CFCB: The first related to the ‘premature’ issuance of the decision by the Investigatory Chamber to the Adjudicatory Chamber of the CFCB, which MCFC argued denied it the opportunity to make submissions concerning the relationship (or in fact the separation) of MCFC and its sponsors; the second related to the leaking of information to the press during the CFCB’s investigation, which may have implied bias.

The Panel found that MCFC was not prejudiced by the timing of the referral decision and that the de novo review of matters by first the Adjudicatory Chamber and latterly the CAS Panel had the effect of curing any defect in impartiality (if “for the sake of the argument” any were found) of the Investigatory Chamber implied by the leaking of information (Paragraphs 144 and 145).

Whilst the ultimate finding of the Panel in this aspect of the case was resolved in UEFA’s favour for present purposes, there will be cause for concern, given the Panel stated that the alleged leaking of information “is worrisome and too coincidental not to be taken seriously”. This follows similar remarks by the panel in the prior CAS case between the parties, CAS 2019/A/6298[13].

C - The 2014 Settlement Agreement
MCFC argued that the alleged breaches giving rise to this case could not be pursued by the CFCB because the matters at hand were subject to the Settlement Agreement.

The Panel found this to be incorrect. The Settlement Agreement concerned discrete matters: MCFC’s break even deficit; the fair value of certain sponsorship arrangements; and whether certain sponsorship arrangements were with related parties. The CFCB did not at the material time issue a referral decision to MCFC which were broader than the issues set out in the Settlement Agreement (Paragraph 153). The alleged breaches set out in the Settlement Agreement were not the same as the alleged breaches in the case at hand (relating to alleged disguised equity funding), notwithstanding certain overlaps in the time, persons, and issues involved.

The Panel’s conclusion makes sense to the author. The very nature of the case at hand is that it arose because of issues which were not known to the CFCB at the time the Settlement Agreement was made. The CFCB cannot be precluded from pursuing disciplinary action against a party on the basis of the resolution of other, distinct, alleged breaches by the same party at a similar time. In the words of the Panel, “The Settlement Agreement did not immunise MCFC from any possible further and different charges” (Paragraph 158).

D – Time-Barring and The Statute of Limitations
The limitation period for the ‘prosecution’ of breaches is set out in Article 37 of the Procedural Rules of the CFCB:

“Statute of limitations

Prosecution is barred after five years for all breaches…”

Limitation is therefore calculated by reference to the commencement of the prosecution. The Procedural Rules are defective in that they do not set out what it means to commence a ‘prosecution’, and MCFC and the CFCB differed in their interpretation.[14]

The Panel, by majority, agreed with neither party, finding instead that ‘prosecution’ starts at the issuance of the Referral Decision. The majority of the Panel appears to arrive at this conclusion based on a dictionary definition of ‘prosecute’, which is somewhat surprising to see, given there is no real analysis of the prevailing applicable law in relation to what it means to commence a prosecution, and given this is a critical issue to the case, with certain facts falling outside of the relevant limitation period.

As a result, the Panel found the relevant limitation period extended to 15 May 2014. Breaches before such date could not be prosecuted.

Given the multi-year assessment basis of FFP, there was also some discussion as to whether information submitted within the limitation period, but concerning ‘comparative information’ which relates to dates outside of the limitation period, can be prosecuted, given such information would previously have been submitted, but would fall outside of the limitation period if considered only on its original submission.

This question is critical in respect of the Etisalat sponsorship, as “the amounts at issue were transferred to MCFC on 13 June 2012 and 10 January 2013, i.e. outside the five-year limitation period” (Paragraph 185). The financial information submitted by MCFC in respect of the Etisalat sponsorship was thus submitted for the 2013/14 monitoring process, which falls outside of the limitation period.

UEFA argued that the resubmission of financial information for comparative assessment brought it within the limitation period. The majority of the Panel disagreed on the basis that this would “artificially” extend the limitation period (Paragraph 189). It is hard to disagree with this conclusion. For example, if clubs were required to submit financial information covering a ten year period on a rolling basis, on UEFA’s interpretation this would create a de facto limitation period of fifteen years, which surely cannot be intended. As an aside, the majority of the Panel did, however, find that this conclusion may be different in respect of break-even information, given that historic (possibly time limited) information is inherent to the correct calculation of the break-even calculation. Again, it is difficult to disagree with this conclusion.

Consequently, the Panel found the allegations in respect of the Etisalat sponsorship to fall outside of the limitation period (Paragraph 196). For the reasons expanded upon below, this is an important finding.

E - Standard of Proof
The standard of proof to be applied was that of comfortable satisfaction, with the burden of proof on UEFA.

MCFC suggested that the Adjudicatory Chamber failed to properly apply the standard of proof given the nature of the CFCB’s evidence and the severity of the allegations (“effectively being beyond reasonable doubt”, Paragraph 205); however the Panel found that the nature of the allegations, notwithstanding their severity, did not, in fact, have implications for the standard of proof.

F – Findings of Fact
I - Disguised equity funding
Limitation issues taken aside, this case was, in effect, decided on the evidence. In that regard, “Initially, UEFA’s case was entirely premised on the Leaked Emails” (Paragraph 229) and latterly certain financial information, whereas MCFC was able to rely on witness evidence of witnesses included the former President and CEO of Etihad, the Legal Advisor to the Abu Dhabi Department of Finance, the Senior Vice President in the Contracts and Administration Department of Etisalat, as well as its own officials and expert witnesses, and its own more detailed accounts.

The Panel found that whilst the Leaked Emails provided prima facie evidence of breaches by MCFC, who “clearly had a case to answer” (Paragraph 213), that case was answered by more comprehensive evidence available to the CAS Panel.

Moreover, the Panel found that Leaked Emails did not, on their own, establish a breach of the rules, as they do not establish that “the arrangements [discussed therein] were made and implemented”. The allegations brought by the CFC required a “completed act”, which was not found (Paragraphs 215 and 290). Whether or not the Leaked Emails demonstrate an intention to circumvent the rules (and it is not suggested here that such an intention was found), there was in any event no evidence that such a contravention was consummated.

The Award discussed the evidentiary aspects of the case at length (see Paragraphs 213 to 293), but the conclusions of the Award are best summarised by Paragraph 254:

“a finding that Etihad’s sponsorship contributions were funded, or procured to be funded, by HHSM and/or ADUG would require a conclusion that the evidence of several high-ranking officials of large international commercial enterprises….were false…and that at least [two persons] would be subject to criminal sanctions”.

The Leaked Emails and limited financial information available to UEFA were eviscerated by the comprehensive and credible witness evidence presented by MCFC.

However, this leaves important questions about the robustness of UEFA’s processes and of MCFC’s compliance with its regulator: Why was UEFA, and the CFCB before it, only able to obtain such limited information? As the competent regulator of European club football, acting under financial rules which give it broad audit and investigatory powers, is it proper that fuller information should transpire only on appeal to the CAS?

Even in the context of the present CAS case, UEFA made evidentiary requests in respect of contextualising information in relation to the Leaked Documents, an unredacted payment ledger, and the identity of an unnamed person who "plays a key role” and “made payments to MCFC which are at the heart of this case” (Paragraph 40). MCFC resisted this on the basis it would require “a proper determination” based on written evidence and a hearing, for which there was not time in light of the parties’ self-imposed deadline of 10 July 2020 (Paragraph 42). Instead, MCFC agreed to partly comply with UEFA’s requests (that is, provide some but not all of the material requested). UEFA acquiesced to that more limited disclosure.

This perhaps speaks to an undue confidence by UEFA in respect of the case presented. UEFA suggested that “There is no need for inferences to be drawn from the Football Leaks Documents as the true situation is set out in them” (Paragraph 63 subparagraph 648(d)) and made various references to its case being “unimpeachable” (see Paragraphs 40 and 63). With the benefit of retrospect, these proclamations look ill-advised, given the finding that the Leaked Emails were in some respects edited.

Ultimately, the Panel concludes that “Any alleged wrongdoing of MCFC with respect to the Etisalat payments is time-barred. Any alleged wrongdoing of MCFC with respect to the Etihad payments is partially time-barred and, in any event, not established to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel” (Paragraph 324).

This leaves a somewhat open question as to whether the Panel could have reached a contrary conclusion in respect of the Etisalat payments were this element not time barred on the Panel’s interpretation of Statute of Limitations in the CFCB Procedural Rules. Based on the details of the Award, the Etisalat sponsorship does appear to raise more questions than the Etihad sponsorship. Counsel for MCFC indicates that ADUG did, as a matter of fact, make payments which were due to be paid by Etisalat, albeit that Etisalat, as the liable party under the sponsorship arrangement with MCFC, repaid ADUG on 18 March 2015 (Paragraph 61, subparagraph D.1.19 and 20). In submissions set out in the Award, MCFC put forward that “MCFC recognised in its accounts that these payments were made on behalf of Etisalat [by or at the direction of ADUG]” (Paragraph 61, subparagraph D.1.22).

This raises questions as to the proper characterisation of those payments made by ADUG. On one characterisation, these could be construed as the settlement of the liabilities of Etisalat to MCFC in accordance with the terms of their sponsorship agreement(s), albeit by a third party. An alternative characterisation would be to construe this payment as a related-party loan by ADUG to MCFC, later satisfied by the offsetting of the obligations of Etisalat to MCFC and MCFC to ADUG. Paragraph 61, subparagraph D.1.30 goes on to state that “Ernst & Young confirms that the accounting records of ADUG treated the two payments as creating a receivable from Etisalat [for ADUG]”

The proper interpretation of these payments is not examined in the Award, as the Panel found the arrangements to be time-barred, notwithstanding the repayment by ADUG to Etisalat on 18 March 2015, within the limitation period. Clearly the liabilities between ADUG and Etisalat should be properly recorded in those parties’ own accounts; however, if overall relationship of these payments were to have been recharacterised, then this may properly have entailed book entries in MCFC’s accounts within the limitation period. Paragraph 61 subparagraphs G.47 highlight the fact that under accrual accounting methods, revenue must be recognised when sponsorship services are provided, not when cash is received. Therefore MCFC had to account for the Etisalat liabilities in accordance with its invoices; but this point remains premised on the assumption that the payment by ADUG ‘on behalf of Etisalat’ is properly treated as such, and not as a loan to MCFC repayable by (in effect) by Etisalat at a future date.

However, the evidence presented does suggest that whatever the treatment of these payments ought to have been, once the inter-partes liabilities were set-off by Etisalat, that the monies were not funded by ADUG. In effect ADUG a creditor of Etisalat, not MCFC. That is to say that in the fullness of time, there was no equity provided by ADUG, because the payments were ultimately borne by Etisalat (albeit apparently not before 18 March 2015). UEFA did not, after all, base its case on related party transactions between ADUG and MCFC (if any), but on the funding of sponsorship arrangements by ADUG, which was found not to be the case.

Overall, the question of the Etisalat sponsorship arrangements is redolent of the case overall. UEFA averred that “No sensible explanation has ever been provided by MCFC as to why: i) ADUG was arranging payments on behalf of Abu Dhabi-based partners; nor ii) why ADUG needed to engage the assistance of [X] to make the payment” (Paragraph 63). It is certainly true to say that on its face, this arrangement raises questions; however, it remains somewhat based on mystery and insinuation without concrete facts buttressing the questions raised. A core question remains as to why UEFA only came to interrogate the matter in 2019 when the payments by ADUG on behalf of Etisalat came many years prior, ostensibly without interrogation by UEFA at the material time, despite the contemporaneous submission by MCFC of financial information in accordance with the FFP licensing and monitoring process.

II Failure to Co-operate
The final substantive point addressed by the Panel was whether or not MCFC failed to cooperate with the CFCB in accordance with its duties under the Club Licensing and FFP Regulations. UEFA argue that MCFC was “suddenly” able to provide witnesses for the CAS who were denied to the CFCB investigation (Paragraph 40).

Various parts of the Award make it clear that the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber did not have the evidence available to it that the Panel did (see for example Paragraph 257). The Panel acknowledge that FFP is dependent on the cooperation of those clubs regulated by it, and that this duty of cooperation is explicitly enshrined in Article 56 of the Club Licensing and FFP Regulations (Paragraph 274). The Panel further acknowledge that the Leaked Emails gave MCFC a case to answer to the CFCB (Paragraph 213).

The Panel found that MCFC “failed to provide all but one of the witnesses requested by the CFCB Chief Investigator” (Paragraph 305) and “failed to provide the complete runs of emails of which the Leaked Emails formed part” (Paragraph 306).

On examination of the facts, the Panel found MCFC to have failed to cooperate with the CFCB’s investigation in contravention of Article 56 of the UEFA Club Licensing and FFP Regulations (Paragraph 321). A significant aspect of the section of the Award dealing with MCFC’s failure to cooperate with the CFCB is found at Paragraph 316, in which it is found that the failure to cooperate is “not repaired by the de novo nature of the CAS proceedings, because allowing clubs to hold onto relevant evidence until the proceedings before CAS would seriously risk turning the proceedings before the CFCB into a farce”. This interpretation must be correct, as any contrary finding would have conflated the failure to comply with Article 56 with the failure to comply with the CAS procedure, despite those being distinct obligations.

Yet there was still a benefit possible to MCFC in failing to comply with the CFCB, in that the Panel found that limitation is calculated by reference to the CFCB Investigatory Chamber’s Referral Notice, and thus any delay in the investigation leading to such Referral Notice could have had the effect on the events in scope of review for the CAS.

G - Sanction
The Panel was of the view that UEFA “by no means filed frivolous charges” (Paragraph 325); however, the central allegations of providing incorrect information and receiving disguised equity funding through Etisalat and Etihad were dismissed.

The Panel did, however, find MCFC to have breached the Club Licensing and FFP Regulations in respect of its cooperation with the “reasonable evidentiary requests” (Paragraph 326). The Panel agreed that “the entire FFP system depends on…complete and accurate reporting by clubs” (Paragraph 327), with MCFC’s “failure to produce original versions of the Leaked Emails…particularly serious” (Paragraph 328). The Panel goes on to state that MCFC’s failure to cooperate is aggravated by prior investigation by the CFCB for alleged breaches of FFP as resolved by the Settlement Agreement (Paragraphs 329 and 33), and concludes that MCFC, by failing to cooperate with the CFCB’s investigation, had committed a “severe breach and that MCFC is to be seriously reproached” (Paragraph 331).

However, taking view of the case overall, given that the main allegations were not established, the Panel reduced the sanction levied by the CFCB to a fine of EUR10m. The Panel did not find it appropriate to uphold the ban on participation in UEFA club competitions (Paragraphs 333 and 334).

UEFA may well have been frustrated by this outcome, and it may be construed as surprising given the seriousness the Award places on the failure to comply with the CFCB; however, as is noted in the Award at Paragraph 333, the Adjudicatory Chamber did not indicate to what degree its sanction was related to “disguised equity funding on one hand and on MCFC’s failure to cooperate…on the other hand”. Nor does UEFA’s own regulatory regime stipulate a specified punishment of a ban for breaches relating to clubs’ failures to comply with the CFCB. Thus, the punishment of a fine is within the reasonable spectrum of punishments available to the CAS Panel; it is for UEFA to clarify its rules if it has a contrary intention for future cases.

Analysis and commentary
There are a number of interesting details to this case on a granular level, but first to take a step back to look at matters in context: The origins of this dispute, which has generated significant interest in the media, and has doubtless had significant financial costs to both parties, arises because of opaque questions concerning unknown factors about the particular provenance of certain sponsorship monies paid to MCFC. The matter is unlikely to have every been pursued by UEFA but for the publication of certain limited and curated private emails into the public domain.

As is acknowledged in the Award, it would have been difficult for UEFA to have come into receipt the Leaked Emails and not to raise the matter with MCFC, not least because UEFA has an obligation to the other clubs which compete for and in UEFA competitions to ensure compliance by all clubs with its rules. In that respect, it is interesting to note at Paragraph 32 an application for intervention in these proceedings by nine Premier League clubs (in essence, those who had a prospect of taking a UEFA competition place in the event of a ban of MCFC), even though that application was ultimately moot.

As was anticipated, this case did not hinge on the underlying fundamental legality of FFP; and whilst the outcome of the matter may have reignited debate, the dispute between UEFA and MCFC was not in any real sense a referendum on the merits of FFP as a regulatory initiative, and care should be taken in drawing conclusions that imply that it was. Ultimately, this case related to an idiosyncratic set of circumstances which are unlikely to be replicable.

There are, however, clearly points to be taken away.

Timely production of documents
In particular, the entire CAS case, and indeed the initial decision of the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber, could have been avoided had MCFC provided the timely production of the documents requested by the CFCB (Paragraph 328). In one sense, this comes as a surprise. The Club Licensing and FFP Regulations and the Procedural Rules of the CFCB bestow on the CFCB broad audit and information access rights. In another sense, it is not surprising, as those rights are only of use to the degree they are complied with and enforced. As Hessert has explained in greater detail here[15], the duty to cooperate with sports governing bodies is fraught with tension.[16]

This issue could perhaps be ameliorated with more robust audit and information rights. After all, the Award indicates that the CFCB was not wrong in its investigation or adjudication per se; it simply had a deficit of information when contrasted with the CAS (Paragraph 341). Part of the issue in this matter is that in order to properly determine the facts, the CFCB had also to consider information in the possession of parties outside of its regulatory ambit (both related parties and unrelated parties). Clearly this is problematic in relation to audit and information gathering. In other industries, this issue is addressed by a regulatory obligation for licensee to include audit rights of regulators in contracts with key counterparties.[17] Whether this is necessary or proportionate to the issues presented by the majority of FFP matters is, however, questionable. Nevertheless, a tightening of the scope of audit and information gathering rights would improve matters, as would a more clearly defined set of sanctions for failures to comply with such rights.

The split in the Panel’s views
An interesting point to note in this case is the clear split observed in the views of the Panel, with references in the decision to the views of the ‘majority’ of the Panel throughout. This indicates dissenting views.

In respect of the composition of the panel, it is noteworthy to observe that in each of the two CAS cases that were comprised in the dispute between MCFC and UEFA (i.e. CAS 2019/A/6298 and CAS 2020/A/6785), the parties nominated the same arbitrator (UEFA appointing Prof. Ulrich Haas and MCFC appointing Mr Andrew McDougall QC (Paragraphs 30 and 31)). There are, of course, legitimate reasons why the parties may have elected to nominate the same arbitrator in each case; not least their familiarity with the background in what is an incredibly complicated set of facts.

It should also be highlighted that research by Lindholm shows that CAS arbitrators tend to be selected from a narrow pool even in the context of the CAS list;[18] however, this may well reignite debate as to the independence of the CAS––which is critical to its legitimacy as a competent arbitral body (notwithstanding the elaboration on and partial foreclosure of that debate in the recent cases of Riza, Mutu and Pechstein[19]).

Much ado about nothing?
It is difficult not to conclude that aspects of this case constituted much ado about nothing. Allegations of deception, based on part truths and innuendo, which were not ultimately substantiated. FFP as a policy initiative may be refined as a result of the outcomes[20], but that was likely to happen in any event (temporary measures[21] already have been taken in response to the ongoing impact of the coronavirus), and indeed FFP has changed iteratively over the years of its existence in any event (as explained here[22]).

This Award does not, therefore, indicate the death of FFP. It may precipitate a refinement of the rules or the resources put into monitoring and compliance, but it would be disproportionate to invoke wholesale changes to the rules as a result of the specific facts of this case; particularly given the view of UEFA that, taken overall, FFP is working.[23]

Leaked information
The final point of this article is to highlight that despite the decision of the Adjudicatory Chamber of the CFCB and two CAS Awards, the matters in issue are still not altogether resolved. As it noted at Paragraph 26, MCFC filed a complaint with UEFA’s Control, Ethics, and Disciplinary Board concerning leaks of information during the CFCB investigation process. The CAS Panels in both CAS 2019/A/6298 and CAS 2020/A/6785 have expressed disquiet at these leaks. It remains to be seen how that aspect of this case will be resolved.
by Chester Perry
Mon Aug 24, 2020 11:17 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

TwoHundredPercent.com looks at the Swiss case against FIFA President Gianni Infantino and the strange unrecorded and unremembered meetings between him and the former Swiss Attorney General

FIFA ‘Farce’ – Infantino Meeting His Match?
by Mark | Aug 21, 2020

That Fifa president Gianni Infantino faces legal scrutiny over certain of his actions in office isn’t exactly news. The previous two Fifa presidents were corrupt as f**k for decades without proper sanction. Thus, cynical shoulder-shrugging is the commonest reaction to such things.
The issue imperiling Infantino seems innocuous. Three meetings with Switzerland’s attorney-general Michael Lauber in March/April 2016 and June 2017 (Fifa is headquartered in Switzerland). Indeed, descriptions of the legal importance being attached to these meetings as a “farce” and “absurd” have superficial merit.

However, the meetings forced Lauber’s resignation, the opening of a Swiss criminal investigation into their content, and (drum roll) criminal proceedings against Infantino, after Swiss investigations found “indications of criminal conduct” relating to “abuse of public office, breach of official secrecy, assisting offenders and incitement to these acts” with consideration of “additional criminal acts” remaining “reserved.” Wooh.

The meetings were undocumented and unmentioned by Infantino or Lauber, despite the by definition importance of any liaison between two such top-ranking officials. The explanations for them haven’t even addressed their secrecy, or those criminal conduct indications. Everyone at them has, to varying extents, tried to cover them up. And their very existence potentially explains some of the issues with Fifa-corruption probes since 2015.

The meetings were revealed, in November 2018, by “Football Leaks,” the website full of leaked documents on sports skullduggeries (the recent change in status of the man ‘behind’ FL, Portuguese hacker/whistleblower Rui Pinto, from house arrestee to protected witness, may or may not be coincidental). But the story originated in the world-famous rounding-up of many of Fifa’s less-than-great-and-good in Switzerland’s largest city, Zurich in May 2015.

Lauber was the leading light of the Swiss ‘end’ of the investigations into alleged Fifa corruption which the Zurich raids rammed into public consciousness. On 10th March 2015, his office had “opened criminal proceedings against persons unknown on suspicion of criminal mismanagement. and money-laundering in connection with the allocation of the 2018 & 2022 World Cup finals hosting rights.” However, the rest of the 700-word announcement of this operation was more defensive.

“The procedure is huge and complex on many levels,” Lauber stressed. Swiss investigations would be “executed independently” from US operations. He insisted that “the world of football needs to be patient. By its nature, this investigation will take more than the legendary 90 minutes.” And, indeed, the “Swiss probe” was soon “running into obstacles.”

These references now haunt Lauber. The US brought many Fifa officials to justice in late 2017, about which a book has since been written, published and best-sold globally (Ken Bensinger’s excellent, if unimaginatively-titled, “Red Card”). But his Fifa-corruption probes have foundered on a variety of rocks, the latest the collapse in April of a tax fraud trial relating to 2006 World Cup hosting rights, which fell to a “five-year statute of limitations,” the legalese for “took too long.” And an increasing number of legally relevant people have linked these failings to the Lauber/Infantino conflabs.

On 2nd November 2018, German news magazine Der Spiegel revealed Football Leaks’ Infantino leaks. “How Fifa’s President Failed To Clean Up Football,” they wrote, adding: “When Infantino took the helm at Fifa, he promised to rescue (it) from the crisis in which it found itself. Yet thousands of internal memos suggest he is just the latest in a line of despots bending the global organization to their will.”

The article referenced Rinaldo Arnold, a close Infantino friend, both hailing from Switzerland’s Upper Valais region. Arnold was president of the Swiss sixth-tier football team for which Infantino “often came on as a substitute and often got substituted.” However, FL alleged that in his ‘other’ role as Valais public prosecutor, Arnold facilitated two of THE Lauber meetings and subsequently received a number of potentially Infantino-related invitations.

On 6th November, the Valais Attorney-General’s office announced that it had “decided to entrust a special prosecutor with the task of establishing precisely the facts” of Arnold’s relationship with Infantino “and determining whether or not they would be subject to criminal law,” given media reports that Lauber’s office was then “leading 25 separate investigations” of suspected Fifa-linked corruption.

Infantino donned his sarky boots in response, asking if it was “forbidden in Switzerland to have friends.” And in April 2019, the special prosecutor, Damian K. Graf, said Arnold wasn’t forbidden, having “ruled out any suspicions” of him “accepting bribes” or committing the intriguing crime of “passive corruption.” But Graf focused more on tax evasion, of which he also cleared Arnold, than meeting facilitation. And Swiss legal focus soon (suspiciously soon, perhaps) re-turned to THE meetings.

Media reports chronologically-linked Lauber/Infantino I and II with Infantino’s April 2016 appearance in the “Panama Papers” mass document leak. This leak revealed that he signed a Champions League TV deal with Cross Trading, a company owned by US Fifa indictees, Argentine father-and-son Hugo and Mariano Jinkis. Infantino was then Uefa general secretary. So Lauber’s office searched Infantino’s old Uefa office.

Nothing publicly emerged from this. But Arnold’s probe was barely closed when another probe opened. This was conducted by the memorably-acronymed AB-BA, the Swiss Attorney-General’s Office supervisory authority, after Swiss media reports of a THIRD Lauber/Infantino liaison, on 16th June 2017 at Swiss capital Bern’s Schweizerhof hotel. AB-BA president Hanspeter Uster said that “when we asked (Lauber) in November if there had been any further meetings. He replied ‘no’.” Ooops.

Cynicism abounded. “When is a meeting not a meeting? Simple. When no-one remembers it,” wrote mock-bemused veteran journalist Keir Radnedge, as Lauber, Infantino and two other purported attendees, Lauber’s spokesman Andre Marty and Arnold (again), denied all recollection of being attendees.

A furious Lauber called the probe “a full-frontal assault on my person” and “an infringement on the independence” of his office. While a Fifa spokesman said: “The fact that the Fifa president met the general prosecutor in open circumstances and in full transparency to discuss these matters is simply an illustration of Fifa’s willingness to cooperate and to assist the (OAG) with its work.”

But circumstances had not been “open.” Transparency had not been “full.” The AB-BA said that “the mere fact that two meetings took place” was “not problematic,” but they should have been formalised and documented. Then, in June, Switzerland’s Federal Criminal Court ruled that the third meeting “gave the appearance of bias and collusion” and that its undocumented nature violated Swiss federal law. Lauber was thus ordered to recuse himself from all Fifa corruption investigation.

Lauber appealed and was even reappointed Attorney-General last September. But in March 2020, the AB-BA concluded its probe, which in turn concluded that Lauber had committed “breaches of duty of loyalty on the basis of false information provided concerning two meetings on 8 July 2015 and 16 June 2017 as well as obstructing the (AB-BA’s) investigations and showing “disloyal conduct towards it.” Lauber’s salary was cut by 8% for a year, reduced last month to 5% on appeal to the Federal Administrative Court (FAC).

The veracity of the 2015 meeting, with Marty and Arnold (who sound like a music hall act), was not questioned, as Infantino’s Fifa presidential candidacy was “not yet on the cards.” But the FAC slammed Lauber’s statements on the 2017 meeting. And it noted that no-one at the meeting could remember it, adding, with what may be my favourite line of all-time for a long time: “Such a gap in memory among several participants is to be regarded as absurd according to general experience of life.”

Thus it concluded “that (Lauber) intentionally made a false statement to the (AB-BA) on 12 November 2018 and knowingly concealed the third meeting with…Infantino.” This confirmed the original ruling that Lauber “deliberately and knowingly did not tell the truth about” Lauber/Infantino III, a “serious breach of Lauber’s official duty and duty of loyalty” to his office. But why the meeting was “knowingly concealed” remained unaddressed.

On 26th April, Swiss newspaper Tribune de Geneve (TdG) offered a possible subject of Lauber/Infantino I, quoting an e-mail from Infantino to Arnold, “expressing concern” about the probe into the above-mentioned Cross Trading deal and asking Arnold to facilitate a meeting with Lauber so that he could “try to explain that it is in my interests that everything should be cleared up as soon as possible, that it be clearly stated that I have nothing to do with this matter.” TdG also called Lauber/Infantino II, which it dated 22nd April 2016, a “mystery.”

Fifa’s combative response wasn’t over-helpful. They were responding to Uefa business which, by definition, was none of their business. They parroted a familiar line on ‘Football Leaksleaks, calling the email “obviously obtained by hacking, which is an illegal and criminal act,” thereby confirming its veracity, the silly sods. The email quotes were “completely out of context with the sole objective of misleading the reader” and it “never said (Infantino) wanted to clear his name.”

However, TdG said they had documentary confirmation that Infantino met Lauber to “get rid of an investigation that threatened him personally.” From July-to-September 2016, Swiss prosecutors and Fifa lawyers shared “more than 20” phone calls to “apparently help Fifa” as a victim in corruption cases, which “seems incompatible with the OAG’s duty of impartiality.” And, BTW, the investigation was closed in November 2017 “after a third informal meeting” between Lauber and Infantino.

The World Cup tax fraud trial collapse brought calls for Lauber’s resignation. The Swiss parliament’s Judicial Committee also wanted a word, about the AB-BA ruling. Meanwhile, on 14th May, a criminal complaint was filed, anonymously, with prosecutors in Bern…against Infantino, in connection with the Lauber/Infantino meeting there. This accused Infantino of “trying to induce Lauber to commit a crime that would compromise criminal investigations.”

Again, Fifa responded, despite not being involved. “Meeting prosecutors is standard procedure not a crime. Making an complaint against someone for (that) is a farce. Those who fear being brought to justice can make as many anonymous complaints as they want. This will not deter Fifa and the Fifa President from cooperating with prosecutors. The sole aim of such meetings is to assist the authorities in their investigation of criminal wrong-doing which has adversely affected Fifa.” But if so, it re-begged the question, why were they “knowingly concealed.”

Some observers ‘knew.’ Former Fifa governance adviser, Professor Mark Pieth, was quoted by Private Eye magazine, noting that while “a lot of Fifa investigations might look impressive, they have yet to result in a single conviction.” The Eye added that football was “not Lauber’s only blind spot,” noting that “privately, several Lauber colleagues have bemoaned his lack of vigour in pursuing money-laundering cases involving the larger Swiss banks.”

It concluded that “were the Swiss now to encourage Lauber to walk, Fifa on its own turf may find itself dealing with an altogether tougher agency.” And on 21st May, the parliamentary Judicial Committee voted 13-4 to launch impeachment proceedings against Lauber after questioning him on his role in Fifa corruption cases. Meanwhile, more criminal complaints were filed against Lauber and Arnold, in connection to the Infantino dalliances, leading Swiss MPs to call for another special prosecutor to examine the increasing complaints pile.

This finally got Infantino speaking out in late June. He barely departed from what Fifa had said for him. Meeting “the chief prosecutor of Switzerland” was “perfectly legitimate and perfectly legal. It’s no violation of anything. On the contrary, it’s part of the fiduciary duties of the Fifa president.” And his prior silence was “because the whole thing is absurd.” But he was bothered by “the wording about secret meetings.” Which was…absurd. “There is nothing secret in meeting a prosecutor in a civilised country,” he noted. But these meetings were called secret because they were kept secret.”

Infantino’s intervention put no obvious brake on his by now inexorable slide towards criminal investigation. On 3rd July, (very) senior Swiss prosecutor Dr Stefan Keller was named by the AB-BA as the called-for special prosecutor, who they said had already begun examining what were now four criminal complaints against Infantino, Lauber and, reportedly, “other people.” And on 28th July, after his appeal against his sanction by the AB-BA largely failed, Lauber announced his resignation, to take effect on 31st August.

On 30th July, Keller applied to parliament for “authority to conduct criminal proceedings” against Lauber, whose attorney-generalship gave him immunity from prosecution…until 31st August. And Keller began “criminal proceedings against” Infantino and Arnold. A media release said that Keller’s “original task was to examine” the afore-mentioned “four requests for criminal proceedings,” since when there had been “further requests.” And after his “examination of two of them, he concluded that, “in connection with the meetings…there are indications of criminal conduct.”

Fifa again responded, despite there being no proceedings of any kind against them, although Infantino was quoted extensively. Apart from much rehashing of earlier responses, they and Infantino went big on “co-operation” with relevant authorities and the “judicial process.” Arnold chipped in separately, calling the proceedings “actually a logical step to clarify the facts” and, incorrectly, thinking it relevant that “a case against me was closed last year.” But about the issues of “abuse of public office, breach of official secrecy, assisting offenders and incitement to these acts”? Nothing.

On 3rd August, Fifa Deputy General Secretary Alastair Ball, an old Uefa colleague of Infantino, showed combative but coherent disdain for the situation. The themes were familiar, though. There was “no criminal conduct of any kind…unless meeting the attorney general has somehow become a crime in Switzerland, which I rather doubt.” Ho-ho. Bell then claimed: “We have no idea what (Infantino) has done wrong or what could remotely be described as criminal conduct. All we have are anonymous complaints. Maybe the people who made those complaints would like to see (Infantino) fall.”

And the explanation-of-sorts for Infantino’s conduct had familiar flaws. “The president was in China, he comes back to Zurich, meets (Lauber), and the following day he goes to Russia,” Bell contextualised. “He gets asked about the meeting two years later and says he doesn’t remember the details. Is not remembering the details of a meeting a crime?” Well…no. But Infantino is under investigation for non-disclosure of the meeting, not forgetting the agenda.

Bell continued: “You see the most senior law officer in the country to offer co-operation for the purposes of criminal investigation and you end up being the subject of a criminal investigation yourself. What sort of message does this send out?” Probably that if “you see the most senior law officer in the country” for such purposes, it should be disclosed and documented.

And Bell called it “almost preposterous to suggest that if someone doesn’t remember the details of a meeting, something criminal should have been discussed.” Which is why no-one has suggested it. The suggestion is that something criminal being discussed was an entirely plausible reason to “knowingly conceal” its very existence.

Last week, Infantino and Fifa General Secretary Fatma Samoura tried galvanising support among global national football associations, using the same arguments…Infantino again using Fifa resources to fight a personal battle, almost as if Fifa is his personal fiefdom. Thus it was barely news that Fifa’s Ethics Committee Investigatory Chamber chair Maria Claudia Rojas (appointed in May 2017 by *checks notes* G. Infantino) isn’t even feigning interest. She announced this week that she “has” (present tense) “initiated a preliminary investigation.” But within about 261 words, she’d finished it.

She had “duly scrutinised all the material” which directed Keller to “indications of criminal conduct” and “decided to close the case due to the evident lack of a prima facie case regarding any alleged breach of the Fifa Code of Ethics.” And she insisted that “no aspect of the conduct analysed constitutes a violation of Fifa regulations, some do not even fall within the provisions of the Fifa Code of Ethics, or justify…any kind of measure, including provisional suspension.”

Yet DGS Bell insisted, two weeks earlier, that “no criminal conduct of any kind has been communicated to Fifa.” So, Rojas was able to fully investigate and dismiss the case in under half the time it took Keller to establish that there was a case to START investigating. Unless “indications of criminal conduct” do NOT breach or violate Fifa’s ethics… Which…well…

Swiss justice deserve scrutiny. Swiss attorney-generals are political appointees, which sits uneasily with their supposed independence. And Lauber was, remember, re-appointed during all this, a bizarre decision which has aged badly. But Infantino is a lawyer. He should know the implications of important meetings between holders of high office being undocumented and left for Football Leaks, of all entities, to reveal, 17-to-32 months later. The idea that he has no case, or even questions, to answer is…well…almost preposterous.

Still, in the “general experience of life,” Fifa presidents can act preposterously, absurdly, farcically unethically, you name it, with impunity. Infantino may yet be no different.
by Chester Perry
Sun Aug 23, 2020 1:22 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Chester Perry wrote:
Wed May 06, 2020 11:35 am
Middle East airlines have shown themselves to be massive sponsors of sport in a bid to make themselves known in the global market - the prominent players being Qatar Airways, Etihad and Emirates

They have been as competitive in their sponsorship as they have been in the air - Remember the Man City shirt sponsorship change for the Emirates FA Cup final - "Choose Etihad"

https://www.joe.co.uk/sport/man-city-ac ... nal-232167

well it appears that the two of those sponsors are now working closely together to enable "synergies" while the third is struggling

https://twitter.com/Prof_Chadwick/statu ... 9528104961

- what does that mean for football sponsorship
Since this post the problems have mounted for the Gulf airlines - though Qatar Airways are making much of tonights Champions League final as they sponsor both teams https://twitter.com/qatarairways/status ... 7676645376.

What is astounding is that even with these huge losses Man City are apparently expecting to extend their huge £67m a deal with Etihad beyond next year when the current deal is supposed to end - remember much of the outrage created from Football Leaks centered on that deal and just how much the airline itself paid and how much was funnelled through that channel by the state/owner. This from the Mail

Manchester City to keep £67.5m-a-year deal with Abu Dhabi airline Etihad with club hopeful that sponsorship goes beyond next season
- Manchester City have been sponsored by Abu Dhabi airline Etihad since 2009
- The airline company has also led Manchester City's stadium rights since 2011
- The deal with Etihad will continue into the 2020-21 term and potentially beyond
By JACK GAUGHAN FOR THE DAILY MAIL

Manchester City's long association with Etihad is set to continue beyond the upcoming season.

Etihad started sponsoring the club’s kit in 2009 and, two years later, announced a 10-year partnership to include naming rights of the stadium and the surrounding campus.

Sportsmail understands that contract now goes past the initially announced 2020-21 campaign and City are hopeful the relationship is prolonged further.

Manchester City are set to extend their mega-money sponsorship deal with Etihad
Etihad started sponsoring the club in 2009 and gained stadium name rights two years later
The club’s arrangement with the Abu Dhabi airline formed part of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play probe — launched on the back of leaked documents published in German magazine, Der Spiegel.

Those alleged that, between 2012 and 2016, the majority of Etihad’s £67.5million-a-year sponsorship was funded by the club’s owner, Sheik Mansour.

City strongly denied any wrongdoing and won an appeal with the Court of Arbitration for Sport to overturn a two-year ban from European competition.

The club¿s deal with the Abu Dhabi airline formed part of UEFA¿s Financial Fair Play probe
The club’s deal with the Abu Dhabi airline formed part of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play probe

The CAS panel concluded they were not ‘comfortably satisfied’ that ‘arrangements discussed in the emails were in fact executed’.

A move away from Etihad, who recorded losses of almost £600m in the first six months of this year as a result of the pandemic, would have represented a significant shift.

It remains to be seen whether City eventually separate their kit and naming rights deals between two parties in the future.

Manchester City and club owner Sheik Mansour denied any wrongdoing amid the FFP claims
New commercial opportunities for Premier League clubs are complicated by the global financial impact of Covid-19, with industry sources suggesting shorter-term deals may be more prevalent.

As such, there is uncertainty surrounding the scale of new contracts across football. A huge uplift in revenues has occurred over recent years, with Manchester United having signed a long-term deal with Chevrolet to sponsor their kit, bringing in £59m annually.

In 2018, Arsenal landed a five-year extension to their Emirates deal worth £200m.
by Chester Perry
Thu Jul 30, 2020 8:20 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

It has been quite the day - Infantino facing Criminal Charges, Saudil pulling out of the Newcastle bid and Der Speigel releasing more Football Leaks emails that suggest Man City really were guilty of the UEFA charges that CAS has just released them from. The latter was actually the first big story to break but was in German and I had been looking for a translation, but not benn successful with a page translation - fortunately the Guardian have now picked up the story.

Der Spiegel claims new Manchester City emails cast doubt on Cas verdict
New ‘leaked’ emails relate to City’s sponsorship by Etihad
Club refuse to comment on emails but have denied wrongdoing

David Conn - Thu 30 Jul 2020 20.02 BST - Last modified on Thu 30 Jul 2020 20.03 BST

The German magazine Der Spiegel has published new “leaked” emails relating to Manchester City’s past sponsorships by Abu Dhabi state companies, which it claims cast doubt on the court of arbitration for sport judgment that overturned City’s ban by Uefa.

In one of the emails, a City director, Simon Pearce, who was also a senior executive in an Abu Dhabi government authority, set out that he was “forwarding” the airline £91m of £99m that Etihad owed to the club for its sponsorship, with Etihad providing only £8m.

City refused to comment on the substance of the new emails, maintaining as the club has since the first “leaks” in November 2018 that their emails were “criminally obtained”. Spiegel’s source, Rui Pinto, who is charged with computer hacking in his native Portugal, which he denies, has denied that he obtained the City emails by criminal means.

City have vehemently denied that the Etihad sponsorship was subsidised by the club’s owner, Sheikh Mansour of the Abu Dhabi ruling family, or any other Abu Dhabi entity, since Spiegel first published the emails, and throughout the subsequent investigation and ultimate guilty finding by Uefa’s Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) adjudicatory chamber (AC). Pearce and senior Etihad executives gave evidence at the Cas hearing, categorically denying the finding, largely based on the published emails, that the airline did not pay the sponsorships in full.

The emails considered by the CFCB and Cas included three from City’s then financial officers to Pearce, a City board member and senior adviser on the Executive Affairs Authority (EAA), a strategic Abu Dhabi government authority. The finance officers set out that in 2012-13, 2013-14 and 2015-16 Etihad paid only £8m of sponsorship deals City stated to be £35m, £65m and £67.5m respectively. The rest, they wrote, was being paid by Mansour’s company ownership vehicle, the Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG).

City had refused requests from the CFCB for Pearce and other senior people to give evidence, and Cas severely criticised the club and imposed a €10m fine for their failure to cooperate and obstruction of the investigation. Pearce did appear before Cas, as did James Hogan, the former Etihad chief executive, and other senior figures, and based largely on their evidence, the Cas panel overturned by a 2-1 majority the CFCB conclusion that Mansour “disguised” his own funding as Etihad sponsorship.

One of the new emails was sent by Pearce in December 2013, from his Executive Affairs Authority address to Peter Baumgartner, then Etihad’s chief commercial officer, with the subject “payments”. Pearce set out that under its sponsorship agreement, Etihad had owed City £31.5m for the 2012-13 season, and £67.5m for the £2013-14 season, a total of £99m.

“So we should be receiving a total of £99m – of which you will provide £8m,” he wrote to Baumgartner. ”I therefore should have forwarded £91m and instead have sent you only £88.5m. I effectively owe you £2.5m.”

Pearce offered Baumgartner two options to reconcile the missing £2.5m. The first was for Etihad to pay only £65m of the £67.5m sponsorship for 2013-14 and pay the £2.5m the following year. The second option, Pearce wrote, was: “You pay the £65m now and I will forward the £2.5m in a couple of months – at which point you can forward it on.”

Pearce apologised to Baumgartner for the missing £2.5m he had not sent, writing: “As I am sure you knew, embarrassingly it would seem that rather than overpaying you I have underpaid you!”

The figure of £88.5m Pearce apparently sent to Etihad for forwarding to City tallies with the same figure, £88.5m, set out to Pearce in one of the previously published emails. That was sent five days earlier by Jorge Chumillas, City’s then chief financial officer, who said the breakdown of Etihad’s sponsorship of City was £88.5m from ADUG, while Etihad were paying £8m.

Pearce’s evidence to Cas about the City’s finance officers writing in their emails that only £8m was coming from Etihad, was that the arrangements had caused “some confusion among individuals at the club” and “a misunderstanding that ADUG was making funds available to Etihad”.

City declined to provide a response to the contents of the new emails, as they did publicly in 2018, so they did not explain why or in what capacity Pearce was apparently sending £91m to the chief commercial officer of Etihad for its sponsorship of City.

The club said in a statement: “The questions and matters raised by Der Spiegel appear to be a cynical attempt to publicly re-litigate and undermine a case that has been fully adjudicated, after detailed proceedings and due process, by the court of arbitration for sport.

“Manchester City’s policy remains not to comment on out of context materials purported to have been criminally obtained from City Football Group and Manchester City personnel.”
by Chester Perry
Fri Jul 03, 2020 12:50 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

the trials and tribulations of buying a Football club when you act as an effusive investor rather than someone who has done real due diligence and understands the environment into which you are moving into - the murkiness of the transfer market and agents that give the industry a bad name - from the NY Times

Secret Contracts Held a Surprise for Fiorentina’s New Owners
Rocco B. Commisso completed his purchase of an Italian team in record time. It was only after the closing that he learned an agent controlled the fate of some of the club’s top players.

By Tariq Panja - July 3, 2020, 4:00 a.m. ET

When Rocco B. Commisso completed his purchase of the Italian soccer club A.C.F. Fiorentina last summer, he described the deal as the “quickest closing in soccer history.”

Flushed with excitement about owning a top-division team in the country of his birth, Commisso, the billionaire chairman of the cable provider Mediacom, spoke passionately about his aspirations to lift the club, based in Florence, up the league standings. There would be no shortage of effort to match the ambitions, he said at the time.

But like other American owners who have invested in Italian soccer, Commisso, 70, has quickly learned that the challenge of running a team in Italy is a far more difficult undertaking than simply buying one was.

Like other American owners, for instance, he has found his grand hopes for a new stadium become tangled in red tape and nostalgia. But there have been other, thornier challenges, too. After that speedy agreement to close the deal last June, Fiorentina’s owners discovered a curious set of agreements — contracts signed by the club’s former executives just before the team changed hands.

The agreements, according to documents reviewed by The New York Times, effectively gave a soccer agent, named in February as part of a money laundering investigation in Spain, permission to find buyers for at least five members of Fiorentina’s roster. In return, the agent would be paid a commission. If Fiorentina balked at completing any deal the agent brought to the club, he would receive a penalty fee instead.

In effect, Fiorentina had agreed to offload some of its top players for a price negotiated by an outsider, for an amount it had not defined, or pay the agent a fee if it did not.

“This agreement seems to guarantee a payment to the agency no matter whether a transfer actually takes place,” said Roy Vermeer, the legal director at FIFPro, the worldwide union for professional players. “It’s hard to understand the reason why any club would agree to this.”

The accords are with companies controlled by the agent, Abdilgafar Fali Ramadani, whom the Spanish authorities have accused of being part of a multimillion-dollar money laundering and tax evasion scheme. But they offer yet another glimpse of the murky realities that underpin the global player transfer system, an industry worth more than $7 billion a year.

Fiorentina executives declined to comment on the agreements, and Commisso was not available for comment, according to a spokeswoman.

“For sure there was a strange relationship between Fiorentina and Ramadani,” said Pippo Russo, a sociologist at the University of Florence who has written books on the role of soccer agents in the transfer system.

For much of the decade before Fiorentina’s American takeover, the club’s relationship with Ramadani was as close as one between a team and an individual agent could be. A frequent visitor to the club’s offices, Ramadani, a Macedonian businessman known for his access to some of the brightest prospects in the Balkans, sent a number of his clients to Fiorentina, including several that were still on the team’s books when it was sold to Commisso.

It was those players — a group that included promising Serbian youngsters like defender Nikola Milenkovic and striker Dusan Vlahovic — that the former Fiorentina executives sought Ramadani’s help to offload, even as the team was days away from being sold to new owners. The connections between the club and Ramadani ran so deep that the person who signed the so-called private agreement on behalf of his company, Primus Sports, was Pedro Pereira, a Portuguese talent-spotter who once worked as part of Fiorentina’s recruitment team.

Pereira declined to comment on his role in the contracts, saying they were subject to confidentiality clauses.

The agreements were all worded the same way, with the only differences being the amount of money or percentages that would go to Primus Sports. “A.C.F. Fiorentina is interested in monitoring the market in view of evaluating possible opportunities to transfer the player to another club within the territory of Europe and China,” the contracts said.

Such agreements are not uncommon in soccer; clubs regularly enlist agents as they seek to offload unwanted players or try to raise funds. What was curious about the Fiorentina agreements, according to sports lawyers consulted by The Times, was not only the timing — so close to the sale of the club — but also the absence of any wording stipulating a minimum fee Fiorentina would accept.

“Such offers shall be in line with the market value of the player,” each contract states without determining how that value will be determined.

The Fiorentina contracts are only the latest developments involving Ramadani that have caught the attention of soccer officials. According to the authorities in Europe, Ramadani and his associates “were part of a criminal network which manages football clubs in several countries, among which are Belgium, Cyprus and Serbia.”

Through connections, the authorities said, the group was able to exploit lax regulations to hide millions of dollars in commissions by moving athletes through what were described as so-called ghost clubs. By doing so, investigators said, the agents avoided paying taxes on the payments they received for brokering the deals.

According to the investigators, the soccer agents used intermediary clubs in second- and third-tier European leagues as way stations in player trades. One teenage player bought by a Cypriot team for just over $2 million, for example, was sold six days later for more than triple the price. Another player was on the same club’s books for only eight days.

Pantaleo Corvino, the former Fiorentina technical director who signed the contracts with Primus on the club’s behalf, said the team’s relationship with Ramadani had greatly benefited the club and its balance sheet. He claimed that some of the players Ramadani brought to the club — like Stevan Jovetic, Matija Nastasic and Adem Ljajic — were later sold for prices that were multiples more than what the team had paid for them.

“What has been agreed has always been done within the rules and in the interest of Fiorentina,” Corvino said in a series of text messages over WhatsApp.

Corvino added that the deal to sell the team to Commisso was completed in such secrecy, and so quickly, that he had not known Fiorentina was on the verge of being sold when the agreements were signed with Ramadani’s company.

Fiorentina’s former executive president, Mario Cognigni, said the club had always complied with local regulations. “Please note that throughout my tenure as president of A.C.F. Fiorentina every single transaction has been carried out in the sole interest of the company and duly recorded in the relevant company’s books,” Cognigni said in an email.

While Fiorentina officials declined to discuss the agreements, a spokesman for the team said only that the team’s previous managers had been replaced. “We would like to let you know that the current management of the club works in complete transparency and we have no exclusions to work with any agent who might have interesting players to offer to Fiorentina, as long as all the rules are respected,” the spokesman said by email.

The revelations about Fiorentina’s contracts and close relationship with Ramadani come amid a push by soccer’s governing body, FIFA, to curb the influence and power of agents. FIFA recently agreed to new rules capping agents’ commissions and to a prohibition on an agent’s representing all parties involved in a transfer.

A senior FIFA legal official with nearly two decades of experience in the soccer industry said he had never seen any agreements like them.

Vermeer, the FIFPro legal director, said the union has been outspoken in its opposition to the player transfer market generally. Even before recent issues came to light — a money laundering and bribery scheme involving a club official in Belgium, huge fees paid to agents revealed in the Football Leaks hacks — its senior leaders had been at the forefront of calls for the system to be overhauled.

“It is plain wrong that the careers of professional footballers can be influenced by financial incentives to third parties,” Vermeer added. “We strongly oppose any arrangement that raises this possibility, and introduces a conflict of interest into player transfers.”
by Chester Perry
Fri Jun 05, 2020 11:41 am
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

On Monday CAS will hear the Man City's appeal against UEFA's 2 year ban and £25m fine. The club's stance has not really change and they maintain their bullish outlook. The verdict is likely to take some time to arrive (which could cause it's own problems), but the implications of the UEFA ban being sustained in full or part are very significant for City. - From the Independent

Manchester City braced to face the biggest test of their Abu Dhabi era as FFP appeal case looms
City are appealing against the two-year ban from the Champions League for breaching FFP regulations, writes Tony Evans.
If the verdict is upheld, the club’s immediate future will be thrown into chaos

The clock is ticking for Manchester City. The reigning Premier League champions have an appointment with destiny on Monday. The direction of the club will be determined over three days of hearings in front of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne.

City are appealing against the two-year ban from the Champions League for breaching Uefa’s financial fair play (FFP) regulations. If the verdict of European football’s ruling body is upheld, City’s immediate future will be thrown into chaos.

The club – who vehemently deny any wrongdoing – would face the prospect of player departures and questions over Pep Guardiola’s continued presence at the Etihad. There would also be the prospect of an unseemly battle in the Swiss courts. Unless City are exonerated by CAS there are difficult days ahead.

The English club have taken a bullish approach to their showdown with Uefa. Money is no object to the Abu Dhabi-owned club – that is the root of the problem – and City have engaged numerous lawyers of the highest quality to fight the case against them. They have taken the same approach to the law as to managers and players: pay for the best to get the best chance of success.

The most high profile member of the legal team is David Pannick, QC, whose reputation was enhanced by two successful challenges to the government’s handling of the Brexit process. FFP is almost as divisive and intractable as the UK’s quest to leave the European Union. Next week’s case may end up as a mini allegory for Brexit with City out of Europe, suffering dire financial consequences and foreigners deserting the Etihad in droves.

Uefa have involved legal big guns, too. They will deploy what a seasoned observer called “their A-team.” It has not always been that way in the ruling body’s dealings with CAS. More effort has seemed to go into the original, internal proceedings and appeals have sometimes seemed like an afterthought. On Monday only the sharpest minds will be on deck.

There is confidence in the organisation’s Nyon headquarters that the hearings will go their way but no one is prepared to discuss the details. In November City went to CAS contending that Uefa had wrongly assigned the case to the adjudicatory chamber, the committee that hands down the punishments. CAS dismissed the petition on procedural grounds but were sympathetic to club’s assertion that leaks to the media undermined the integrity of the disciplinary procedure.

That view, CAS said, was “not without merit.” Uefa will not make the same mistake again.

There has been a cloud over City’s spending since a website called Football Leaks revealed a cache of hacked emails that contained damaging allegedly internal communications that appeared to indicate that the club had flouted FFP rules. Uefa have insisted from the start that their evidence is not connected with the illegally-obtained Football Leaks material.

It will take CAS some time to reach their decision but City’s fate should become clear in a matter of weeks. Although the court schedule does not allow enough time for proper, forensic cross-examination of witnesses – a factor that may suit the club – the case will be treated with proper seriousness.

If City are adjudged to have broken the rules, it is possible that the ban will come at a good time. The Covid-19 crisis means that European competition may not even happen next season. A likelier scenario is a stripped down Champions League without the prestige and fiscal rewards that come with success in a conventional season. In those circumstances a two-year period of exile would not be as damaging. Every effort is being made to get domestic football back to normal but continental play with cross-border travel may prove more problematic.

There are many imponderables for football in the next few months but one thing is for certain. City’s appeal is a landmark case for the sport. Uefa’s authority is at stake and the direction of FFP in the future may well be defined in Lausanne.

City’s most crucial test since the Abu Dhabi takeover in 2008 will come in a courtroom rather than on the pitch. Stakes do not come higher.
by Chester Perry
Mon Apr 27, 2020 9:26 am
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Another Portuguese Judge in the Rui Pinto "Football Leaks" case admits to a conflict of interest

https://twitter.com/tariqpanja/status/1 ... 5123151874

the original article translated by Google Translate
https://translate.google.co.uk/translat ... interesses
by Chester Perry
Wed Apr 22, 2020 10:20 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

@TariqPanja asks "Is Benfica the most powerful sporting institution in any country? A series of curious legal dramas suggest its tentacles spread far and wide" no surprise that it links to the Football Leaks story as this is where that started - from the New York Times

In Airing Benfica’s Secrets, a Hacker Angered Its Fans. His Trial Judge Is One of Them.
Judges, prosecutors and even Portugal’s prime minister count themselves as Benfica supporters. But what happens when they are allowed to preside over cases that affect the club’s interests?

By Tariq Panja - April 22, 2020 Updated 3:44 p.m. ET

The judge’s allegiance to Benfica, the biggest soccer club in Portugal, hardly made him an outlier.

Benfica often boasts that it can count more than half of Portugal’s population as supporters, and judges, prosecutors, top police officials and even the country’s prime minister are regular guests in the directors’ box at the team’s matches. One judge has been so loyal, in fact, that he was honored last year with a Golden Eagle lapel pin, symbolic of his half-century affiliation with the club.

So when it was revealed that a judge, not the one given the lapel pin but another one, had joined the legion of critics assailing a 31-year-old computer expert, Rui Pinto, who had embarrassed Benfica by publishing some of its darkest secrets online, few rushed to the hacker’s defense.

But to lawyers for Pinto, who is scheduled to stand trial this summer, the judge’s fandom was a serious problem: He had been assigned to oversee their client’s case.

“You don’t feel at ease,” Pinto’s Portuguese lawyer, Francisco Teixeira da Mota, said in a telephone interview. “Of course, we would like someone who is not committed to Benfica.”

Benfica’s reach, though, may make that difficult. The Lisbon team is the biggest of Portugal’s three most powerful clubs, a sporting and media colossus whose influence extends into nearly every aspect of daily life in the country. It is a team whose victories are celebrated, whose losses are mourned and whose fans hold positions of power in everything from media to banking to government. That power, Benfica’s critics say, affords the club and its leaders a type of leverage that extends far beyond the soccer field, and explains why some refer to it as the Octopus.

Ana Gomes, a career diplomat turned anticorruption campaigner, said in a recent interview that she believed Benfica’s outsize influence had given it a privileged status in Portuguese society, particularly when it came to legal matters. The phrase she used to describe that status — “state capture” — refers to the notion that private entities like corporations, or maybe even a popular sports team, can grow so powerful that they are able, if they choose, to unduly influence the state itself.

“State capture is done through the capture of people who are in an institutional position in the state, and of course one key pillar is the justice system,” said Gomes, who has been campaigning on Pinto’s behalf. “If you have judges who are captured, or don’t mind having the appearance of being captured, we have a problem.”

Benfica, which was asked for a comment on Monday, had not responded by the time of publication.
For now, it is Pinto, though, who may have the biggest problem of all. In crossing Benfica and exposing its secrets, he has made a formidable enemy.

Arrested last year in Hungary and extradited home to Portugal, Pinto now faces 25 years in prison for his hacking, which unearthed not only the secret documents of Benfica, but also others related to players, prominent agents and even the office of the country’s attorney general.


The disclosures were hailed in some corners for shining a light on the underbelly of the world’s most popular sport, but for now they are producing only anxiety for Pinto. That is because his fate now rests, potentially, in the hands of a judge, Paulo Registo, who may already have signaled he believes the defendant is guilty.

After being picked to preside over Pinto’s trial, Registo worked quickly to delete social media posts linking himself to Benfica, but not before they had been noticed by journalists and others. In one, the judge was reported to have liked a post that described Pinto as a “pirate.”

“The judge that will judge Rui Pinto doesn’t hide his love for Benfica,” read one headline from a news outlet that reprinted some of the messages.

That association offered more ammunition to critics who have long bemoaned what they considered to be a close relationship between Portugal’s most important institutions and Benfica. But it was not the first time he had overseen a case closely linked to his favorite team.

Before he was named to lead Pinto’s trial, Registo served on a three-judge panel overseeing a case involving Benfica’s former legal director, Paulo Gonçalves. The legal director was accused of trading perks like prime seats and club merchandise to two court officials who are accused of illegally gaining access to details of ongoing investigations into Benfica and then passing that confidential information to team officials.

Yet even though he was the head of the club’s legal department, and his actions benefited the club, the court allowed Gonçalves to obscure his links to Benfica by claiming he had acted in a private capacity. A court of appeals judge later complained that Benfica itself should have been charged.

But, then, Registo was not the only judge handling a case in which Benfica held an interest who was later revealed to be a devoted supporter of the club.

Last year, in March, the judge who received the prized Golden Eagle lapel pin, Eduardo Rodrigues Pires, only belatedly asked to be recused from a case in which Benfica’s great domestic rival, F.C. Porto, was seeking to overturn a ruling ordering it to pay two million euros, or about $2.2 million, for disseminating confidential Benfica documents on its television channel. (A supervising judge rejected his request to step aside, declaring that Pires’s passion for Benfica could not possibly influence his impartiality as a judge.)

Shortly after being selected to hear the case, Pires, who also owned stock in Benfica, was invited by the club to visit its training complex.

Porto is currently appealing the ruling, but the frequency of outcomes that appear to have benefited Benfica and the contents of some of Pinto’s leaks — which included a database with the names and addresses of some of Portugal’s most senior judges and notes on games they had been invited to attend — have renewed questions about how far the club’s influence extends.

“You need to understand Portuguese history to understand the importance of football in our culture, politics, even in our everyday lives,” said Mário Figueiredo, a former president of the Portuguese league. He said that several of the presidents of Portugal’s three biggest clubs had often found themselves in legal trouble, but that none had ever been prosecuted while in office.

“Being the president is a form of protection,” he said. More than a decade ago, for example, Porto’s longtime president, Jorge Nuno Pinto da Costa, was cleared of involvement in a corruption scandal after wiretap evidence that appeared to link him to a scheme to bribe referees was deemed inadmissible by a judge.

Whether Registo will continue to oversee the Pinto trial is less clear.

On Monday, after details of his links to Benfica were published by Portuguese news outlets, and after Pinto’s lawyers complained, Registo wrote to the court of appeals asking to be recused. No decision on his request has yet to be made.
by Chester Perry
Wed Apr 22, 2020 11:08 am
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Update on Rui Pinto, John of Football Leaks notoriety, his lawyers are seeking to end his house arrest so that he will technically be a free man when his trial commences

https://www.theguardian.com/football/20 ... on-be-free
by Chester Perry
Thu Apr 09, 2020 8:09 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Rui Pinto of Football Leaks fame has been moved from Prison to home where he will remain under house arrest

https://www.theguardian.com/football/20 ... d-internet
by Chester Perry
Thu Mar 05, 2020 12:25 am
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

@TariqPanja reflects on what has been a difficult few days for agents (he is the one who has kept pointing out the strange deals involving Mendes by the way) - Remember these Agents are currently fighting FIFA attempts to regulate them - from the New York Times

In Spain, Soccer Transfers and ‘Ghost Clubs’ Collide in a Tax-Fraud Case
The Spanish authorities charged a powerful soccer agent and accused him of hiding millions of dollars in commissions as he worked in the player-transfer market.

By Tariq Panja - March 4, 2020 - Updated 4:47 p.m. ET

The luxury homes on a Spanish island and the gleaming yachts moored in Mediterranean ports were all trappings of a life well-lived.

They were also, according to the Spanish authorities, the fruits of a multimillion-dollar money laundering and tax-evasion operation controlled by one of world soccer’s most powerful soccer agents, which last month resulted in criminal indictments against the agent, Abdilgafar Fali Ramadani, and several of his associates.

According to the authorities, Ramadani was at the center of the scheme in which a group of agents connected to him were able to exploit lax regulations and hide millions of dollars in commissions by moving athletes through several so-called “ghost” clubs in Belgium, Serbia and Cyprus. By doing so, the authorities said, the agents avoided paying taxes on the payments they received for brokering the deals.

Reached by telephone, Ramadani declined to comment on the charges. His Berlin-based agency, Lian Sports, has grown to represent some of soccer’s most sought-after players.

Like dozens of other investigations that have roiled European sports in recent years, leading to high-profile tax cases against players like Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo and financial examinations of clubs like Paris St.-Germain and Manchester City, the Ramadani case, named Operation Lanigan, stemmed from a leak of documents — the so-called Football Leaks files — that have shined a light on soccer’s business, and on a murky player-trading industry that is worth more than $7 billion annually.

When Football Leaks hacked documents related Ramadani and then leaked them to news media outlets or published them online, Spanish prosecutors got a window into the operation, and a road map to the agents who profited from it.

“They got information from Football Leaks and then decided to start the case with the special prosecutor’s office responsible for organized crime and anti-corruption,” Borja Pastor de la Morena, an official at Europol, an organization that coordinates Pan-European investigations, said in a telephone interview.

The investigation’s main findings, Morena said, were the agents’ use of intermediary clubs in second- and third-tier European leagues as waystations in player trades. One teenage player bought by a Cypriot team for just over $2 million, for example, was sold six days later for more than triple the price. Another was on the same club’s books for only eight days.

The indictments, and the details of the case, come at a delicate moment for the sport’s biggest agents. In recent months, the agents — often professional rivals — have joined forces in efforts to reject plans by soccer’s governing body, FIFA, to tame their industry by capping commissions and introducing stringent licensing regulations and compulsory examinations.

The investigation, according to Morena, also suggested close links between a handful of top agents.

Ramadani, for example, was not the only agent to profit from moving players through the Cypriot team Apollon Limassol. The team turned over documents related to player transfers to Cypriot authorities and to FIFA, according to a person familiar with the investigation. One of Ramadani’s most important clients, Real Madrid’s Serbian striker Luca Jovic, was among those whose transfer history includes a brief stopover with Apollon.

After the ghost transfers were made, the Spanish authorities said, the agents and their partners are accused of using a sophisticated network of companies to acquire assets while hiding their ownership. At least €10 million (about $11.1 million) found its way into Spain through the purchase of assets including real estate on the island of Mallorca and several yachts.

Events in Portugal this week suggested the Football Leaks evidence could yet yield further charges, and implicate other significant figures in soccer. In Portugal, the authorities on Wednesday raided the offices and homes of some of country’s biggest soccer teams, as well as some belonging to Gestifute, perhaps the most influential soccer agency in the world. Gestifute is run by Jorge Mendes, whose clients include the Juventus striker Cristiano Ronaldo and Tottenham Hotspur’s manager, José Mourinho.

A statement by the Portuguese attorney general’s office said nearly 300 tax inspectors and police personnel were involved in more than 70 raids linked to an operation nicknamed Offside. Portugal’s two biggest teams, Porto and Benfica, confirmed they were cooperating with authorities.

Following the raids, Portuguese authorities said they had identified 47 suspects, a group, they said, that includes soccer players, agents, lawyers as well as sporting directors, officials at soccer clubs responsible for trading activities.

Until now, the authorities in Portugal have been reluctant to act on evidence from Football Leaks, a trove of data that had been illicitly secured by a 31-year-old Portuguese citizen, Rui Pinto. Pinto had evaded justice for years, hiding in Budapest until his capture on a Portuguese arrest warrant last year led to his extradition.

Pinto has been kept in preventive custody in a Lisbon jail for more than a year. He is expected to stand trial this summer on more than 90 counts, the most serious of which is tied to accusations that he made an extortion attempt on a soccer agency.

In many cases, Morena said, “the players who are involved in the transfers did not need to set foot in the intermediary club.”
by Chester Perry
Wed Mar 04, 2020 4:32 pm
Forum: The Bee Hole End
Topic: Football's Magic Money Tree
Replies: 10346
Views: 1531718

Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

A strange one from Switzerland - the Swiss Attorney General as been sanctioned for misconduct in a FIFA investigation - anywhere else he would have been sacked - there an 8% salary cut for 1 year

Swiss prosecutor disciplined for misconduct in FIFA case

GRAHAM DUNBAR (AP Sports Writer)
The Associated Press Mar 4, 2020, 12:30 PM

LAUSANNE, Switzerland (AP) -- Swiss attorney general Michael Lauber was disciplined Wednesday for misconduct during an investigation of FIFA, including failing to tell the truth about an undisclosed meeting with the soccer body's president Gianni Infantino.

The ruling of a panel overseeing the federal prosecution office also found Lauber obstructed its disciplinary investigation and had not grasped how his conduct was problematic.

''On several occasions he did not speak the truth, acted in a disloyal manner, violated the code of conduct of the federal prosecutor's office and obstructed the (disciplinary) investigation,'' the ruling stated.

Lauber was fined 8% of his salary for one year, the oversight panel ordered. The amount of salary involved was not disclosed.

In fallout from scrutiny of his role in the five-year soccer corruption case, Lauber was recused from the sprawling FIFA investigation last year by Switzerland's federal criminal court.

Lauber was not formally involved in indictments last month issued against Qatari soccer and television executive Nasser al-Khelaifi, the president of French champion Paris Saint-Germain, and former FIFA secretary general Jerome Valcke.

Four soccer officials from Germany and Switzerland - including Valcke's predecessor at FIFA, Urs Linsi - were also indicted last August on charges linked to an irregular payment between FIFA and organizers of the 2006 World Cup. German soccer great Franz Beckenbauer is also implicated.
Still, Lauber was given a renewed four-year mandate last September by Swiss lawmakers while the disciplinary probe was ongoing.

Key to the disciplinary case was a June 2017 meeting Lauber had with Infantino at a hotel in the Swiss capital Bern at which the prosecutor took no notes.

Lauber had previously acknowledged two undeclared meetings he had in 2016 with the recently elected Infantino when they were reported in the Football Leaks series of confidential documents published in November 2018.

In 2018, Lauber called a news conference and said the first two Infantino meetings were justifiable exchanges with FIFA's new leader about long-running investigations affecting soccer's world body. They were brokered in part by a prosecutor who was Infantino's friend since childhood.
However, the third 2017 meeting remained secret for several more months.